



Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-88-213
Thursday
3 November 1988

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Worldwide Issues

Gerasimov on Phase-Out of Political Prisoners

LD0311145288 Moscow TASS in English
1445 GMT 3 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—"The Western mass media have reported extensively of late about so-called political prisoners in the Soviet Union," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a briefing here today.

The assertions emerged in the wake of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's remarks at a news conference in Moscow, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the ministry's Information Directorate.

"An hour after the news conference I was here to present the case, but since the question is still being raised assiduously, I'll have to return to it again."

There was nothing new in discussions with the West German chancellor on that issue in Moscow, said the ministry spokesman.

One could only repeat what had already been said by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at a news conference in Paris in October 12: A reform of the political system was under way and legislation, including criminal laws, were being modified in the USSR.

When the draft penal code was published and submitted for discussion before the end of 1988, there would be no grounds whatsoever to speak about "political prisoners," Gerasimov said.

Any other interpretation, he observed, would be incorrect. "The attempts to interpret our explanations as a 'concession' to Western pressure are groundless.

"By the way, this has been actually acknowledged by West German officials who said that the preconditions advanced by the United States at the Vienna meeting (including on the issue of political prisoners) had no direct relationship to the Soviet proposal for holding a humanitarian conference in Moscow."

In principle, the spokesman said, "we cannot agree to the assertions that people are prosecuted in our country for political or religious convictions, rather than for criminal offences.

In the West, still current are lists of people who are arbitrarily described as 'political prisoners.'"

Many people on those lists had already been freed and are no longer registered with correctional labour or health institutions, Gerasimov said.

"11 people are serving terms for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda or the dissemination of deliberately false fabrications discrediting our system, and for encroachments on the individual and rights of citizens under the guise of performing religious rites," Gerasimov stated.

"According to our statistics, there are also 25 mental patients who stood trial under these articles in the penal code but were not convicted because the court sent them after an examination envisaged by law for compulsory treatment."

Gerasimov emphasised that a firm trend towards humanizing all aspects of Soviet life had set in over the past two years. This trend covered the court system, punishment for criminal offences, conditions of imprisonment and so on.

Reiterates Stand on 'Jewish Problem'

LD0311150688 Moscow TASS In English 1454 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—"The Soviet Union has given explanations on more than one occasion on the so-called 'Jewish problem' in the USSR", Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing here today. "However, we have to return to it once again, because mass media organs and some statesmen in the West are again raising it. Specifically, they are bringing up the subject of the departure from the USSR of people of a Jewish nationality". Gerasimov pointed out that the subject had been also brought up by Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress, during his talks in Moscow.

The spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry recalled that at present 5,000 people were registered in this country who would like to leave the USSR and to take their permanent residence abroad. In the nine months of the current year 66,000 people were given permissions to leave. 15,700 of them were Jews. The figures show that the Jews were in the minority.

Speaking about the time needed for giving a permission to leave in connection with the reunification of families, Gerasimov pointed out that it had been reduced to one month and in emergency cases to three days, which is even less than the time envisaged by the final document of the Madrid meeting.

Gerasimov described as inaccurate a report of the Voice of America broadcasting station which asserted with reference to Bronfman's talks in Moscow that the Soviet authorities had agreed to permit representatives of Soviet Jews to take part in the work of the World Jewish Congress. He pointed out that the question mentioned by Voice of America had not been discussed at all during yesterday's conversation of Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, and Mr. Bronfman.

According to Gerasimov, the question was mentioned during a conversation between Mr. Bronfman and Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers. Kharchev said that it is only the first contacts that were established with the World Jewish Congress, and it was too early to speak about possible developments.

'Repercussions' Program on Soviet Journalism
LD0211172088 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1615 GMT 1 Nov 88

["Repercussions" program, presented by Farid Seyful-Mulyukov, with A.Ye. Bovin, S.N. Kondrashov, V.V. Ovchinnikov, and I.P. Belyayev, political observers; G.I. Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate; and Prof Ya.N. Zasurskiy, dean of the journalism faculty at Moscow State University]

[Excerpts] [Seyful-Mulyukov] Hello, esteemed television viewers. It has already become traditional for topical problems of international life to be discussed in our studio, where our live "Repercussions" program is about to start. Today's television feature is of an unusual nature: the very methodology of the work of international affairs journalists in the conditions of restructuring is being submitted for discussion by television viewers. I hope that my colleagues will agree that the conversation ahead of us certainly does not seek to account for what one has been done, and even less to subject it to severe criticism, but rather to attempt to find out, along with our television viewers and those who read our press, why international journalism has so far failed to match the level of domestic journalism; why glasnost in foreign policy matters and differences in appraisals of the complex processes taking place in our mutually interdependent and contradictory world are not everywhere and not always perceived as a normal phenomenon. [passage omitted: quote from Gorbachev's 19th party conference speech; general description of journalism; the law on the press is now being elaborated; restructuring has already improved our journalism: less propaganda clichés and more objective information; introduces participants; gives phone-in number]

Let me put the first questions to Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov. He, as it were, embodies the link between our diplomacy and international journalism, constantly maintaining the link between them. The essence of the questions raised by our television viewers (Metrokhin) from Tula, (Lebedenko) from Rovno, (Aziskhanova) from Samarkand boils down to the following: For decades our international journalism was almost a mirror reflection of Soviet foreign policy. The new political thinking, glasnost and democratization, has made it imperative to renounce simply copying official pronouncements. Independent judgement and argumentativeness in examining acute questions have appeared in the contributions of our international affairs journalists.

How is the restructuring of relations between our foreign policy departments and mass media proceeding? ask our television viewers. Over to you, Gennadiy Ivanovich, please go ahead.

[Gerasimov] The Foreign Ministry is opening its doors to journalists. We have a press center. There we hold press conferences and briefings, currently on a daily basis. And what is interesting is this: Foreign journalists come to attend; there are very many of them, there are 470 of them in Moscow now, accredited with the Information Directorate; Soviet journalists come, too. In most cases it turns out that Soviet journalists are present as observers; sometimes as interested observers, sometimes as indifferent observers. Why, then, is this the case? Maybe they know the answers to all questions? But, if what they publish is anything to go by, then you cannot, on the whole, arrive at this conclusion. Apparently they have some sort of timidity syndrome which they are overcoming with very great difficulties indeed.

[Bovin] The point does not revolve round this timidity syndrome—sometimes it is simply not recommended to ask poignant questions.

[Gerasimov] Incidentally, I recall that Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin has, in my view, never paid a visit to the Foreign Ministry Press Center and never asked a question.

[Bovin] But, incidentally, I have never been invited there.

[Gerasimov] Not quite so—we invite everyone. Of course, we do not send out personal invitations. [passage omitted: it is a pity some do not attend]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Well, we have an interesting question here. (Zoya Andreyevna Mikhaylova), Kuybyshev history lecturer, asks us why our press and television describe socialist countries, where stormy processes are currently underway, in what is still not infrequently a formal and often superficial manner? Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, I think that one can agree with this view in part, although our mass media have recently put out much objective, substantive material about events in Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, about the reforms being carried out in China and in other socialist countries. I know that for a number of years you used to deal with these problems. I will ask you to answer the question.

[Bovin] Yes, it is, of course, a very interesting question. The problem here is that everybody is very touchy. For many years, I would even say decades, we have been lavishing nothing but praise upon each other. Take, for instance, our press of the forties, fifties, sixties, or seventies. We have become used to the situation when they praised us while we praised all that was taking place over there. That is how the situation in socialist countries used to be presented. And it is very difficult to depart from this inertia, you see, because it is easy, say,

to write about events in Poland or Yugoslavia—relatively easy, because they themselves analyze their problems, and in a fairly profound manner, and we describe their problems using their own words, so to speak. But when it comes to countries where such analyses are unavailable—for example, I could write about what is happening in Romania, but my view of their events would, perhaps, be at variance with the Romanian comrades' view, and I think they would hardly accept this with equanimity. Perhaps they would become nervous and would make some sort of protest. And at this point the ministry's position comes in. I understand it too; why should we spoil our relations with a fraternal country? You may write a sharp article. Comrades over there will be hurt. What do we need that for?

Of course, there is another side to it: I may say that this is my personal opinion, and why should anyone identify it with the Foreign Ministry's view or with that of the state in general? And in theory, everybody agrees with this. Yet this very inertia continues to work against this sensible approach, for until now, whatever I myself, Stanislav, or Vsevolod may write has been perceived as the USSR's point of view, nevertheless. And it is very difficult to destroy that kind of perception of our articles. We are trying to alter the situation. We speak and write about this, however; this has been difficult so far and, therefore, we have to restrain ourselves and take all these factors into account.

On the whole, of course, there some changes in this area, too, and one may write quite meaningful things about a majority of countries because they themselves write in this way. But where this has not been the case so far, complex and delicate issues arise, and one has to take them into account. I would say, however, that the process is moving in the right direction. A profound approach to the problems of those countries is in evidence more and more often.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I would make just one comment in relation to your answer to this question. I believe that one cannot define a priori the position of the country about which you are writing until the article in question has been written and published...

[Bovin, interrupting] Well, we have had experience.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] But, you see, experience should not... I have heard that some publications about socialist countries, specifically about Yugoslavia and Poland, have evoked great interest and approval among our Yugoslav and Polish friends.

[Bovin] Yes, of course.

[Gerasimov] One must admit that difficulties remain because we ourselves have accustomed others to identifying journalists' words with the official point of view whereas they may differ, and, on the whole, this problem remains.

[Bovin] And the thing with Yugoslavia is that they write whatever they like about themselves. Just read Yugoslav newspapers. They give a very comprehensive analysis, and all this may be described; all this will be interesting and will not create any problems with them.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] One must say openly that in the last few years, especially in the last few months, a shift toward a more serious, deep, and competent presentation or processes which are currently underway in socialist countries has taken place.

[Bovin] Of course, this is true. Remember, when I came to work at IZVESTIYA, I tried to write precisely about socialist countries. And I remember that terrible (? case) with Poland. I had been in Poland. I wanted to write, say, about religion. I wrote a series of three articles, and one was about religion. I had to go there several times to have their Central Committee agree with it, and then I had to do the same with our Central Committee, then again with their Central Committee, and then again with our Central Committee. Finally the Poles (? withdrew their approval); they said: You have written everything correctly but it would be better not to publish it because you speak of religion too seriously in your article. And that was that. After I had run up against such procedures a few times, I simply stopped writing about socialist countries.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Well, that was in the past, whereas now—you remember that interesting interview [Cardinal] Glomp gave to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

[Bovin] Yes, of course, it is much easier now.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] There are many original materials.

[Bovin] But, unfortunately, that inertia is still in evidence.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Well, occasionally, only occasionally.

[Bovin] Occasionally, in separate instances, and only partly, naturally, I understand.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Here is a question from (Yevgeniy Semenovitch Pavlyuk) from Chernigov. Truth and glasnost have brought light to our recent history and today's life, and this has cut the ground out from under various foreign voices and from under those who used to capitalize politically on our misfortunes. Excessive secrecy and lack of glasnost, however, in certain issues of foreign and defense policy are still weighing heavily on the work of our press and television. When will we see changes in this area too? viewer Pavlyuk asks. This is a question for you, Stanislav Nikolayevich, please.

[Kondrashov] On the whole, viewer Paviyuk seem to be somewhat late with this question because changes are taking place in this area too. But I must say that these changes are insufficient. Information is journalists' bread and we do not have enough of it either.

As an example, I will tell you about what has happened to me, or, to be more precise, to my commentary on the visit by Carlucci, U.S. Secretary of defense, to the USSR. If you remember, apart from other sites, he visited our air-base in Kubinka, near Moscow, and while there, he was invited to look at a new strategic bomber, and he went into the cockpit. In the west this bomber is known as Blackjack, but our name has not yet been disclosed. So, when my commentary was to be published, I tried to give our name, and one of our senior military officials said: Of course, this should not be a problem because Carlucci was there and he was aware of what he saw. Nevertheless, thanks to another intervention, so to speak, I was unable to give the name of that bomber. And here a question arises: Either Carlucci did not realize where he was sitting, which is out of the question, or, following habit, it was decided that our readers and viewers must not know where Carlucci had been sitting. You see? This shows obviously how strong inertia is and how preposterous it sometimes is, though this word may sound harsh.

[Gerasimov] We have managed to agree on medium-range missiles, using U.S. names for those missiles, such as SS-20—this is its American name, and it turned out later that it was RSD-10.

[Kondrashov] Yes, we introduced our names for missiles only after that. Speaking about the area of secrets and how it is being reduced, of course, the treaty itself on medium- and shorter-range missiles shows, along with comprehensive inspections in compliance with the treaty, how far we have progressed in this sphere. But if we take another fundamental issue, the most fundamental issue of our aggregate military expenditures—to this day we do not know the sum total of these expenditures. We have undertaken to announce them. We have said that we will fulfill this pledge after we have carried out a price reform. Indeed, it is difficult to announce them now. Indeed it is difficult to count them now. That is how things are. Yet, on the other hand, how can we talk seriously about certain cardinal issues of restructuring if we do not know such a very important component as our aggregate military expenditures? And, on the other hand, how can we ensure a true democratic approach to the solution of military-political questions—including the constitutionally plenipotentiary approach, about which Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke at the party conference—if we do not know these facts and if they are not discussed in a democratic way? For a democratic way, apart from being democratic, is also cheaper and more advantageous. That is the point.

[Bovin] You are speaking about the military-political side of secrets, but there is also the side related purely to

the Foreign Ministry. Gennadiy Ivanovich justly says that the Foreign Ministry is opening doors for journalists. But what about foreign ministry archives? It is not opening them yet.

[Gerasimov] Yes, we are.

[Bovin] There are the following regulations in other countries: 30 years, say, or 40 years have passed and the corresponding items are brought from the archives for nearly everyone to see. It seems—as we are developing a state based on the rule of law—that perhaps we should also have such a prospect in mind and should also adopt such regulations, say, for using the Foreign Ministry's documents.

[Gerasimov] We are opening the archives. Moreover, we even publish some documents in the VESTNIK MID SSSR magazine.

[Bovin] This is very good.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] This is a very good undertaking, by the way, a very good one. Many documents relating, so to speak, to the first years of Soviet diplomacy have been published there.

[Bovin] Perhaps one should follow this line more vigorously. Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the complex of our accords with Germany—1939—and at this point a host of questions arise in which all are interested. But we do not have the original documentation at our disposal, and it is fairly difficult to write about that period. I am using this as an individual example, but there are a multitude of things where original documentation is required to enable one to analyze our history and learn some lessons. Opportunities have been opening up here, but on a very limited scale so far, in my view.

[Kondrashov] In other words, we have looked at an aspect of the problem of why international journalism is lagging behind internal journalism—there is lack of information, sometimes on very essential subjects. If we take another aspect of why we are lagging behind internal journalism, I think there is a psychological angle. We do not feel the same momentum and pressure of life around us as domestic affairs journalists do.

[Kondrashov] Here again, speaking somewhat crudely, it is much more difficult for a domestic affairs journalist to tell lies than for an international affairs journalist, because the readers or viewers do not know the reality of what he is writing about. With domestic matters, especially now in the period of glasnost, when this has been opened up and when very many things have been brought to the light of day, it is virtually impossible to do that any more. That is to say, domestic affairs journalists undergo a direct and very rapid scrutiny by the reader or viewer, while the work of the international affairs man cannot be assessed properly. Not always, of course. It can

be assessed, although of course the reader feels which person is conscientious in his work and which is not so conscientious. [passage omitted]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Let's look at the problem in a slightly different perspective. We have an interesting question here. Our viewer Mikhail Konstantinovich Radzevich from Kharkov asks us to discuss how international affairs journalists are trained in conditions of perestroika. This is a question for you, Yassen Nikolayevich.

[Zasurskiy] [Passage omitted] We receive 27 newspapers from the capitalist countries and many papers from the socialist countries. And the students learn to read English and German from the HERALD TRIBUNE, NEWSWEEK, SUEDEDEUTSCHER ZEITUNG, from real papers, the papers which are the most active in covering international matters. We have the possibility of showing them U.S. television programs. At present we are taking part in joint Soviet-U.S. research into television. We have some very interesting examples of U.S. journalism which are understandable to our students. [passage omitted]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] [Passage omitted] Igor Borisovich Fomenko, a doctor from Moscow, asks us, in particular: I would like to find out when our journalists will cease to portray Israel only in gloomy tones. [passage omitted] Igor Petrovich, over to you.

[Belyayev] [Passage omitted] If I ever were to reproduce in an article of mine all that the Israelis themselves write about Israel, then to many it would surely seem simply awful. Of course, I think that our press should now write in the greatest possible detail about Israel and the Arab countries alike, as well as about certain problems which are, incidentally, dictated by geopolitical considerations. After all, there was a time when we despised this category. But, after all, we are all part and parcel of specific regions. Take the Middle East, the Near East—they are our closest, direct neighbors. The Afghan problem, as far as we are all concerned, is a problem which can bring about a very serious headache literally in the very nearest future. And I, for one, understand the bewilderment of our readers who now ask, in letters and during meetings: Why, for instance, should we extend such gigantic aid to Afghanistan? Why was the USSR's population not asked about this? Why is it that it has not been explained why so gigantic a sum is going to be spent to extend economic and other aid? I think that here we do owe something to our readers. I certainly do not want to say that such aid should not be extended, but I reckon that it is necessary to explain why we are doing it. [passage omitted]

We speak very easily and, I would say, instantly, of friendship with Third World countries, even with those countries where there is a very long way to go before friendship is attained. Should we not renounce this approach and these terms? Maybe we should speak of partner countries, countries which follow the same path. [passage omitted] However, as far as we are concerned,

the Third World is, obligatorily, friendly. As far as we are concerned, the Third World represents countries in which there are very many similar terms of reference, but as soon as matters reach a stage of understanding, specific problems, divergences begin and we are subsequently astounded as to why this or that leader of this or that Third World country suddenly and abruptly turns away from our country toward the West, towards the United States or Western Europe. I think that in this respect we should also manifest a balanced approach and seek to give replies in the pages of our newspapers to all, literally all, questions from our readers—replies which, in any case, if not exhaustive, would at least satisfy them at the time.

I think, comrades, that we should not forget yet another, very important aspect of what is taking place. We should now address ourselves to other problems, such as, for instance, curtailing arms deliveries, especially to hot spots. Moreover, this should not just be done by the USSR alone, but also by the United States and the West European countries. Maybe we should discuss some joint actions with the United States against international terrorism. And at present, international terrorism applies, first and foremost, to the Near East, where, as it were, aircraft are hijacked, where the lives of air passengers are threatened, and where things happen which makes one's hair stand on end. That is to say—and to put it more briefly—it seems to me that the time has come for us to take a new approach, as it were, to the problems of the Third World and to the problems of hot spots and the problems which, in one way or another, are linked with our varied relations with this huge, truly complex world, which is acute in all its aspects.

[Bovin] Incidentally, I want to put this problem more on the knife's edge, as it were. Indeed, what is it that defines our information policy? Well, what, why do we, well, difficulties with Khomeyni. Ah, Khomeyni will take offence and problems will arise! And Libya? Ah, al-Qadhafi will take offence and problems will arise! Or go write about Iraq? Saddam Husayn will take offence and again there will be problems of one kind or another!

So, what you get is this: What we write is determined not by us, but by reaction, the anticipated reaction on the part, as it were, of the countries about which we will be writing. So, one way or another, we must find a way out of this, because it turns out that if, say, a country is regarded as friendly toward us, then the amount of information our readers get about the real problems which exist in that country is thus automatically curtailed. Well, how do we get out of this circle? Again, there is only one way out: to share the point of view of the commentator with the point of view of the Foreign Ministry. And, again, everyone understands this in theory, but in practice there is no way we can get ourselves out of this. I do understand, yes I do, Gennadiy Ivanovich, and, true enough, there have now been changes, because I know that certain ambassadors become nervous and fire off all manner of angry cables, complaining

about journalists, but, thank God, the Foreign Ministry's attitude toward this is now calmer. However, on the whole, the problem does remain, it does.

[Gerasimov] I do not know where you learned this thing about the cables, but, on the whole, this looking upon the Third World through rose-tinted spectacles is largely to be blamed on journalists, too, superficial journalists who wrote about how good it is that this or that country said it would follow the socialist path and who failed to check whether or not it did follow this path, that right away it would become a friend and all that. [passage omitted: Ovchinnikov says that a Delhi journalist had told him that the Soviet attitude to India is as though it were a sacred cow; Seyful-Mulyukov recalls his time as a journalist abroad]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Much depends on us, too. Over many years we have become accustomed to writing what we have been told to write, without, as it were, an independent approach to the appraisal of these complex processes. This goes for the Third World in particular, because here there is a need, above all, to be competent, to know what is what in these complex processes. [passage omitted]

[Belyayev] Well, finally, a specific question that has been put, concerning Israel and diplomatic relations with that state. [indistinct interjection] I understand and I want to tell our television viewers that on this score, too, the time has come to have one's say, being objective and decisive, because there are those who support it and those who oppose it; incidentally there are those who support it and those who oppose it in Israel itself, and in my view it is not a subject that should be banned. And we must make our position known on this subject, as indeed on all others, and we must, at long last, make a start on discussing this subject in such a way that at long last—I, Gennadiy Ivanovich, favor, for instance that the foreign Ministry personnel....

[Gerasimov—interrupting] Igor Petrovich, you do not come to the briefings, we discuss this subject there all the time.

[Belyayev] I understand. I am talking of something else. Over the past 3 and ½ months or so I did not come to the briefings due to illness. But the point is this: I, for one, would like the foreign Ministry personnel to tremble when they open their newspapers. [passage omitted: press should be regarded as an ally in making policy]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Here is an interesting question. A Moscow taxi driver, (Aleksey Yatskovskiy), asks whether glasnost can be half-hearted? Jamming radio stations, such as Voice of America and the BBC has been halted, but, at the same time, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are being jammed. Why? Gennadiy Ivanovich, please answer this question.

[Gerasimov] And the Deutsche Welle also remains on the blacklist and delegations from West Germany raised this issue when they were on visits here. Free Europe and Liberty are subversive stations. Those who betrayed us, traitors, mainly work there. And their main goal is not to give information to our country, but to feed it disinformation and that is why they deserve to be jammed. So there you have it. As for the question on glasnost—can it be half-hearted—well, glasnost is a process. Already today we criticized the shortcomings of glasnost when we spoke of military matters—that glasnost is still insufficient from our journalist viewpoint and, incidentally, from the point of view of the Foreign Ministry, because when we conduct disarmament talks, our diplomats, too, have to use the names given by others and, what is worse, other people's data—something that is very improper. So, glasnost is a process. On the other hand, maybe you cannot have absolute glasnost; some restrictions will remain all the same. Naturally, some state secrets will remain secret; apart from that you have things like pornography and all that—this, too, will remain. So, glasnost is a process and we are now moving toward glasnost, but, of course, a long road is still ahead of us.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, I think we have interesting questions about socialist countries.

[Bovin] Yes, indeed. Well, we have several questions about China, too. Nina Ivanovna Mikhaylova from Moscow and Artut [word indistinct] Urzhinis from Riga say that our television and press carry little material about our great neighbor. You have a situation in which it is as though journalists are passing over the subject of China in silence. Apart from V. Ovchinnikov's interesting materials, there is almost no information about China. [repetitive passage omitted] But, incidentally, I do not wholly agree with these comrades. The point is that we are getting more and more material about China. Incidentally, I would recommend to all that they read IZVESTIYA where, incidentally, we have a rather—a very good—correspondent in China, and where articles on China are printed rather often. I think that Stanislav Nikolayevich published large bits about China. Materials appear in other journals and dailies. The situation in this area is, of course, largely changing for the better very quickly, but, all in all, matters are fast improving here.

[Konrashov] The trend is to put things right?

[Bovin] Yes, to put this issue right. Well, I have another batch of questions concerning Albania. Well, they do not concern journalistic methodology here. This question is simply: Why is it that you write so little about Albania? [passage omitted]

Well, to begin with, this is what I can say. We do not have a single journalist in Albania. That is, we have no direct sources of information in Albania. This, though, is just a sort of formal excuse, for you can base what you write on other materials too, and we do know about the situation in Albania. But here apparently the situation is

this: All in all, changes toward, as it were, democratizing the internal regime have been few in Albania. It is difficult to speak of any sort of glasnost or democracy there. It was an authoritarian regime in the classic vein—Stalinist vein is how I would put it—a regime that has remained intact in Albania to this very day. Of course, I must say that some changes have taken place there and are taking place there.

Let us take what may appear to be symbolic detail. Every year the Albanians would mark the day of Stalin's death. On 5 March they would hold festive sessions and papers would publish appropriate materials, but this year, for the first time in many years, there has been absolutely nothing on this subject. That is to say that, all the same, something is changing there, but this change is apparently rather slow.

All in all, we are in favor of restoring good relations with Albania, and maybe that is why we do not want—or it is not recommended to us, let us put it that way—to write any critical materials about Albania. However, writing positive things is now also rather difficult because, by the way, they criticize us. They criticize us every day—well, the words "they criticize" are almost inappropriate here—they lash at us for restructuring, believing that we are sliding on to a revisionist path, a path of petty bourgeois socialism. What don't they say about us! So, against this backdrop, it is rather difficult to write any sort of positive things about Albania. But we are disinclined to publish negative materials so as to, as it were, keep the door open for possible mutual understanding. Well, in all probability this complex of reasons is, as it were, making itself felt here, and we are indeed silent, although not altogether so, it is true, for there have been several reports. In the journal *NOVOYE VREMYA*, as I recall, there was an interesting report on Albania but, of course, we write very little, apparently proceeding from the considerations of which I have been speaking here.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Thank you.

[Ovchinnikov] As the only professional sinologist among those present, I would like to say literally a few words. As for Albania, I fully agree with Aleksandr.

As for China, I foresee in the immediate future an avalanche, to put it figuratively, a steady increase of materials about China in our press. This is because it is precisely now that a sort of unique moment has arrived, when we really need each other. The renewal processes that are taking place in each country, different conditions notwithstanding, have a very great deal in common. And it is no coincidence that we have approached the point of reforming the political system almost simultaneously, even though reforms in China are 10 years old, whereas our restructuring is three times younger. [passage omitted]

The time has now really come in earnest when each other's experience—moreover not just the positive, but also the negative—when an exchange of this experience has become for us a question of vital necessity, so to speak, and not a matter of propaganda, nor of being courteous. [passage omitted] Already there is experience in, as they put it, political aspects. Of course, you in the USSR are proceeding much more boldly and radically and there is much that we can learn here. For our part, I think, we can learn from the Chinese as far as the economic aspects of the reforms are concerned. [passage omitted]

[Kondrashov] Several questions have apparently been dictated by the title of our broadcast. People ask: What is pluralism? [passage omitted] Well, if you translate the word pluralism into Russian, it sounds rather simple: a multitude, a variety....

[Zasurskiy, interrupting] Like our seven observers seated round this table.

[Kondrashov, to muffled laughter] Yes, yes, yes, yes. It means a multitude and a variety, replacing the unanimity and like-mindedness which for a long time have been part and parcel of our life and which have, in general, been extolled in every way. We have come to the conclusion that it would be no bad thing for us to have some variety, since like-mindedness in the final analysis entails stagnation. Uniformity is tantamount to oversimplifying life, something that cannot be set up as a goal, since we know to what this endless oversimplification of life may lead. It again leads to the self-same stagnation, to precrisis and even crisis circumstances. As is common in our country, we prefer our political terminology to be of foreign origin, which is why we have taken the word pluralism, instead of simple Russian words, and we have very many of them.

[Bovin] [passage omitted]

[Kondrashov] Pluralism, it is true, was a term of abuse in our country for a long time. It was applied mainly to capitalism. [passage omitted] Is political and ideological pluralism possible in our country in the foreseeable future? Incidentally, we are conducting experiments in this area right now. It has been set as a goal and, in general, it goes a long way toward explaining the content of our political reform. Also the sense of restructuring is to a considerable extent to be found therein. That is, we wish to create another, a more extensive model of socialism, inherent in which and entailed in which would naturally and organically be this multitude and variety of views, a struggle, so to put it, of views, arriving at the truth through debates and so forth.

If, in connection with these questions, you take the foreign policy aspect, we are right now explaining what pluralism in international journalism is. It seems to me that pluralism also entails, as it were, a natural interpretation, not hierarchical, not formal, but a natural, or, if

you wish, a civic interpretation of patriotism. A person has a right to express his view on this or that foreign policy action. This is because if we are all busy solely approving some or other actions, we thereby lend support to a patriotism that is not civic but that is a kind of hierarchical patriotism, because, well, let us just take the issue which, of course, is in everyone's memory and is a festering wound, the issue of Afghanistan.

If this question had been discussed at a time when we were introducing troops there, if some views had been expressed, no matter whether they would have been proven wrong or not—for this is a different kettle of fish altogether—in any case, this question would have been tackled in what is, as it were, a more democratic manner. As for me, I was, to be honest, moved to tears by a letter from a reader. I received it at IZVESTIYA. It was from Kovel. He asked what the reasons were: tell us precisely, name names; who, as it were, made this decision? Well, the way he wrote, you could not go on reading. This is how he signed the letter: I have this right, for I am the father of a soldier who died in Afghanistan. It is a sacred right and people have this right, this right to get answers, ones which, moreover, are exhaustive answers to this question.

[Seyful-Mulkukov] [passage omitted]

[Kondrashov] We have one more question here: Why is it that international affairs journalists fail to discuss economic deals being concluded with the West, deals which are possibly not to our country's advantage?

Well, that is not quite so. At times journalists do discuss these deals, and they are now beginning to discuss them more and more, but, of course, to an insufficient extent. This is explained by the force of inertia and passiveness on the part of our journalists, as Gennadiy Ivanovich said at the beginning. [passage omitted] So, much depends upon us and, of course, there are some things that depend on the people who have this sort of information and who prefer to keep it secret.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] There are two interesting questions addressed to Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, PRAVDA political observer. Why is it that the PRAVDA editorial board has starved its readers of international news? Why are international materials given such an uninteresting form? Why is there no source of information? And the second question: PRAVDA appears as a periodical in some Western countries. Are there any plans to issue in our country one of the most prominent Western papers in translation?

[Ovchinnikov] [Passage omitted] The thing is that official materials, the so-called protocol, naturally claim an enormous amount of newspaper space. Here there is really nothing you can do, because even though we are a party paper and we should really publish only party materials. However, it has somehow traditionally come about that the fact of publication or nonpublication of

this or that communique from this or that official visit, or full texts of speeches of presidents, prime ministers, or our leaders, represent some sort of huge burden for the paper. We have said many times that maybe when the foreign minister, for example, is on a long trip, IZVESTIYA could publish all these communiqués and official materials while we would contribute some sort of commentary on how it is going, published over a good amount of space—say three columns.

[Unidentified speaker, off screen] Vsevolod Vladimirovich, why give it all to IZVESTIYA?

[Ovchinnikov] But I believe that as far as the question of official materials, of the so-called protocol is concerned, inertia is still making itself felt here, and I place great hopes on the publication of the PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, because maybe then things will be somewhat different. [chuckles]. This is because we literally have weeks when the paper carries only the materials that you cannot fail to publish at present. [passage omitted]

The second question concerns the publication of PRAVDA abroad. All these publications have so far been commercial ventures, and the PRAVDA editorial board has nothing to do with them. It is not we who select materials to be included in these foreign language weekly editions, or those which appear, say, once every 3 days or once every 2 weeks.

I do not believe that it will be possible in the foreseeable future to have daily English, French, or other foreign-language PRAVDA editions. I do, however, believe that the experience of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE is valuable: It would be a paper published in Europe and the United States in the form of a digest—that is, materials taken from several Soviet papers—a paper which would make it possible to monitor our press on such a regular basis as the one by which we monitor Western press, thanks to ZA RUBEZHOM.

[Kondrashov] Farid Mustafyevich, I would all the same like to add something.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] To add? Please go ahead.

[Kondrashov] Yes, I'd like to add something concerning the following two points. In the first place, I mean, what Igor Petrovich was talking about—this insufficient amount of coverage given to Third World countries. Apart from all the reasons he and Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich mentioned, one of the reasons—a shortcoming of, how shall I put it, a technical nature—consists of the shortage, the perennial shortage of space in the paper. The reader is unaware of this problem, but as far as the staff is concerned it is one of the most acute ones. That is why I am in full agreement with what has been said on the subject of the overabundance, the damaging and overbearing influence exerted by officialese. Too much

newspaper space which could be given to other materials is claimed by *officialese*. This, to some extent, is unavoidable, but not to this extent, it seems to me.

But there is something else I would like to say. It seems to me that in one respect we do not have enough of this *officialese*. We have the press briefings say, given by Gennadiy Ivanovich.

[Gerasimov] Briefings which, as it turns out, not many of us attend!

[Kondrashov] They do not occupy much space in the papers, although at times they deserve more space. An Information Section [otdel informatsii] attached to the Council of Ministers has now been set up in our country, which is great, but we have not yet had and we still do not have a regular institution of news conferences by our leaders and the top leader, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the foreign minister.

It seems to me that one should not regard with disdain this form of communing with the public, if you pardon the tautology, but rather one should take it on board and introduce this form of intercourse. It will be useful for journalists and, in a wider sense, it will be useful for the public. This is because journalists are professionals who live the life of society and who know its essential, important, and real concerns, and because journalists can ask direct questions in this format, the format of a news conference, putting them to the country's most competent people.

[Gerasimov] [Passage omitted]

[Zasurskiy] I would like to add that when one of our journalists interviews, for example, a British foreign minister without having interviewed his own foreign minister, of course, it does not go so well for him as for a British journalist who, having the experience of contacts with his own journalist [as heard], finds it easy to interview the Soviet one. I saw how in the United States they were covering the visit by Reagan to the Soviet Union, and every television commentator spoke in the Hotel Rossiya with Shultz, who sat there on the window-sill.

A second point that I would like to note is in connection with the publication of PRAVDA in English and other languages. Here the matter concerns, as it proves, not so much the reader as databases. As they explained to me, all these translations are done in order to put PRAVDA's information into databases, and then those who have access to them can easily get the information. I was told by a specialist in public relations from Singapore that when he needs to know something about some problem, he orders it up over a computer communications channel, and right away has the viewpoint of THE NEW YORK TIMES and PRAVDA. Then, he says, I split the difference, and I can learn the truth. That is another matter, but it seems to me that our journalists' problem

in connection with international topics is that we have very large irregularities in supplies of up-to-date information. We don't have these databases. That is why our journalist has to go to the library and do a lot of search there while, for example, someone from THE WASHINGTON POST or THE NEW YORK TIMES has their own database, and they will present information on any Soviet politician for you on the printer, (?six or) seven pages in 1 minute, and you have the material with which to write an article. Not much effort is required. That makes work easier.

[Gerasimov] With today's technology you can connect to a database.

[Zasurskiy] You can.

[Gerasimov] You can, but you must pay.

[Zasurskiy] You have to pay, and you have to get one of these terminals. We are trying to get ahold of this, but it is not too simple.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Igor Petrovich, I think that you have a very interesting question there about the publication of some material.

[Belyayev] The question I have is as follows: When will data be published about our help to various states? Under what section of the budget does it come? And who sanctions it? As to the first part of the question, comrades, there indeed are no overall data on how our aid is rendered to the developing countries, the Third World countries.

But at the same time, just from my own experience, I can judge that various assertions which have nothing in common with reality are current among our readers and television viewers. For example, both viewers and readers assert that we built the High Dam in Egypt, that we built more than 100 industrial enterprises there. I would like to take the opportunity to say that in return for all this Egypt has not only paid us but has paid interest. Low interest, but nevertheless that stipulated by a corresponding agreement. I can say the same about a whole number of other countries. Among these countries we have very profitable, from an economic viewpoint, partners both in the sphere of economic ties and in the trade sector. You need not reckon that every developing country is some kind of burden on the shoulders of the Soviet people. Although I do share the sentiment of the viewer who asked me this question—that is, Vladimir Petrovich Pirogov, an engineer from Moscow—that we ought to publish these data regularly. How to do this in the very near future? Well, let us try to do it together, but so far such overall figures do not come my way, and in a number of cases these figures remain a secret under seven seals.

As for the second part of the question, who sanctions this aid, at what level, and under what section of the budget all this comes. Comrades, on this score there is a single category—that is, our economic ties with the developing countries, or with the Third World countries. Of course, any specific data in this case would be both an explanation of the real state of affairs and at the same time a refutation of those assertions which are still current among our readers and viewers. I believe, comrades, that far from all Third World countries are ones which live at our expense and a burden on our economy, and we should not believe that we are ruining ourselves by rendering such aid. In a number of cases we receive greatly needed goods, and through the development of economic ties, in a number of cases we gain preferential treatment which helps in one way or another to strengthen our relations with the countries which are not far from the Soviet border and which in one way or another act along the same lines as our own foreign policy measures, and who thus make it easier to attain our highest foreign policy aims. [passage omitted]

[Gerasimov] Quick now, a very rapid question. How many Soviet journalists are accredited abroad? I don't know the answer, it's a very interesting question. But if 470 journalists are accredited in our country, then approximately the same number of our journalists are accredited abroad, or maybe rather fewer. The problem is that there is not enough space in the newspapers.

The same thing goes for the second question. When will they put an end to the practice whereby questions from foreign journalists and answers to these are not translated for Soviet viewers and listeners? The same thing applies: there just is not enough space in the newspapers. These questions and answers are not taken because there is not enough television time. We print this in the USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY GAZETTE newspaper.

Finally, Moscow engineer Boris Sergeyevich Baulin says: Our Foreign Ministry has long been beyond the sphere of criticism and this is still the case.

No, that's not so. We have entered that sphere, we accept criticism, and we are ready to take all blows, but only justified criticism. We stressed this at the scientific and practical conference, we are demonstrating this, we are taking account of public opinion and studying public attitudes to the foreign Ministry. So, please go ahead and make your criticisms, but only if they are to the point.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Thank you. Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, you have a question there.

[Bovin] I've a rather spiteful thing here. Petr Nikolayevich Ivanov from Kiev says that 6 or more months ago, you said that you do not believe it possible for us to come to an agreement with Reagan. Well now, I did indeed say that, and indeed I did not believe that Reagan would change his position. It is true, I always stressed when I said it that it was one of those rare occasions when I

would very much like to be wrong. I was indeed wrong. So what of it? That sort of thing happens in a journalist's life, and I probably wouldn't be able to write anything at all if I were afraid of being wrong. So, please excuse me, but I will carry on being wrong. It does happen, but so what, there's nothing so terrible about that.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] A journalist should have the right to make a mistake. [passage omitted]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Here we have a series of questions about throwing light on Afghan topics. Be very brief, please.

[Ovchinnikov] Yes, well, these in fact concern the essence of the problem rather than the theme of today's conversation. Here Comrade Stoyarkin from Moscow, Orlov, also from Moscow, and Glubkov ask questions such as the following: Why is the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan still advancing badly? Will decisive measures be taken there to destroy the basmachs? Will the Afghan Government be able to hold out? We are concerned that as the Soviet troops withdraw, the opposition forces are occupying territory; how are we to hold out in the future, and so forth.

Well, comrades, I believe we try to write about all these questions. The situation in Afghanistan is indeed difficult. It is not as difficult and sombre as many people in the West predicted after the Geneva Accords were signed. The opposition forces have had their fingers burned in a number of directions. But I repeat: The national reconciliation process is indeed moving more slowly, is advancing more slowly than we would like. The situation continues to be difficult. We hope that within the context of the Geneva Accords it will be possible to reach a political settlement of the issue. But the appointment of the first deputy minister of foreign affairs to the post of ambassador in Afghanistan at the present is a sign, I believe, first of the fact that the situation there remains difficult, and second of the fact that we in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet leadership devote a great deal of attention to it.

[Belyayev] May I add something here?

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Very briefly.

[Belyayev] Extremely briefly. I am nevertheless in favor of us writing about all difficult issues. Why? So that when some sort of catastrophe breaks, if it does, then our public opinion might be prepared for it. Yet in our country at the moment I, for instance, can detect that in the speeches of Afghan president Najibullah, for example, he spoke ever so much more truthfully last time about the fact that there was an imminent threat to territorial integrity. Which means that Afghanistan could split into five enclaves—maybe six, maybe four, I

don't know—but in any event, this was a surprise to me [sentence as heard]. I would like to have heard that first and foremost from my journalist colleagues who are there.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] [passage omitted]

[Zasurskiy] The last question concerns what press laws exist abroad, in Britain and the United States, for example, and other capitalist countries. Such laws do exist. In Britain there is no written constitution, there are

only precedents, but there is a certain procedure whereby notification is sent to newspapers of what they should not write. For example, recently the Thatcher government decided to ban television from interviewing certain Northern Ireland politicians. In the United States there is the so-called First Amendment to the Constitution, which formally grants full freedom. But there is the libel law which is used to oppose the press, in a way. Similar laws exist in other countries, too. Thank you. [passage omitted]

United States & Canada

Shevardnadze Receives State Department's Solomon
*LD0311003188 Moscow TASS in English 2328 GMT
2 Nov 88*

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC and Soviet Foreign minister, received here Wednesday Richard Solomon, director of the Bureau for Foreign Policy Planning of the U.S. Department of State, who is in the Soviet Union for consultations with the USSR Foreign Ministry.

During their conversation they touched on the prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations as well as on some topical international problems.

Rogachev, Gaston Sigur Confer in Paris
*LD0311065788 Moscow TASS in English 0623 GMT
3 Nov 88*

[Text] Paris November 3 TASS—In accordance with the earlier reached understanding, regular consultations were held in Paris on Wednesday between Igor Rogachev, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Gaston Sigur, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East-Asian and Pacific affairs.

A wide range of problems of the Asia-Pacific region and ways to ensure peace and stability in the Far East and in South-East Asia were discussed.

The purpose of the Krasnoyarsk initiatives, specifically those concerning disarmament and curtailment of naval activity, was explained to the American side.

When considering regional conflict situations, the sides declared in favour of further efforts to stimulate the search for a political settlement of the Kampuchea situation and normalisation of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. side took much interest in the economic aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk. In this connection the sides expressed a number of concrete considerations regarding cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in developing the Soviet Far Eastern economic region, and their cooperation in such fields as ecology, telecommunications, oceanological research, and the utilisation of marine resources.

CIA Behind Moscow Embassy Bugging 'Clamor'
*PM0211201988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 88 Morning Edition p 5*

[Vikentiy Matveyev "Rejoinder": "Who Stands To Gain From This?"]

[Text] The Moscow correspondent of the London newspaper THE TIMES some time ago told readers an anecdote he had heard: A U.S. journalist staying in one

of our hotels found a screw in the floor of his room under the carpet while looking for bugging devices. He struggled to extract the screw, thinking he would find a hidden microphone. There was a noise in the room below as the chandelier crashed down, and the American had to pay for the damage he had caused. He no longer looks for "concealed microphones."

But now enough of anecdotes. Let us turn to the ballyhoo raised in Washington concerning the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow. It is being claimed that it "is bristling with listening devices," and that for this reason it must be pulled down and another, new building built on the site.

It is, of course, possible to claim anything. But where is what is described as "a multitude" of these devices? Where is the material evidence?

This is the first question which comes to mind. And there are others. How does this unseemly ballyhoo tie up with the CIA plans which have recently become known in Washington? Let me explain: W. Webster, the agency's chief, delivering a report on the topic "Intelligence: Key Problems of the Nineties" to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. He declared that "the Soviet Union will remain the main sphere of our activity in the gathering and analysis of intelligence data in the nineties." It emerged from what the CIA chief said about the large-scale operations of his agency that they will require further billions in appropriations under federal budget articles.

The U.S. special services would like to claim credit for their "supervigilance" in respect to the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow. After all, they were the original source of the ballyhoo over the "bugging devices." This view is confirmed in the latest issue of the U.S. NEWSWEEK magazine, which has just been published. Citing the opinion of clandestine service staffers, the magazine points out that Reagan reached the decision to pull down the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow under pressure from the CIA.

The \$300 million which, judging by reports in the U.S. press, will be needed to pull down the present U.S. Embassy building and build a new one are clearly regarded as not too high a price by the initiators of the ballyhoo, bearing in mind what is at stake.

The new bout of "spymania" in Washington is not fortuitous. The thaw in Soviet-U.S. relations, the practical implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the enforcement of the system of mutual verification and inspection of its execution—all this is causing serious concern to certain people across the Atlantic. And therefore, anything that is capable of poisoning the atmosphere is regarded as acceptable and desirable by these circles in the United States, for it is grist to the mill of distrust, alienation, and tension.

These are the thoughts that come to mind in connection with the clamor over the "bugging devices."

Daily Notes Bush Speech on Summit, Disarmament
PM0211162188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Nov 88 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Speech by George Bush"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Nov—During an election speech delivered Tuesday at Notre Dame University, Indiana, U.S. Vice President George Bush dwelt on questions of Soviet-U.S. relations and problems of nuclear disarmament.

We now find ourselves at a very important stage in the development of relations between the two great powers, the United States and the USSR, the Republican presidential candidate said. Many changes are under way and considerable progress has been made in our relations. We must be realists and be correctly informed. That is precisely why, if I am elected president, I will instruct my secretary of state to meet with his NATO colleagues as soon as possible, and why I will then instruct him to seek the earliest possible meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to discuss the whole range of problems with the Soviet Union.

I will ask the secretary of state, the Vice President continued, to inform the USSR that I am ready to meet with General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev at the earliest opportunity—which would serve the interests of universal peace. My objective in holding such a meeting will be not to try to achieve any significant breakthrough but rather to launch a serious and direct dialogue to examine the question of what our positions are and how we can best advance along the path of further arms reductions, an easing of tension in different regions, and reliable peace.

At the same time Bush advocated a "strong defense" for America and asserted that he will not allow any cut in appropriations for the Pentagon's needs and will not abandon planned military programs.

Commenting on the candidate's speech, AP notes that he "acted like someone convinced that he is going to be president." As for his rival, Democrat Michael Dukakis, the agency commented, he is "under siege." This balance of forces is also reflected by the results of the latest opinion poll conducted by CBS-TV. Some 53 percent of voters polled expressed support for Bush and 41 percent for Dukakis. But 22 percent of those polled declared that they might change who they support by the day of the presidential election.

Dukakis Campaign, Effort To Catch Bush Detailed
OW0211012488 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1130 GMT Nov 88

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Hello, comrades. I would like to dedicate this program to the events pertaining to elections soon to be held in several countries. First, about the U.S. election, which will take place in exactly 1 week and which, according to American tradition, is held on the first Tuesday of the month—in other words, on 8 November.

Let me remind you that on that day, not only will the president and the vice president be elected, but also all 435 Congressmen [as heard] and 33 out of the 100 senators, as well as 13 state governors and several hundred city mayors.

Certainly, the presidential elections attract the greatest attention. Judging from the latest NBC poll, from which we received this video report, the Republican candidate, Vice President Bush, continues to lead. [video shows Bush on the election trail]

However, recently, his lead over his Democratic opponent, Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts, has been reduced. It is generally felt that Dukakis, in the last few days, has gone over to the attack, and that he has stopped denying the liberal label which the Republicans have pinned on him. [video shows Dukakis on the campaign trail] In any case, Dukakis began to more actively speak about economic questions, concentrating his attention on the U.S. budget and trade deficit.

Truly, this deficit is enormous. In the past financial year, which in the United States traditionally ends on 30 September, the federal budget deficit, according to official figures recently released, exceeded \$155 billion, which is \$5 billion more than in 1987.

The U.S. state debt during the Reagan administration had reached \$1.3 trillion, more than the debts of all past U.S. presidents put together.

The following is a curious bit of news published in an issue of THE WASHINGTON POST: During the 8 years of Reagan's presidency, U.S. military spending amounted to \$ 1.83 trillion. This is the reason for the astronomical U.S. debt and the chronic budget deficits. It is hardly surprising that THE NEW YORK TIMES writes that the most pressing task of the upcoming presidency is to aspire to wrestle the United States out of its indebtedness. However, neither of the candidates has announced how they propose to achieve this.

Admittedly, for a time, Dukakis was more actively speaking out against some of the more expensive military programs, particularly against the preparations for Star Wars. However, when the Republicans bombarded

him with charges of being unpatriotic and undermining national security, Dukakis also started to speak out in the spirit of the position of strength.

As a result of this, the U.S. press began carrying an increasing number of reports which indicate that the voters cannot discern a fundamental difference between the positions of the two candidates. Even the WALL STREET JOURNAL admits that almost two-thirds of voters—or more accurately, 61 percent—are unhappy with the choice presented to them.

Wall Street itself, the personification of U.S. big business, has, in all probability, made its choice. THE WASHINGTON POST writes: The attitude of Wall Street to the candidates can be stated by rephrasing the old saying—better the devil you know than the devil you don't. Wall Street prefers Bush. Stockbrokers, investment analysts, and financial managers know the course he will follow should he be elected.

NEDELYA Interviews Ambassador Matlock
LD2110090588 Moscow TASS in English 0850 GMT
21 Oct 88

[Text] Moscow October 21 TASS—Differences between our countries should not impede better cooperation, the ambassador of the United States in Moscow has said.

Jack Matlock said in an interview with the weekly NEDELYA (its first ever by a foreign ambassador) that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were developing in a positive direction.

He admitted that some of the existing differences were quite serious, but what mattered most was that there was an open discussion of those differences and a search for a solution.

Dwelling on the changes, under way in the Soviet Union, the ambassador noted that the goals of perestroika in the Soviet Union could benefit people both in the USSR and abroad.

Greater glasnost, or openness, in Matlock's opinion, was playing an important role in improving the U.S.-Soviet relationship: If the two countries succeeded in making this relationship more open, they would create a basis for better trust.

The ambassador spoke in favour of broader Soviet-American contacts as conducive to better mutual understanding and destroying the wall of mistrust and suspicion.

The Soviet Union and the United States should be interested in developing a dialogue, and not only between diplomats and statesmen as far as possible, Matlock said.

He called the Soviet-U.S. intermediate nuclear forces treaty historic and noted that it had come as a result of an immense joint effort by the USSR and the U.S. to substantially reduce nuclear weapons.

The ambassador expressed the hope that the treaty was only the first step to be followed by an agreement on a 50-per-cent reduction of the two countries' offensive strategic weapons.

Policy Speech of U.S. Envoy to Austria Derided
PM0211151188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Oct 88 Second Edition p 5

[P. Bogomolov "Rejoinder": "Mr Grunwald's Battle of Grunwald"]

[Text] "Nowadays it is difficult to imagine any intelligent person taking Marxism seriously," U.S. Ambassador to Austria Henry Grunwald stated recently. Speaking in the city of Innsbruck, he hurled the entire force of his "armor" at the East like a medieval knight. In other words, he organized a downright battle of Grunwald against restructuring in the USSR, and at the same time also against the sound approach to the development of relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr Grunwald evidently felt cheerful. The fact that comparatively recently he was not an ambassador but rather the publisher of TIME magazine, which is well known for its punchy and aggressive style, probably was also a factor. However, while the U.S. diplomat was expressing his personal doubts about particular changes under way in our society, his speech was quite acceptable. The trouble was only that Grunwald very quickly, as it were, lost his head and made personal attacks on Soviet leaders, hacking himself a trail with a heavy Teutonic sword. Yet why in fact feel bothered, for the USSR, as the enraged ambassador stated pretentiously, should not be ranked as a great power!

This being so, Grunwald believes, there's no chance of the Soviets successfully advancing along the path of radical transformations. So is it surprising that the U.S. ambassador boldly strikes the pose of an oracle and states with enviable confidence: "What the Soviet leadership has announced is impossible to carry out." It's no good trying, he says.

...As is well known, the battle of Grunwald ended with a crushing defeat for those who did not take the Eastern side's capabilities seriously. Henry Grunwald's oratorical attack has not been crowned with success, either. His "arguments" are too unsubstantiated and, most importantly, not at all new.

Daily Presents Two Views of Cold War Origins

PM0111142988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Oct 88 Second Edition p 6

[Articles by J.L. Gaddis, director of Ohio State University Institute of Modern History, and O.A. Rzhesheskiy, chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History's military history problems sector, under the rubric "Two Views of a Single Problem" and general heading: "About the Past for the Sake of the Future"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The PRAVDA editorial office has received a letter from J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, requesting that it publish a commentary by Professor J.L. Gaddis, director of Ohio State University's Institute of Modern History, on the article by Candidate of Historical Sciences L. Bezymenskiy and Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Falin entitled "Who Unleashed the 'Cold War'..." (PRAVDA 29 August this year). Inasmuch as the commentary is not only of interest but also debatable, we also publish the thoughts put forward on this subject by Professor O.A. Rzhesheskiy, chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History's Military History Problems Sector.

J.L. Gaddis (United States)

The term "retrograde motion" is used in astronomy to signify movement in a direction opposite to that expected. PRAVDA readers were recently reminded that it is sometimes not only stars and planets which move in a "retrograde" manner. A similar tendency can be perceived in the interpretation of events of past years.

The article by Lev Bezymenskiy and Valentin Falin entitled "Who Unleashed the 'Cold War'...is Borne Out by Documents" (PRAVDA 29 August) is an example of "retrograde motion" in the field of history. Examining the question of who bears responsibility for the emergence of the "cold war," the authors of the article assert that "black remains black and white remains white" irrespective of the content of archive documents. The Soviet Union, they assert, did not unleash the "cold war" and could in no way have deliberately taken such a step. On the contrary, the war was the result of a conscious choice by "very many people" in the leading circles of Britain and the United States.

This viewpoint is "retrograde" primarily because it does not allow the possibility that in 1945 neither side wanted a "cold war." Too often in historical events there is an abyss between what is desired and what is reality. The path from intentions to results is a long one and abounds in treacherous traps and is sometimes concealed from view. On the other hand, we know of examples far closer to our time than the initial period of the "cold war" when attempts by states to consolidate their security have led to the emergence of new enemies and consequently to a reduction in security. It is entirely natural to suppose that at the end of World War II both the United

States and the Soviet Union were concerned primarily for their own security. The tragedy was that they sought to achieve their goal unilaterally instead of acting together.

The article by Bezymenskiy and Falin is also "retrograde" because it cites as proof only U.S. and British sources: Not a word is said about Soviet documents. That is a dishonest method. A lawyer does not need to be a genius to present his court opponents in a bad light if he has the opportunity to read their own confidential documents without granting them similar privileges.

The authors of the article use the fact that any Soviet historian, and indeed any Soviet citizen, can simply enter the National Archives in Washington or the Public Archives in London and ask to be shown or even have copied what were once top secret diplomatic or military documents of the first years of the "cold war" and this request will be satisfied in minutes. At the same time Western scholars are denied similar access to Soviet archives of the same period. Moreover, you form the impression that the majority of Soviet historians are also denied access to Soviet archives. Presenting only one side of the case in court is not real justice. Just as the practice of citing the opposing side's documents while keeping quiet about your own sources should be beneath the dignity of serious critics.

The third reason for the "retrograde" nature of the article by Bezymenskiy and Falin is connected with the fact that they have obviously not looked into the U.S. and British documents which they cite. The authors of the PRAVDA article quote abundantly from what at first sight appear to be genuine plans for military aggression against the Soviet Union, one of which goes back to 1943. However, they keep quiet about the fact that it is a case of plans for actions in different scenarios which are elaborated as a matter of course in any professional military organizations.

These plans are compiled in advance in the event of war and in no way mean that the governments who authorized their elaboration have decided to begin a war. Bezymenskiy and Falin see something highly sinister in this kind of activity, but surely they do not want this to create the impression that Soviet military men did not elaborate similar plans in the period we are talking about? If they did, it is hard to understand what relation the military planning which also took place in London and Washington had to the "cold war." If not, we can only conclude that the Soviet military command was professionally incompetent, although not a single Western scholar I know of would consider this conclusion worthy of attention.

One more "retrograde" aspect of the article by Bezymenskiy and Falin is that they rely only on military plans, disregarding other widely known documents which could cast doubt on their main thesis. Thus, it is

well known that the U.S. military were among the last people in Washington to be concerned over the Soviet Union's postwar intentions, but you cannot find that out from the documents cited.

In petitioning, during the war, for the right to create military bases in the postwar period, they proceeded exclusively from the possibility of a new war with Germany or Japan, by no means with the USSR. It is impossible to learn from the documents cited by the article's authors that President Truman, for a long time after the Potsdam conference, took an optimistic view of the prospects of concluding agreements with Stalin or that in September 1946, when his hopes for cooperation finally collapsed, he ordered that the report of Clark Clifford, his aide for naval affairs, with a highly critical assessment of how the Soviet Union was treating its commitments under wartime agreements, be made secret. It is impossible to learn from the documents cited by Bezymenskiy and Falin that in the period between 1945 and 1947 the U.S. Armed Forces personnel was reduced from 12 million to 1.6 million or that throughout the same period U.S. military appropriations were cut back from \$81.6 billion to \$13.1 billion, or that even at the end of 1949 the U.S. nuclear arsenal did not contain enough bombs to strike all projected targets in the event of the outbreak of war. Considering the limited number of atom bombs and bombers at its disposal, the U.S. Air Force concluded in that same year that it could not guarantee victory even if the Soviet Union had no similar weapon. All these general conclusions are based on U.S. and British documents accessible to Bezymenskiy and Falin, as they are to all historians, including Soviet historians, studying this period. We can only conjecture as to what guided the article's authors in keeping quiet about these facts.

It cannot be said that the article by Bezymenskiy and Falin is "retrograde" in all respects. The authors believe that we should not put all responsibility for the advent of the "cold war" on Stalin and Stalinism "allegedly for the sake of 'breaking' with the past." We will not argue. The West also committed errors during the war and in the postwar years: It is pointless to deny or justify them. Among the most important errors we should recall the fact that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill troubled to explain to the public of their countries the territorial and political concessions to the Soviet Union which they were prepared to make in East Europe and Northeast Asia. There is also Washington's exaggeration of the magnitude of the postwar Soviet threat stemming from its chronic overestimation of Soviet military potential, and its inability to predict the reaction of an alarmed Moscow to the Marshall plan, the creation of NATO, and the formation of an independent West German state. There is no doubt that in those years many people in the West, without looking into the nature of the international communist movement, ascribed to the Kremlin the actions of communist parties of countries like China, Greece, and Yugoslavia, which were moved primarily by nationalist motives. Nor is there any doubt

that after North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 there emerged in the West something like panic, which was followed by the buildup of military might on scales which in retrospect seem excessive.

But, in acknowledging that the West bears part of the responsibility for the result of the above mentioned errors, we should neither overlook the errors committed by the Soviet side, and that inevitably leads us again to the question of Stalin and the political system he created. Stalin did not suffer from excessive trustfulness, to put it mildly, and in the days when the "personality cult" was at its height this character trait of his could not fail to be reflected in Soviet diplomacy. The West had legitimate grounds for alarm when Stalin, after June 1941, insisted on retaining control over the territories he acquired as a result of the 1939 pact with Nazi Germany. The West had grounds for alarm when free elections in Poland promised by Stalin at the Yalta conference did not in fact take place. The West had grounds for alarm when in 1945 the communist parties throughout Europe suddenly rejected the line of cooperation with the West to which they had adhered during the war. And there is no doubt that the West had grounds for alarm when it surfaced that a ramified espionage network created and guided by the Soviet Union had operated throughout the war in Britain and the United States. At the same time there was not and is not any proof that Americans or British tried during those years to conduct similar espionage operations against the USSR.

History is rarely so simple that it can be presented in categories of "white" and "black." In examining a question as complex as the sources of the "cold war" it is illogical and stupid to try to fully whitewash one side and place all the blame on the other. Incidentally, U.S. and British historians have long been admitting their countries' partial responsibility for what happened after 1945. And some of them, especially the U.S. "new left," who have now almost totally discredited themselves, were on the verge of putting all responsibility on their country. But few of them would agree today with Bezymenskiy and Falin, who are evidently trying to persuade us that a return to primitive "retrograde" schemes is the key to understanding the events of the past.

In his speech to mark the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that in assessing the past it is exceptionally important not to lose a sense of historical responsibility and to proceed from the historical truth. And as USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze recently pointed out, the history of Soviet foreign policy is fully amenable to such an analysis. Moreover, he called for a particularly attentive study of the question of the degree to which deviations from Leninist principles in domestic policy adversely affected the Soviet Union's mutual relations with the rest of the world. In an article published in May in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev, from the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist

System, put the question very keenly: "Surely we cannot seriously believe that, while committing major errors in domestic development, we were able to avoid them throughout 70 years in the international arena? After all, it does not happen like that. It is natural for people to make mistakes. It is important to know your mistakes and to be able to learn from them."

That's it. That is why the West received with such surprise the fact that such an eminent rostrum was given to the "retrograde" views of Bezymenskiy and Falin who, as we can see, do not admit that the Soviet Union bore any responsibility for the "cold war." It remains to be hoped that their article reflects only one view in the debates beginning in the Soviet Union on the sources of the "cold war"—debates in which Western scholars will also be involved—and by no means a return to moss-grown dogmatism. Because the past can only be understood by studying it honestly and frankly, without closing our eyes to the true evidence of documents. Because only with this understanding can we embark together on overcoming the grave heritage of the past. [Gaddis article ends]

O.A. Rzheshhevskiy (USSR)

Let us remind readers that the article by L. Bezymenskiy and V. Falin describes the prehistory of the outbreak of the "cold war" on the basis of a strictly documented analysis of the policy of U.S. ruling and military circles. The U.S. historian, by admitting in his commentary "partial responsibility" for the "cold war," would like to create the impression that the United States was drawn into confrontation almost against its will. And in view of the absence of proof for this hypothesis he gives vent to his feelings. In this case they will not bring us a single step closer to the truth.

It is possible to agree with J. Gaddis that the problem of the sources and causes of the "cold war" is not only the question of U.S. policy but also the question of the USSR's policy, a viewpoint which, incidentally, is also shared by Soviet authors.

There are many fundamental sources to clarify the question. The theme of postwar relations between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition was the focus of attention of Soviet foreign policy and was worked on in conjunction with Britain and the United States at summit level—at the conferences of the heads of the allied powers in Tehran (1943), and Yalta and Potsdam (1945). Discussions at these forums, the process of the rapprochement of viewpoints and its potential and limits and the compromises reached serve to this day as an example of the elaboration of multilateral commitments according with the interests of all peoples and the world as a whole.

In the transitional period from war to peace which, it must be said, has been only poorly studied, very large changes took place in the distribution of forces in the

international arena and on the political map of the world. Not only in the countries of Europe and Asia but also far beyond them a new and fairer world began its journey. Imperialism's colonial system collapsed.

Extremist circles, and not only in the United States, which by that time was the mightiest capitalist power, openly demanded foreign policy expansion and a tough line with regard to revolutionary-democratic and national liberation forces on a world scale. This political course, which was called the "cold war," was "officially" proclaimed by W. Churchill in the presence of U.S. President H. Truman 5 March 1946 in Fulton (United States). Churchill called for the creation of an Anglo-American alliance to struggle against "world communism headed by Soviet Russia." In the economic sphere this meant a program to establish a tough blockade against the socialist world, in the ideological sphere it meant anticommunism, the dissemination of the myth of the "Soviet military threat," and the creation of an "image of the enemy" in the shape of the USSR; in the military field it meant the accelerated preparation of the United States and its allies for war against the USSR, counting on the United States' atomic monopoly and military-economic superiority. Politics, the economy, strategy, diplomacy, the training of the armed forces, and the activity of the intelligence services were subordinated to these goals.

As early as Spring 1945 the pendulum of the U.S. political mechanism swung sharply to the right. H. Truman's coming to power, which happened at the same time, was used to switch to a policy of open confrontation with the USSR. D. Fleming, one of the founders of the historiography of the "New Left," was profoundly right in concluding that Truman's actions "cancelled out the years of work by Roosevelt, when the foundations were laid for mutual understanding with the Soviet leaders."

On 20 April, at a meeting with V.M. Molotov, the U.S. president demanded, in an unacceptable form, that the United States alter its foreign policy in a spirit to suit the United States. Less than a month later Lend Lease deliveries to the USSR were ended without any explanations. In September the United States set the Soviet Union unacceptable terms for receiving the previously promised loan. As Professor J. Gaddis has written in one of his works, the USSR was required "in exchange for the U.S. loan to change its system of rule and renounce its sphere of influence in East Europe."

General M. Taylor, the U.S. Army chief of staff, subsequently described as follows the point of U.S. foreign policy of that period: "The terrifying destructive force of the atomic bombs had given rise to the view that our Air Force now had a decisive weapon which would henceforth enable the United States to establish political control over the world and impose on it a kind of 'Pax Americana' ('peace American-style'—O.R.)."

Counter to sober thinking in politics and strategy, the leading position was taken by the concept of all-permissiveness based on the monopoly on atomic weapons.

We can agree with J. Gaddis that more documents about the "cold war" have been published in the West and that access to Soviet archives is still not organized in the best manner. But his key theses do not withstand contact with the historical truth: the first thesis being that the U.S. plans for a war against the USSR bore the abstract nature of staff studies and the second that the United States launched preparation for war with a view to protecting national security.

The incorrectness of the first thesis is revealed by the political aims of war and the specific paths for attaining them contained in the plans elaborated in the Pentagon and the White House; while the incorrectness of the second is revealed by the absence in those years of any military threat to the United States and its allies and satellites.

Let's look at the first thesis on the basis of those selfsame American documents on which the Soviet authors worked and which are undoubtedly known to J. Gaddis. "The most serious threat to U.S. security," they indicated, "is presented by the very nature of the socialist system." The aim of war was "to destroy the roots of bolshevism" by defeating the USSR and its allies. The concluding stage of the war (after 65 million people had been "put out of commission" and the USSR had capitulated) envisaged the occupation of the territory of the USSR and its division into four "spheres of control" with centers in Moscow, Kiev, Omsk, and Khabarovsk. Other socialist states were turned into individual "regions of control." It was planned to station divisions of the occupiers in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Tallinn, Kaunas, Murmansk, Vladivostok, and 18 other cities of the USSR and also in Berlin, Gdansk, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Constanta, Belgrade, Zagreb, Tirana, and Seoul. The total number of U.S. occupation troops was to be about 1 million.

The creation on the territory of the USSR of "several civil governments" and the complete destruction of the Soviet state was to complete "the destruction of the roots of bolshevism." Subsequently it was planned to seize China and all Southeast Asia and to defeat "procommunist" forces in Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and "other regions"—that is, to suppress the national liberation movement throughout the world. If you consider that the "necklace" of U.S. bases which it was planned to use in the war against the USSR was situated on many continents and India, Pakistan, and the countries of the Near East were viewed as either "voluntary" or "coerced" U.S. allies, then it becomes clear that the whole world was being drawn into the orbit of the war.

It goes against nature even to allow that such plans "are elaborated as a matter of course in any military organization."

At any rate the USSR had no such goals and correspondingly no plans cut to fit these goals. Soviet policy was dictated primarily by domestic factors, by the need to restore the civilian economy and create conditions for eliminating the war-generated ravage and displacement of millions of Soviet people and gradually improving the people's welfare.

Not a single country in a single war had such large losses and destruction as the Soviet Union. The Hitlerites destroyed and plundered 1,710 cities and city-type settlements and burned down over 70,000 villages and hamlets. They destroyed fully or in part about 32,000 industrial enterprises, destroyed 65,000 km of railroad, plundered 98,000 kolkhozes and about 5,000 sovkhozes and machinery and tractor stations, and destroyed tens of thousands of hospitals, schools, technical colleges, vuzes, and libraries. Material losses totalled about R2,600 billion (in prewar prices).

In connection with the end of World War II and the elimination of the fascist military threat, the armed forces were reduced and reorganized. On 23 June 1945 the 12th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the first law on demobilization from the Army and Navy, which began 5 July 1945 and ended in 1948. In all, 33 draft age categories were released from the Army and Navy, which had numbered 11,365,000 men (according to the figures for May 1945). The numerical strength of the armed forces was reduced to 2,874,000 men. The State Committee for Defense was disbanded and the Supreme High Command Headquarters ceased its activity. The number of military districts was reduced from 33 to 21 in 1945-1946.

During the period of the Army's reduction there was also a redeployment of troops from foreign countries onto the territory of the Soviet Union. In September 1945 our troops were withdrawn from Northern Norway, in November from Czechoslovakia, in April 1946 from Bornholm island (Denmark), in May from Manchuria (China) and Northern Iran, and in December 1947 from Bulgaria. In late 1948 the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Korea was entirely completed.

At the same time the U.S. authorities refused to fulfill the request of the Korean Supreme People's Assembly for the withdrawal of their troops from South Korea, which was one of the main reasons for the 1950-1953 war.

There was a substantial reduction in the number of Soviet troops left in East Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Porkkala Peninsula and Port Arthur regions. Military expenditure was reduced from 43 percent of the budget in 1945 to 17.9 percent in 1948.

What Soviet military threat could be at issue? In its foreign policy the Soviet Union followed the agreements reached in Yalta and Potsdam, including in their part relating to the Western borders of the USSR. In fact even

J. Gaddis does not discern any violations of these agreements except for the elections in Poland which, as is well known, were held in 1947.

The Soviet military plans reflected the country's national interests and potential and the realities of that time. The plan for the country's defense for 1947 set the armed forces the following main tasks:

- ensuring the reliable deflection of aggression and the inviolability of borders in the West and East established by international treaties after World War II;

- being ready to repel an enemy air attack, including one using atomic weapons;

- the Navy should deflect potential aggression from the sea and ensure support for ground forces' actions for this purpose.

The Soviet foreign policy decisions of the period of the outbreak of the "cold war" were mainly of a responsive nature and were determined by the logic of struggle, not the logic of cooperation. In the heat of the duel there were probably excesses which ultimately cost us more dearly, dragging the country into the vortex of the arms race and slowing down society's socioeconomic development, which was in fact what Washington was seeking. No, the "casting back of communism" was not an innocuous staff game. "Casting back" was the basis of the United States' "national policy." The relevant Pentagon and National Security Council documents were approved by the U.S. President, including the "Dropshot" plan, the very plan which programmed the USSR's division and our country's transformation into several protectorates or reservations devoid of rights.

A study of the history and lessons of the "cold war" is necessary and important. Not to give marks to either side in a black and white manner. Still less to benefit from the invention of "retrograde schemes," from the rhetoric which inevitably puts into circulation topics from the field of spy mania. Incidentally, J. Gaddis might recall not only A. Dulles, W. Donovan, and S. Menzies but also the enlistment of Nazi specialists like Gehlen and so forth. Only documents and facts and their objective analysis and respect for opponents' opinions, not labels and offensive stereotypes, will help to overcome tendentiousness of views.

It is expedient, in our view, to prepare a joint Soviet-U.S. work on the history of the emergence of the "cold war," oriented toward seeking alternative solutions aimed at strengthening relations between the USSR and the United States and international security.

Reader Answered on End of 'Cold War'

PM2510101788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Observer Manki Ponomarev under the rubric "International Observer Answers Reader": "Cold Winds From the Past"; first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Excerpts] Extended service Petty Office 2d Class S. Bondarenko has put the following question to the editorial office:

"In articles on international topics readers from time to time come across mention of how a particular Western figure 'spoke in the spirit of the worst times of the 'cold war,' 'or how he 'tried in his speech to revive the cold war,' and so forth. In this connection you form the impression that the 'cold war' is a thing of the past. But is that the case? Do we have grounds for saying that it has already ended?"

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer Manki Ponomarev answers extended service Petty Officer 2d Class S. Bondarenko. [passage omitted]

Obviously, Comrade Bondarenko, there is no need to enumerate all the steps in the international arena undertaken by our country in recent years and all the beneficial changes which have taken place in the world since 1985. They are known to all. The four Soviet-U.S. summit meetings and the practical embarkation on nuclear disarmament speak for themselves. All this enabled M.S. Gorbachev, in his replies to questions from THE WASHINGTON POST and NEWSWEEK in May, to conclude that the winds of the "cold war" are being replaced by the winds of hopes.

But that conclusion does not mean that the changes taking place in the world have already become irreversible. The icy winds from the past are blowing from time to time. For instance, here is the opinion of G. Bush, U.S. Vice President and candidate for the post of White House incumbent: "We must remember that the 'cold war' has not ended" and that "we must be ready for a protracted conflict" with the USSR.

It is not only a matter of words—who knows what may be said in the heat of election battles? The point is that there exist the continuing buildup of militarist preparations in the United States and the United States' attempt to delay the preparation of an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and the refusals to examine the new Soviet initiatives—like those put forward in Krasnoyarsk, for instance.

From this, I think, we may conclude that it is still early to speak of having completely overcome the "cold war" policy. Yes, the shift from confrontation to cooperation in the world arena is obvious. But it has not yet been completed. Relapses into the "cold war" in one form or

another are still possible. The winds of hope will undoubtedly supplant the winds from the past. But they have not yet been definitively driven from the international atmosphere. That is why we are obliged to react keenly to all attempts to revive the "cold war" and to all relapses into it. Otherwise we will have to pay too dear a price.

Issue of Human Rights in U.S. Addressed

LD3111153388 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0615 GMT 31 Oct 88

[Text] Today, in "The Publicist Speaks" program, Melor Sturua, a well-known writer on international affairs, addresses one of the most important problems of the modern world, that of human rights:

To talk about human rights, or rather the disputes—heated disputes—over this problem, must—it seems to me—begin from the basic right: the individual's right to live. Why? I think the explanation is perfectly simple, yet at the same time very profound. A dead man needs no rights nor freedoms; he needs neither the right to travel, freedom of the press, nor freedom of conscience, and so on. The right to live is the most fundamental human right, and so, correspondingly, is the right of all mankind to survive. That is why we speak now of the priority, the primacy, of the universally human right over those things that are narrowly based upon class. This, incidentally, is also a new step in the development of our new political thinking.

Peace and freedom. We have just been talking about the right to live. This, of course, is more the sphere of international politics, the sphere that finds its very embodiment in the word peace. Let us now go on to consider freedoms. It is no good hiding or concealing the fact that in this sphere, distortions have been allowed to occur in our country: tragic and dramatic distortions, associated with crimes in the period of the cult of personality and in the period of stagnation. And, as I see it, we are largely to blame for the so-called Iron Curtain; we are largely to blame for the fact that human rights in our country have been interpreted in the West in a form that seemed to us in principle unacceptable. It is all the more gratifying that, in a brief period of history—just in the few years since the April plenum of 1985, when words like restructuring, glasnost, and democratization entered our vocabulary for the first time—we have taken such great strides forward.

It goes without saying that when we speak of human rights, we are not talking about human rights in any one particular country, but in our world in general, in our time.

I worked for many years as the IZVESTIYA correspondent in Britain and in the United States. I have, in my time, visited many countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa. And I make no bones about it: both I, and the majority of my colleagues writing about the West, were guilty of certain exaggerations. We were guilty of distortions in

our treatment of various aspects of the problem of human rights. I think our main failing was that we wrote about the countries where we worked without reference to our Soviet reality. For example, I wrote—and continue to write—that unemployment is a scourge which hits Americans hard; that is correct. But of course, one must not forget that an American who is unemployed receives certain benefits which are enough to live on and enable him to survive. By our standards, for instance, he can live, you might say, quite well. But, comrades, let us not leave it at that, because a man who is out of work—even if he is not starving to death—is still a man in decline. I met many unemployed Americans who said they would rather work for less money, but work; because a man without a job is a man whose personality is disintegrating and being destroyed. That is what we must talk about.

Finally, I want to say the main thing which needs to be stressed when talking about human rights is the biblical truth that man cannot live by bread alone. I have visited many reservations in the United States. I have seen Indians who, outwardly, looked very good. They were not hungry, not dying; they were not all skin and bones. No, they were and looked fairly normal. But they were living on a reservation; that is the point. They were living on a reservation: They were second-class citizens.

We write about racism in the United States. That must not be taken to mean that they lynch Blacks in the United States today; nothing of the sort. By the way, you must not imagine that the murder of a Black is a lynching. Lynching is something quite definite: mob law, in which white people take upon themselves the duties of the criminal law and themselves take reprisals against Blacks, colored people. There is no lynch law in America today. Blacks in the United States are no longer lynched; but does that mean that the Black population of the United States enjoys the same rights as the white population? According to the Constitution, they do; though it must be said that even the Declaration of Independence—one of the great documents to come out of the U.S. Revolution—stated that a Black man was only three-fifths of a white man. And, strange as it may seem, this three-fifths can be felt even on what you might call the material level. What I mean is that the Black man earns less than the white man, and so naturally cannot give his son or daughter as good an education as a white American of average means can. And this, in turn, means that a Black man, the son of a Black man, having received a below average education, gets a below average job and, again, does not give his children a chance to extricate themselves from this vicious circle.

You may say, and rightly so, that an American Black lives better than a representative of the Black population in an African country, or, say, in some backward Asian country untouched by the economic miracle. Yes, of course, that is so. But then again, human rights are not just a matter of filling a man's belly. The U.S. Black thinks not so much of bread, as of equality; this is what

forms the cornerstone of his activities. in New York. We picture it as a fashionable street, with the bright lights of advertising and the windows of the most expensive shops, and so on. But that is not so. We only talk about a very short section of that street. I have made a point of walking the length and breadth of it on foot, and it's several kilometers, or rather, several tens of kilometers, from one end to the other. One end of Fifth Avenue issues into Washington Square, which is a refuge of sorts for New York's hippies, drug addicts, and young people who have not found their place in life, the renegades and dregs—though I don't like that word—of society. Who has made them the dregs? Society itself, probably. So, this is where Fifth Avenue begins; then it goes on. We pass through districts of—if one can so express it—respectable poverty, poverty that doesn't hit you in the face. We go further up, round about the 40s; and we see the Fifth Avenue where the human personality is in reality subjected to the greatest insult. This is the red light district, where young people, both girls and men, sell their bodies. It is the district where there is a concentration of pornography, a concentration of cinemas which make propaganda for pornography, a concentration of bookshops of similar character, and a concentration of what are in fact brothels under the guise of massage parlors, bathhouses, and so on.

Going further along Fifth Avenue, we come to the district that all the world knows about: the district of banks, large insurance companies and airlines, and expensive shops with items on display which cost perhaps the lifetime wages of a well-paid U.S. worker. Further on, we pass Central Park; this is the green oasis in the heart of New York, or rather, Manhattan, the main island on which this remarkable city stands. In the United States, they don't ask how much you earn, but where you live. If you live in a green district, then you have a lot of greenbacks, slang for the U.S. dollar. So, there you are. The wealthiest inhabitants of this city live in the Central Park area. The Rockefeller live here and the Kennedys; Nixon, former president of the United States, lives here, or rather did until recently, and so do other representatives of the American financial and political elite.

Well, we pass by this part of Fifth Avenue, and suddenly Fifth Avenue begins to darken quietly, more and more. We are plunging into Harlem, the Black ghetto of New York. There, too, it is the same street, still Fifth Avenue, but there are neither luxury shops nor green belts. Instead, we see buildings that have the outward appearance we associate with Dresden after the notorious bombings by the Allied air force during WWII. There you have the social division of that street, which shows human rights, too, move along it at different speeds.

What of social protection? What is it? It is, above all perhaps health services and education. And here we have a lot to learn from the United States and other advanced Western countries, because their health services are on a very high level. Their education seeks new, modern

methods of teaching children and young people. But we are talking now, not of the scientific achievements of U.S. health services, not of the experiments of the outstanding educationalists in the United States, but of the social structure of both health services and education. And here the point is that human rights are provided not socially, but only materially. If you have money, you have good medical services. If you have money, you have a good education. If you have no money, what you get is something very like a substitute.

Take, finally, what you might think would be a perfectly natural human right, equal rights for the sexes. It must be said that even here—though on the face of it we have enormous achievements to our credit—we sometimes go too far. I personally am against men and women being equal if it means that women do heavy physical work which is only accessible to us, the stronger sex. I am against male-female equality in which a woman has to forget her obligations as wife, mother, sister, or daughter, but—above all—when potentially a woman possesses all these rights. In the United States—and this may come as a surprise to many people—women still do not, even under the constitution, have equal rights with men. That is why the women's movement is so strong at present. We are approaching the end of the 20th century, and yet a woman in the United States is still considered a second-class citizen.

I do not want to oversimplify the problem. This does not mean that the U.S. woman is a slave, no. It may even be that her position is better than that of a Soviet woman. She has better washing machines at her disposal, better dryers, say, and she can obtain cosmetics more easily, and so on. But when it comes to equal pay for equal work and when it comes to being able to leave her child at a kindergarten or day care center, enormous difficulties arise. Especially, again, for a woman who, in addition, happens to be Black. Because the worst fate of all is to be a Black, Mexican, or Indian woman, since she is under a double yoke: racial and sexual. So, as we see, these problems are not at all straightforward. It would be wrong to approach them solely from the point of view of material needs, although a man can only be well-fed in the highest sense if he does not have to think about his daily bread.

Let us move on to problems that are perhaps more complex. I once toured a number of U.S. prisons, and, what is more, they were in the south of the United States. And what struck me immediately was that almost 80 or 85 percent of the prisoners were Black. Why, when Blacks make up only 12 percent of the United States? Why is it that the prison population in the United States turns the numerical proportion upside-down? The reason is that Blacks are not just, well, endowed from the start with criminal tendencies of some sort, but are pushed into crime by the lives they must lead. Human rights cannot be implemented unless we solve racial problems, ethnic problems, problems of social justice—in other words—the whole complex that we call human rights.

Imprisoned U.S. Indian Bellecourt Interviewed
*LD0211215688 Moscow TASS in English 2208 GMT
2 Nov 88*

[Text] New York November 2 TASS—TASS correspondent Andrey Sitov reports:

Vernon Bellecourt, member of American Indian Movement Central Council, prominent human rights fighter in the USA, was thrown behind bars. He is one of the associates of leader of the American Indian Movement Leonard Peltier sentenced for life. The attention of the international public is drawn to Peltier's fate.

The TASS correspondent received a report from the central office of the Organization of Solidarity with Victims of Political Judiciary Repression in the USA that Bellecourt who had been subjected more than once to repressive actions for organizing protests against Washington's policy is kept in the Manhattan prison. The authorities hastened to transfer him to New York from the prison in Alexandria, Virginia, after a number of convicts had joined him in fasting. In the Manhattan prison the Indian leader was immediately, as a warning, placed in a solitary cell.

The Indian activist refused to testify on the "case" of a group of Libyan students and this was used as a pretext for another instance of his victimization by judiciary. Washington had decided to expell a group of young Libyans from the USA charging them with "financial crimes", specifically with meeting part of the expenditures of Indian activists for trips to Tripoli on April 15, 1987, the first anniversary of a piratic raid of U.S. planes on residential quarters of the Libyan capital. Besides that, he took part in an international conference held in Tripoli early this year.

Why is it that Bellecourt whose only "crime" was the manifestation of solidarity with the Libyan people, subjected to the U.S. aggression, is kept in a jail? Bellecourt's defence counsel Ronald Cuby said the authorities intend to break the will of the Indian activist. The lawyer said this approach to political prisoners is typical of the USA. He said that a great number of political trials is now held in the United States. Hundreds of people were imprisoned in the past ten years for refusal to testify against those whose political views they share. In some cases imprisonment lasted over many years.

Bellecourt intends to insist on his convictions. The TASS correspondent managed to get in touch with him by telephone. Bellecourt said that from an American jail he would like to address the Soviet leadership to urge it to pose to the Washington administration the question of political prisoners in the USA who are kept in inhuman conditions. He said this refers first of all to Leonard Peltier, but his fate is not an exception. A large number of political prisoners—Blacks and Whites, Latin Americans and Indians—are kept in jails in the USA.

China

Urumqi Railway Accord Signed in Alma-Ata
*OW2910084088 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 14 Oct 88*

[Text] An agreement to begin the construction of a railway from Urumqi to a Soviet border town has been signed in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan. It is well known that planning for this railway began in the 1950's. However, its construction later was interrupted. The agreement has opened a new vista for Soviet-Chinese cooperation.

When the railway is opened to traffic in 1992, it will help to promote international communication. The agreement will shorten the distance from Southeast Asia to European regions.

Correspondent Reports from PRC Space Complex
*LD0211175588 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 2 Nov 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Twenty-four Chinese satellites have been working in space since 1970. Our correspondent visited the cosmodrome in Sichuan Province:

[Kulikov, identified by screen caption] The rice fields of the peasants run right up to the cosmodrome. [video shows shot from a car driving along a wide valley in a hilly area, a peasant working in a field] During the launch the families living in the region are evacuated for safety reasons. However, launches do not take place here very frequently. The potential (?in the country) for producing carrier rockets is limited because of a funding shortage. [video shows a launch facility on a hillside at the end of the valley].

The PRC decided to grant satellite launching facilities to foreign firms. The high reliability which is guaranteed by the PRC side and the inexpensiveness of these launches compared to the international market price attracted a number of countries to this idea. [video shows two uniformed Chinese talking to a group of what appear to be newsmen; then, a road running parallel to a perimeter wall and a building]

Space science is developing rapidly in the PRC, and the interest in joint space research, and particularly in cooperation with our country in this sphere, is very great. [video shows a what looks like a news conference in progress]

The USSR'S successes in space research are well known throughout the whole world.

[Video shows Dun Lunye, deputy director of the space complex, and identified by caption, addressing the gathering] Until recently we did not have contact with your

country in this sphere. But the opportunities for such cooperation are opening up now. We want space to be peaceful and space science to serve mankind. Cooperation with the USSR in the peaceful study of space and the development of new space apparatuses will certainly serve this noble objective.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentary on Upcoming Hun Sen-Sihanouk Meeting
BK2610134588 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia
1100 GMT 26 Oct 88

[Commentary by Station Observer Fedorov: "The Dialogue on Cambodia Will Continue"]

[Text] The leader of one of the three Cambodian opposition groups, Son Sann, decided that he would participate in the new meeting between Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. This meeting is scheduled to take place on 5 and 6 November at the Grillon Hotel in Paris. In this connection, our observer, Comrade Fedorov, has this to say:

The coming meeting between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Sihanouk, according to its serial number, will be the third of its kind. The first two meetings were held at the end of 1987 and earlier this year. The interlocutors admitted that the outcomes of these meetings were very promising. For this reason, they agreed with each other to continue the dialogue. The decision to hold another meeting in Paris was made during the first meeting held in Indonesia in the middle of this year by all four parties involved in the Cambodian conflict. As is known to all, what is becoming a basis for the resumption of the dialogue is the consensus on the interrelations between the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the guarantee that the Pol Pot clique would not be allowed to return to power in Cambodia.

It was in Indonesia that Samdech Sihanouk, with the consent of Comrade Hun Sen, invited to the third Paris meeting the leaders of the two other Khmer opposition groups, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan. The latter is chieftain of the Khmer Rouge. The significance of this invitation is obvious. It is intended to enlarge the ground of the dialogue around the Cambodian problem, drawing to this meeting all Cambodian parties involved in the conflict.

The lesson of the two previous meetings between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Sihanouk has been drawn, for any agreement between the two parties would seem very ethereal as it also requires the approval of the other groups still absent from the talks. For this reason, it is not difficult to understand that with the participation of all parties, any problem would be resolved speedily and without hitches. Son Sann's consent to attend the coming meeting is thus very important for the soon-to-be-held talks on the destiny of Cambodia.

Still mum on the subject are the Khmer Rouge. They have not said yes or no to the invitation. However, there is a disheartening sign for those who are keenly interested in quickly rebuilding peace in Cambodia. Such a sign occurred when Khieu Samphan did not attend the meeting of the working group on the Cambodian problem held in Jakarta in mid-October. But here is the excuse made by the Khmer Rouge for their absence: It was not due to a lack of intention to attend the talks, but rather because they did not have sufficient manpower. Maybe so. As far as we are concerned, we merely hope that common sense will prevail in the end, and that on the newspaper pages of 6 November we will unfailingly see the pictures showing the leaders of all Cambodian political forces shaking hands with each other under the sign of a cricket—for Grillon, the name of the hotel where they will meet, is the French word for cricket.

Hun Sen Interviewed on Talks

LD2710163388 Moscow TASS in English
1512 GMT 27 Oct 88

[Text] Phnom Penh October 27 TASS—"We wish to establish guarantees against the return of Pol Pot's supporters to power," member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kampuchea Hun Sen said here in an interview to a correspondent of QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS. The text of the interview was circulated by the SPK news agency.

"This is the most important matter, and the responsibility for its solution is borne not only by China which supplies armaments to 'Khmer Rouge' but also by a number of other countries which continue to support the Pol Pot group", he said. If it were not for assistance of, say, Thailand and some Western countries, 'Khmer Rouge' would long have ceased to exist as an organisation. And if the tragedy of genocide is repeated, those countries will have a share of responsibility in that," he said.

Touching upon the quest for the solution to the Kampuchean problem, the head of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea said that a plan for political settlement has already been worked out. It is based on the recognition of the need for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the People's Republic of Kampuchea and for preventing a return of Pol Pot supporters and stopping military aid to them. A situation has developed now in which the international aspect of the problem can be settled earlier than the internal one. What is meant is the return of Vietnamese volunteers home and the stoppage of aid to 'Khmer Rouge', he said. As to achieving peace among the forces in Kampuchea, if Pol Pot supporters refuse to take part in the dialogue, Hun Sen is of the opinion that a peaceful agreement should be concluded between the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the opposition group headed by Prince Sihanouk. The suffering of the Kampuchean people should end, Hun Sen said.

Kaysone Phomvihane, Hun Sen Meet in Vientiane
PM0211105588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Oct 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "From Constructive Positions"]

[Text] Vientiane, 29 Oct—Kaysone Phomvihane, general secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Central Committee and chairman of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] Council of Ministers, met here on Friday [28 October] with Hun Sen, member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP] Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, who is in Laos on a working visit at the invitation of the LPRP Central Committee and the Republic's Council of Ministers. During the conversation the Cambodian leader familiarized the Lao side with the situation in the PRK, the steps being taken to protect the gains of the Cambodian people, and progress in building a new society in the country.

The Cambodian side also informed the Lao leadership of the concrete plans to withdraw Vietnamese volunteers from the PRK. The importance of guarantees preventing the return to power in the country of Pol Pot's bloody clique and the cessation of any outside interference in the Republic's domestic affairs was stressed.

Kaysone Phomvihane highly assessed Cambodia's achievements in various spheres and expressed support for the national reconciliation policy being implemented in the country and for the 7-point proposals, which demonstrate good will and the desire to seek a solution to the Cambodian problem by political means. In this context the importance of the upcoming meeting in early November in Paris between Hun Sen and Sihanouk was noted.

Hun Sen Holds Moscow Talks With Shevardnadze
LD0211193088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1830 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] A conversation took place today between Comrade Shevardnadze and Hun Sen, member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and foreign minister of the PRK.

The participants in the meeting paid chief attention to matters relating to the development of the Cambodian situation.

Comrade Shevardnadze stated that the USSR welcomes the constructive efforts by the Cambodian Government to unblock the conflict, and that it fully supports the policy of national reconciliation which it has put forward and is consistently implementing.

Hun Sen stated that he is going to Paris full of goodwill for a meeting with Prince Sihanouk to find realistic and mutually acceptable approaches to the fastest possible political solution and the attainment of national reconciliation.

Comrade Shevardnadze welcomed this approach and expressed the hope that the third round of the intra-Cambodian dialogue will make a weighty contribution to a settlement of the Cambodian situation.

Departs for Paris 3 Nov

LD0311104488 Moscow TASS In English 1025 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Hun Sen, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, left Moscow today.

He made a stop-over here on November 2-3 on his way to France.

Near East & South Asia

Afghan Army Rockets Strike 'Major' Rebel Arsenal
LD0211150988 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] Kabul, 2 Nov (TASS)—A powerful rocket strike has shaken the base of the irreconcilable opposition in the Maroljad [name as received] region in Nangarhar Province, which borders on Pakistan.

As Major General M.Z. Suleman, head of the Afghan Army Artillery Command, told a TASS correspondent, Maroljad was not chosen as a target for this strike by chance. A major transshipment base, a kind of marshalling point for all types of weaponry sent from Pakistani territory to the extremists of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan," and other counterrevolutionary organizations, has been functioning there for a long time. There are anti-aircraft missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and thousands of mines and shells in their arsenals. In October alone 130 civilians died and hundreds were wounded in the mass shelling of Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar Province.

The rocket strike on Maroljad was thus an act of just retribution. As the general observed, such strikes against criminals who are sowing death on Afghan soil will continue. Such steps are intended to bring to their senses the extremists who reject the idea of ceasing the bloodshed and starting talks on the basis of the reconciliation of all conflicting forces in the country.

More on Afghan Army Use of Rockets

LD0311000688 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 2 Nov 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; M. Leshchinskiy report over video]

[Text] Afghan Government troops have inflicted first strikes using new long-range weapons on areas occupied by concentrations of detachments of the armed opposition in the east of the country. [video shows misty view of mountains; launch hardware in the distance; close-up of vehicle with rocket in position; a few men in the vicinity; hardware covered with tarpaulin nearby]

Launch complexes of the new and powerful weaponry of the Afghan Army handed over to it by the Soviet Union have been emplaced in a suburb of Kabul. They have been placed next to the batteries of tube and rocket artillery which virtually every day fire at predetermined targets, and also at those which are newly appeared. These are presumed or already plotted areas in the vicinity of Kabul into which terrorist groups venture to strike at residential districts of the city with rocket missiles. [video shows same mountain area, two more vehicles each with a rocket; close-up of a perpendicular rocket; Leshchinskiy shown talking outdoors near one of the launch vehicles carrying a rocket].

It is true that artillery fire is not always effective. More and more often the opposition uses launching equipment with timing mechanisms or equipment controlled by radio and light simulators. Under these conditions, destructive strikes have to reach the opponent, who declines to accept peaceful initiatives, over a significant distance, perhaps even several hundred kilometers, from the town. [video shows night sky being pierced by the firing of rockets]

It is for these reasons that the Afghan leadership asked the Soviet Union for new long-range weapons.

The missiles are being prepared for launching. Soon it will be announced that No 1 is ready. The targets and their distance have already been marked. I can only say one thing, and that is that the targets on this occasion are the launchers of the armed opposition from which missile strikes are set against Kabul and other towns in Afghanistan. The areas of concentration of large armed opposition groups, their arsenals, and base areas are also targets.

To speak in military parlance, the zero-hour [vremya che] has arrived: One after another, the rockets go off into the sky and enter their operational trajectory. The salvos of powerful rocket artillery pattern the darkness with fiery lines. The strike was inflicted by an independent missile battalion of the Afghan Army under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aziz Balucha. The target chosen was the region of (Marolgad) in Nangarhar Province, which borders Pakistan. There, according to data, a major base of extremists had been created.

Namely, from here, the provincial center of Jalalabad was regularly shelled with rocket missiles. As a result of these barbaric acts, in October alone 130 civilians died in the town.

Every launch, every salvo carries retribution against those who are escalating the war in this land, those who with fanatical stubbornness refuse to sit down at the negotiating table.

Rebels Must Heed Najibullah's 'Appeal to Reason'

PM0211170988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Oct 88 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Okulov dispatch: "Realism and Ambitions"]

[Text] Kabul, 29 Oct—The end of October was characterized by new efforts by the Republic of Afghanistan's state power aimed at achieving calm in the country.

The proposals that have now been voiced by President Najibullah constitute a consistent and realistic plan for establishing peace on Afghan soil. The Afghan leader advocated direct talks between the opposing sides and urged all the armed opposition and refugees to take part in them. Talks, the president stated, could be held in Afghanistan, another Muslim country, or anywhere convenient to the sides. They could examine the question of forming a broad coalition government for Afghanistan on a basis acceptable to everyone. Its immediate tasks would be to achieve a cease-fire, establish monitoring of compliance with it, stop attempts to violate it, convene a peace conference, and create conditions for holding elections and for the convening of a Loya Jirga.

Undoubtedly, this stance is dictated by common sense: Only a ruling coalition that includes all the main political currents and that can rely on the support of various strata of society will win nationwide recognition and will have the potential to establish national unity for the sake of peace.

However, extremist circles among the Afghan opposition abroad are still trying to ignore this self-evident truth. As soon as there is talk of creating a government on a broad coalition basis, the "diehards" oppose PDPA participation in it. According to Western mass media reports, the current leader of the Peshawar "Alliance of Seven," B. Rabbani, categorically rejected the proposal from the president of the Republic of Afghanistan for direct talks between the opposing sides in Mecca.

At a time when the PDPA has elaborated and is implementing a national salvation program, despite the difficulties and obstacles, no political opposition grouping has put forward any positive or real program for restoring peace. At a time when the PDPA has demonstrated that it gives the interests of the people, who crave tranquillity and security, priority over its own party

interests and is renouncing its monopoly of power for the sake of restoring peace, the extremist section of the opposition is continuing to seek this monopoly for itself by force of arms.

Moreover, it would like to exclude the PDPA from the political structure of Afghan society. But this mass organization of 200,000 people has played and is playing a leading role in the progressive renewal of society and in defending national interests. Under the unusually difficult conditions of a war that has lasted for almost 10 years, it has succeeded in resolving the problems of the country's economy and development and in involving broad strata in this process, including many entrepreneurs and traders and including former refugees.

What can the extremists boast? Only of strikes against economic facilities. And also against the interests of international trade.

I will talk about that in particular. Afghanistan was always the trading crossroads of Asia. It is well known that 46 states and more than 200 foreign firms have trading interests connected with the trans-Asian highways that cross the Republic of Afghanistan. Approximately 2 million tonnes of various freight and commodities with destinations that include the FRG, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, the United States, and Japan are shipped annually along the Afghan sections of the route linking Karachi, Peshawar, Kabul, and Hayraton, for instance. Detachments of "diehards" attack international transport routes, make Kabul International Airport unsafe, and blockade Qandahar airport, which is an important international airline center.

What grounds do the "diehards" have for their complaints against the authorities? Extremely shaky ones. Yes, the armed opposition has succeeded in exacerbating the situation within the country and in displacing government forces in some areas. But disorganization and anarchy are no manifestation of authority. Destruction is not construction. In exaggerating their military potential for propaganda purposes and ruthlessly carrying out attacks on the peaceful population, the extremists are lapsing into a state of some self-hypnosis.

The opposition leaders' gamble on war not only contravenes Afghanistan's national interests, it also has no future. Speaking at a session of the National Council—the country's parliament—President Najibullah stressed that any government that does not take into account the realities of the country's current political system, to be more precise, the PDPA, the current government, armed forces, and public organizations, would be doomed to failure from the very start.

If you look at the problem of conciliation in Afghanistan through a gunsight, you won't see anything apart from bursts of gunfire and further loss of life and destruction. The "diehard" opposition's senseless gamble on attaining military victory would lead to national catastrophe

and self-annihilation for Afghanistan. I think that realism rather than overweening ambitions will ultimately prevail. The appeal to reason and national feelings that has been heard once again in Kabul must be heeded.

Proposal Not Sign of 'Weakness'

LD0211144888 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1030 GMT 1 Nov 88

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov; Aleksandr Malikov commentary]

[Text] The UN General Assembly is now about to discuss another, very important issue. I am referring to the situation in Afghanistan. In this connection, particular interest is evoked by the proposal put forward by Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan, to convene an international conference on Afghanistan, under the aegis of the United Nations. I have asked my colleague, commentator Aleksandr Malikov, to talk about this proposal in more detail.

[Malikov] In the last few days, President Najibullah has conveyed his initiative to the opposition and to the world community, sometimes to both. What is it that makes the Afghan president take such steps in a fairly complex situation? Some, and particularly in the opposition camp, are inclined to see the peace-loving proposals emanating from Kabul as a manifestation of weakness. However, I must say that neither fear nor weakness is forcing the search for a formula to achieve peace on two planes, as it were, the domestic and the international. It is appropriate here to speak of wisdom and far-sightedness.

Why can there be no talk of weakness in this instance? Because, in spite of the opposition's assertions that victory is, as they claim, just around the corner, the true situation does not give grounds for such claims. Control of two or three of the country's provinces, and not full control at that, has nothing serious to say as yet, as any reasonable person can understand. Moreover, the latest reports from Afghanistan are not generally comforting to the insurgents. Thus, at the end of last week alone, in the southeast and northern areas of the country, they lost around 500 people killed in battle. I don't think it is without reflection that President Najibullah is insistently proposing that the opposition's commanders in the field come to the negotiating table. In the thick of combat operations, rather than in villas outside Afghanistan like many leaders of the Peshawar Seven, they can see more clearly than anyone that the outcome of the armed struggle is far from unequivocal or close at hand.

Moreover, there is no certainty that, let's say, changes in the authorities will lead to an end to the civil war. This point of view has its logic; after all, the opposition is seriously divided. It is tormented by profound contradictions, dormant for the time being, or more accurately until such time as the groups start to divide power. But the most fundamental point is that the opposition has no

constructive program of its own to build the future Afghanistan. The Afghan Government does have such a program. In broad terms it is contained in Najibullah's proposals addressed to Perez de Cuellar. I will recall its main elements. These are an end to the fratricidal war; the formation of a coalition government; the subsequent demilitarization of the country and its neutral status, guaranteed by the international community; as well as the creation of conditions that will exclude the very possibility of new civil strife in the future.

Muslim Leader Discusses Soviet-Afghan Ties
LD3010221688 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1045 GMT 30 Oct 88

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS)—"The teachings of the Prophet Muhammed on peace and justice"—this was the theme of the international Islamic conference which took place in Kabul and which involved the participation of a delegation of Muslims from the Soviet Union. On his return from Kabul, Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the delegation and chairman of the spiritual administration of Muslims of the European regions of the USSR and Siberia, shared his impressions of his visit to Afghanistan with a TASS correspondent.

The mufti said that he and other members of the delegation were greatly moved by the invitation to attend the conference because it was devoted to the prophet's birthday.

The meeting in Kabul was broad and representative. Members of Muslim organizations from 16 countries attended it. But to our common distress and indignation, we were all witnesses to the fact that even while Muslims were discussing questions of universal significance such as peace, the actions of terrorist forces hostile to the Afghan people did not cease. Rockets continued to fall on Kabul even on those days. Explosions could be heard somewhere, and human blood was being shed.

"The Muslims of the Soviet Union," the mufti continued, "are full of concern for their brothers in Afghanistan, both for the Muslim faithful and their neighbors. We are troubled by everything that is happening in this truly Islamic country, where there is every possibility to profess Islam."

During the conversation, the mufti quoted the following date published at the conference: The country has 32,000 active mosques, 500 prayer houses for Shi'ites, and thousands of holy places for veneration. During the postrevolutionary period 324 new mosques have been built in Afghanistan. All of this is accessible to believers. Nobody interferes with their performance of sacred rites.

Participants in the conference were greatly impressed by the words of President Najibullah to the effect that the government strongly urges the opposing forces to engage in reconciliation.

Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin said that participants in the conference adopted several important documents—addressed to Islamic and other international organizations—which contain an appeal for support in resolving issues of importance to the whole region, such as stopping the war and establishing a stable peace. The mufti also reported that the delegation of Soviet Moslems, motivated by their constant striving for peaceful cooperation and good-neighborliness—which is characteristic of both countries—signed a protocol on further cooperation between the Muslim organizations of Afghanistan and the USSR.

Shevardnadze Desires Continued Ties With Israel
TA0311121088 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
3 Nov 88 p 2

[Report by New York correspondent Shlomo Shamir]

[Text] The USSR will continue contacts with Israel, and meetings between senior Soviet officials and Israeli representatives are expected soon, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in a Moscow meeting yesterday with Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress [WJC].

The meeting took place after the results of the Israeli elections became known in Moscow. Shevardnadze's remarks were seen as the first Soviet reaction to the election results. The meeting, in which WJC Managing Director Yisra'el Singer participated, lasted nearly 2 hours and was described as open, friendly, and constructive.

Simcha Dinitz, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, and Mendel Kaplan, the chairman of the Jewish Agency's board of governors, did not participate in the talk with Shevardnadze. Toward the end of the meeting, Dinitz and Kaplan were invited in to the Soviet foreign minister's office; they shook hands and held a short courtesy meeting.

Shevardnadze promised Bronfman that the Soviets' positive approach to the number of Jewish emigrants in recent months would continue.

The full WJC delegation held a long talk with Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs, during which they discussed the technical details involved in setting up a Jewish cultural center in Moscow which will offer Hebrew language courses.

The Soviet minister agreed to permit Hebrew teachers to come to the USSR. An agreement was reached on an exchange of rabbis under which rabbis from Israel and the United States would be permitted to visit the USSR, while rabbis in Moscow would be permitted to continue religious studies in the United States and Israel. It was also agreed that the Moscow Jewish community would be permitted to join the WJC and to send delegates to WJC conferences. Until this point, only Jewish communities in other East bloc countries were permitted to join the WJC.

TASS Analyst Views Outcome of Israeli Elections
LD0211173888 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT
2 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow November 2 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Albert Balebanov:

It is not fortuitous that the attention of the world public was fixed to the elections of the Israeli Knesset (parliament): The prospects for settling the Palestinian problem and through it of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict largely hinged on their outcome.

The main contestants for the parliament seats were the Likud bloc led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Labour Party of Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, which form the current ruling coalition. They were held in conditions of the Palestinian popular uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which has been going on for 11 months now. Although the question concerned their future, 1.7 million Palestinians residing in the Israeli-occupied lands did not have the right to take part in the elections. Fearing an intensification of the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli military administration of the West Bank and Gaza sealed off all entrances and exits from these lands.

The mass actions by the Palestinians, which cannot be quelled even by means of ruthless terror, demonstrated that continued occupation of the Arab lands had no prospect to succeed, and the need for an early peace settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict on a fair and durable basis. [sentence as received]

In its election programme the Likud bloc has, however, categorically refused to relinquish the seized Palestinian lands, declared against recognizing the Palestinians' sovereign rights, and spurned the idea of holding an international conference on the Middle East. The Labour Party has already acted from the position of a political rather than military solution of the question of the future of the occupied territories. It proposed moving toward making some concessions to the Palestinians to attain a partial settlement.

Following the vote tally, Shamir announced that the obtained situation allowed Likud to form a new government of the country. Meanwhile, Likud and the Labour Party won an approximately equal number of seats in the Knesset. Likud hopes for the support of small rightist religious parties which increased their representation in parliament.

The Labour Party suggests a similar variant but this time with its own participation. The outcome of the balloting shows that the electorate has split: Their sympathies set apart on the central issue of peace and security. Some of the electors were drawn by Shamir's promise to preserve for Israel the occupied territories for good, whereas others preferred the Peres plan which envisions readiness for compromise decisions in exchange for peace.

A view is expressed that if Shamir becomes a prime minister, he will find himself in great dependence on religious and rightist-extremist parties, which will hardly help establish genuine peace in the Middle East. News analysts believe that the Israeli Government will rely to a still greater extent on generous U.S. military and economic aid in its expansionist policy. About three billion dollars in U.S. annual aid allow Tel Aviv to wage the war on two fronts at once: against the Palestinians and against Lebanon.

In case an openly rightist cabinet is put together in Israel, one can foresee a further toughening of Tel Aviv's position toward the Palestinian uprising, Israel's increased obstruction to the plans to convene an international Middle East conference, and higher tension in Israel's relations with Arab countries.

'Insurgents' Capture Maldives Presidential Palace
LD0311060388 Moscow TASS in English 0557 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Paris November 3 TASS—Armed detachments took by assault the city of Male, the capital of the Republic of Maldives, on Thursday morning. Maldives is an archipelago country, a member of the Commonwealth, situated in the north-western Indian Ocean.

The FRANCE PRESSE news agency reports that the destiny of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who was elected the president of Maldives for the third term in September, is unknown.

According to reports from Male, the presidential palace was captured by insurgents.

REUTER Cited on Failed Coup
LD0311102388 Moscow TASS in English 1009 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] London November 3 TASS—President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives is in safety and in full control of the situation in the country after today's coup attempt, the ambassador of the Maldives to Sri Lanka said in Colombo, REUTERS reported.

Fighting broke out in the capital of Male with a group of armed men who attempted to overthrow the government.

About 300 rebels attacked the presidential residence, the headquarters of the national security forces and other government agencies. The airport in the capital was closed down and commercial air traffic was banned.

Up to 200 people have been killed in the coup attempt, according to the eyewitnesses.

President Gayoom, 51, was re-elected for his third term with ninety-six percent of popular vote last September. His inauguration was set for November 11.

Several coup attempts have been staged in the country since 1978. In February of 1980 authorities uncovered a plot with the participation of nine representatives of European countries to oust President Gayoom and bring back to power Ibrahim Nasir, his predecessor.

The second unsuccessful attempt took place shortly before Gayoom's inauguration for the second term in July 1983.

The Maldives, an archipelago in the north-west of the Indian Ocean, has a population of 184,000. The country is situated on more than 2,000 islands many of which are desert coral islets. The total area is 298 square kilometres.

Most of the population are Sinhalese, Dravidian, and Arabs, mostly Muslim Sunnites. The official religion is Islam. Fisheries and tourism are the major sectors of the economy.

Fifty-five islands of the archipelago have been turned into resorts. Up to 80,000 foreign tourists visit that exotic country annually pouring over 20 million dollars into its economy.

East Europe

Commentary Sees Western 'Provocations' in Prague
LD0211144788 Moscow International Service in Czech
2230 GMT 1 Nov 88

[Station commentary]

[Text] In our commentary we are returning to one aspect of the Friday [28 October] provocations in Prague.

Let us consider the role of some Western radio stations which broadcast in Czech, especially Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. They took upon themselves the task of organizing of this provocation; they informed listeners where demonstrations were to take place, tried to evoke unrest and an anticommunist mood, and did their utmost to employ the 70th anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia for their own interests. The Voice of America and other similar radio stations are not jammed in Czechoslovakia; therefore, appeals to demonstrate can stimulate curiosity, particularly among young people.

This was what happened last Friday. In addition to a group of so-called professional dissidents, who are well paid by the West for their antistate activity, there were also quite a number of people expecting some sort of unusual excitement in Wenceslas Square. They were probably disappointed, for the course of the demonstration could have been predicted from the warning of the Czechoslovak press agency, which cautioned that the abuse of our National Day would not be allowed. The public security forces firmly intervened and thwarted the provocation attempt.

The following reactions from the West have shown why the Western media bothered so much with the preparation of the action. They have started to blow up the action against provocateurs in order to influence the talks on security and cooperation in Europe. In this way they are trying to break up the process of detente and the improvement of the international climate. This is the core of the problem.

In itself, foreign broadcasting stations' interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs and their effort to organize provocations are gross violations of the norms of international law. Let us imagine what sharp reactions would be evoked by the attempts of socialist countries' radio stations to create unrest in the West. We do not do so, because we respect the right of the peoples of every country to make their own choices. In the same way, we do not permit anyone to press on us what we can or can not do.

TASS on 'Hostile Elements'

LD3010034688 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0920 GMT 29 Oct 88

[Text] Prague, 29 October, (TASS)—Yesterday's events in the center of Prague that disturbed the atmosphere of the CSSR's national festival rightly evoked the indignation of the Czechoslovak public. People were convinced, not by hearsay but by their own eyes, of the true objectives of socialism's opponents. Provocateurs from antisocialist groups hurled slogans that had nothing in common with the interest of the Czechoslovak people and denigrated its gains and international reputation.

The opening of the hostile elements' counterdemonstration, which involved a proportion of young people, came a day after a festival demonstration in Wenceslas Square, where the working people expressed total support for the political line of the CPCZ leadership to accelerate the process of restructuring and the development of socialist democracy. This fact speaks for itself: The organizers of the provocative gathering were fully aware that they would get no support from working Prague and therefore played out the farce of a counterdemonstration, in which an active role went to criminal elements.

The determination of honorable people committed to socialism to fight for restructuring and for the consistent implementation of the CPCZ's program developed at the 17th CPCZ Congress, has become even more resolute. Here is what Jozef Grousl [name as received] from Prague wrote to 'RUDE PRAVO': "The enemies of socialism in certain countries do not hide the fact that they want to convert restructuring for the rebirth of politically bankrupt people. The power of the working class and the working people must be constantly strengthened and defended. This is the main conclusion of our history. We understood very well in the past that all that glitters is not gold. Those who believe their time has

come in social development wish to make use of democracy, glasnost, and the freedom to criticize [kritichnost]. They are making a big mistake. We will not allow the republic to be torn apart. It was built through the hard work of the working class, all working people. Let no one count on this, either today or tomorrow.

Closure of Polish Lenin Shipyard 'Logical'

LD0311014388 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
2145 GMT 2 Nov 88

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Viktor Shcherbakov]

[Text] We will now discuss the situation in another socialist country: Poland. I recall that the Polish Government made the decision to close the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. Immediately after this decision was made, commentaries appeared in Western press saying that Polish society was shocked. In a number of items, the decision was qualified as a declaration of war on the opposition. In this connection, Polish Government press spokesman Urban stated in Warsaw that the government and the opposition were in agreement on the issue of radical reforms being necessary for the country.

The opposition, Urban stressed, has always—and not without foundation—said that there are too many programs and too few deeds in Poland. However, when the matter reached the stage of real action, this was not accepted. The policy of national concord is, first and foremost, understanding the implementation of radical measures in the economy. The closure of the shipyards represents precisely such a measure. Here I would like to recall that it was precisely at the Gdansk shipyards where the now-banned Solidarity trade union was set up in 1980. Lech Walesa, one of the Solidarity leaders, continues to work there. He described the decision to close the Lenin shipyards as a provocation, the objective of which was to defeat the heart of Solidarity. He himself was the person who made the provocative statement that the decision would cause tension and conflicts in Poland.

I recall something else: A strike was under way in the Gdansk shipyards in August. The government proposed holding talks on the essence of the problems that had arisen. However, the opposition forces wrecked the talks. So, under the conditions of an absence of dialogue, the government's decision to close the unprofitable enterprise seems perfectly logical.

Gorbachev Talk With Polish Intellectuals Published
PM0211101788 *Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
29 Oct 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Collection of Material"]

[Text] A collection of materials entitled "The Intelligentsia in the Face of the New Problems of Socialism" has been published. It is comprised of materials from the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Polish cultural and scientific figures in Warsaw on 14 July 1988.

The collection is published by the Political Literature Publishing House at the "Krasnyy Proletariy" Printing Plant.

Latin America & Caribbean

Document Signed on Panama Canal Neutrality

LD0311111488 *Moscow TASS In English* 1120 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Washington November 3 TASS—The Soviet Union has turned over for deposition the document on its accession to the protocol to the treaty on permanent neutrality and exploitation of the Panama Canal, in a ceremony held at the headquarters of the Organisation of American States in Washington.

The protocol was signed by the United States and Panama on September 7, 1977. It provides for participation of other countries in ensuring the regime of neutrality of the Panama Canal.

"This step evinces the Soviet state's striving to make its contribution to consolidation of the legal foundation of the present-day international relations as an inalienable element of the broad process of consolidation of universal peace and security, building up confidence and mutual understanding between peoples in the channel of the new political thinking", said the USSR's Ambassador in the United States Yuriy Dubinin, touching upon the Soviet Union's decision.

The Soviet Government's decision is appraised at the Organization of American States as a positive act of international significance. General Secretary of the Organisation of American States Joan Clemente Baena Soares has noted the importance of the Soviet Union's accession to the protocol, which was opened for signature in 1979. "The adoption by all states of the world of the obligation to observe neutrality, ensuring the right of peaceful passage through the Panama Canal, will add to the efficiency of the treaty," said the general secretary of the Organisation of American States. He said that the USSR was the 36th state to sign on to the protocol.

The Government of Panama considers the USSR's decision as a fresh manifestation of support for the guarantee of efficient neutrality of the strategic waterway, said Soraya Cano, Panama's acting ambassador to the Organisation of American States.

Deputy U.S. Representative to the Organisation of American States William Pryce expressed the United States' satisfaction with the decision taken by the Soviet Union. He said that the United States viewed the accession to the document as reaffirming the capability of states to resolve international problems through peaceful means. He said Washington would fulfill all its obligation under the canal treaty.

Dubinina Explains Adherence to Treaty

PA0311043088 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America
2300 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] Today Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, went to the main OAS office in Washington, D.C., and presented a document establishing the Soviet Union's adherence to the protocol on the permanent neutrality of the Panama Canal.

In speaking at the presentation ceremony, Yuriy Dubinin said this step is a demonstration of the Soviet Union's will to contribute to the consolidation of the legal bases of international relations. According to the diplomat, these bases are an inescapable element for strengthening world peace, security, and trust, and for mutual understanding among people.

Not long ago, the proper Soviet parliamentary commissions studied the Panama Canal neutrality issue and concluded this was a suitable moment for adhering to the neutrality protocol. A proposal in this regard was approved by the Supreme Soviet.

This has been a serious and responsible step which should play an important and positive role in promoting the idea of the suitability of adhering to the protocol, a decision which would increase the efficacy of the Panama Canal treaties.

Our country's adherence to the protocol is clear evidence that the international situation is improving and that it has been possible to push far away the danger of a serious military conflict.

Panama Accuses U.S. of 'Psychological Warfare'

LD2410101388 Moscow TASS in English 0906 GMT
24 Oct 88

[Text] Mexico City October 24 TASS—Under the pretext of struggle against drug mafia, the U.S. Administration is waging against Panama psychological warfare, seeking the overthrow of the Panamanian leadership.

This was stated in the capital of Mexico by Minister of the Interior and Justice of Panama Rodolfo Chiari de Leon. He arrived here to attend a conference of ministers of justice of Latin American states, Spain and Portugal, which is to open in Acapulco today.

The anti-Panama policy conducted by the White House has the aim to thwart compliance with the agreements between the United States and Panama on full transfer of the Panama Canal to the Republic by the year of 2000, Rodolfo Chiari de Leon said.

He firmly denounced the U.S. interference in internal affairs of other Latin American states which is conducted under the pretext of struggle against narcobusiness.

Political & Social

Law on Ratifying Presidium Decrees

PM0211165188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Oct 88 Morning Edition p 5

["USSR Law Ratifying USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decrees Making Amendments and Additions to Certain USSR Legislative Acts"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves to ratify the following USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees:

The 21 June 1988 Decree "On the Recognition and Execution in the USSR of Decisions by Foreign Courts and Tribunals";

The 25 July 1988 Decree "On Making Amendments to Article 36 of the Fundamentals of Correctional Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics";

The 28 July 1988 Decree "On the Procedure for the Organization and Conduct of Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions, and Demonstrations in the USSR";

The 28 July 1988 Decree "On the Duties and Rights of USSR MVD Internal Troops in Protecting Public Order";

The 28 July 1988 Decree "On Making Amendments to Certain USSR Legislative Acts";

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

The Kremlin, Moscow, 28 October 1988

Gorbachev Speaks at Central Committee Conference
LD0211174688 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1630 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] Conference at the CPSU Central Committee:

The progress in fulfilling the decisions of the party and government to improve the supply of foodstuffs to the population and accelerate the socio-economic development and scientific-technical progress in the national agro-industrial complex as the highest priority, along with the urgent task of restructuring, was examined at a conference of leaders of the central bodies, ministries, and departments, held today at the CPSU Central Committee

The conference was opened with a word of introduction by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

An announcement on the question discussed was made by Maslyukov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the USSR Gosplan.

Reporting on the work and proposals on these problems were: Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the State Agro-Industrial Committee of the USSR; Babenko, minister of construction in the eastern regions of the USSR; Olshanskiy, minister of mineral fertilizer production of the USSR; Shchadov, minister of the USSR coal industry; Manyakin, chairman of the USSR Committee of People's Control; Systsov, minister of the USSR aviation industry; Yagodin, chairman of the State Committee for Public Education; Ryabev, USSR minister of medium machine building; Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Bureau for Machine Building of the USSR Council of Ministers; Ustkachintsev, first deputy minister of the USSR chemical industry; and Voyenushkin, minister of the USSR Construction Materials Industry.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke at the end of the conference.

Taking part in the work of the conference were: Comrades Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Ligachev, Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Biryukova, Vlasov, Baklanov; Batalin, Belousov, Voronin, Gusev, Kamentsev, Tolstykh, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU; Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee; officials of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers; representatives of the mass information media.

Moscow Militia Head Bogdanov Gives Briefing
LD0211133088 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1245 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow, 2 Nov—TASS correspondent Nikita Demidov reports:

Over the first 10 months of this year, there were 640 attempts to hold meetings and demonstrations in Moscow which had not been sanctioned by the municipal authorities. This was reported at a briefing today by Petr Bogdanov, head of the Moscow Militia Main Administration.

It has to be said, Bogdanov stressed, that the bulk of these "gatherings" were of a blatantly provocative, anti-Soviet nature. This was particularly true of the meetings organized by the so-called "Democratic Union." For example, Bogdanov continued, last Sunday they again gathered on Pushkin Square in the very heart of Moscow (by the way, meetings in general are banned there). Those behaving most vigorously were the "leaders" of this "union"—Yevgeniya Debryanskaya and Valeriya

Novodvorskaya. They are well known to the Moscow militia, and on this occasion they were again detained: Debryanskaya for striking a militiaman, and Novodvorskaya for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets.

On the threshold of the 7 November celebration—the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution—Moscow Militia have shifted to an intensified work regime. During the demonstration, about 100,000 people will pass along the squares and streets of Moscow. In Bogdanov's words, the 25-percent increase in the number of patrols during these days is necessary not only in order to curtail possible unsanctioned rallies, but to maintain order in the capital of the USSR so that nothing will spoil the people's celebration.

The head of the Moscow Militia Main Administration reported that cases of burglary have become more frequent now in Moscow; moreover, 70 percent of them are carried out by nonresidents. Manifestations of organized crime have also become frequent. Bogdanov recalled that yesterday, for example, the Militia managed with great difficulty to avert a clash at Vnukovo airport between "private" taxi-drivers and 300 racketeers who had decided to "spread their influence" to them. "We are in control of the situation" stressed Bogdanov. "Proof of this is the Moscow Militia's efficient intervention in the critical situation [words indistinct] there has not been a single case of major disturbances.

Dissident Skeptical Toward Liberalization
PM0111145488 London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
in English 30 Oct 88 p 9

[Article by Soviet Popular Labor Union representative Rostislav Yevdokimov: "A Russian's Sour Look at the New Freedom"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Thirty-one delegates in the Supreme Soviet voted last week against decrees designed to curb dissident demonstrations and increase the powers of Interior Ministry police. It was the first public refusal to toe the party line in the Moscow "parliament" since the 1920s. Yevdokimov, Leningrad representative of the Popular Labour Union, NTS, a Russian opposition group, takes a sceptical view of the new liberalisation.

The announcement by Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, following his meeting with Mr Gorbachev, that all political prisoners in the Soviet Union will be released by the end of the year is to be welcomed. However, recent events suggest that other moves are already afoot to deal with political activists who campaign for genuine democracy and a multi-party system.

On July 28 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decree on the procedures for holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations. Under this decree we must obtain permission 10 days in advance to hold an event.

Even if the event is restricted to members of a given group or organisation one must still state full details about the event, along with the full names, addresses and place of work of all those involved in organising it. Whether a meeting is allowed or not is entirely at the discretion of the authorities.

If this procedure is not followed, or a meeting or other activity is held without official permission, people attending the event may be arrested and either warned, fined up to R300 or, in "exceptional circumstances," sentenced to up to 15 day's imprisonment.

Subsequent arrests may result in a person being fined up to R1,000, jailed for up to 15 days, or sentenced to up to two months' corrective labor.

If these sentences are not a sufficient deterrent and a person continues to violate this decree, punishments range from a fine of up to R2,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or corrective labour for up to 12 months.

Events over the past two weeks in Leningrad have shown that, even where permission is granted, participants are still liable to arrest and sentence. Vladimir Klementyev, an active member in the unofficial group Emigration For All, was arrested at a meeting on October 7 for continuing to speak after the meeting had finished. (It had been officially permitted by the authorities.) Klementyev was fined R100.

Two more recent events suggest that the authorities are about to begin a massive campaign against the Democratic Union, an organisation that views itself as an opposition political party and which campaigns for a multi-party state.

The first was an article in the official newspaper VECHEERNYY LENINGRAD (EVENING LENINGRAD) on October 15 called "Under the Banner of Democracy." In the article three professors from Leningrad University said that the opposition party, the Democratic Union, should be tried for "treason against the motherland" on the basis that it is a conspiracy to usurp power.

And on October 21 the City Executive Committee in Leningrad informed Vladimir Terekhov that it was considering bringing criminal charges against those taking part in the meeting organised by the Democratic Union on October 7, despite the fact that the meeting had received official permission.

Terekhov was also told that the Democratic Union would not be permitted to hold a demonstration on October 30, the "Day of Political Prisoners," on the ground that the organisation violated Article 50 of the Soviet Constitution. Article 50 says:

"In accordance with the interests of the people, and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press and assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations.

"Exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by putting public buildings, streets and squares at the disposal of the working people and their organisations, by broad dissemination of information and by the opportunity to use the press, television and radio."

The contradictions between the Constitution, the decrees of July 28 and the reality of the situation of the opposition movement inside the Soviet Union only reinforce the belief that the Soviet legal system is not based on the rule of law and is not likely to be so in the near future.

Indeed, at the same time as passing the July 28 decrees the militia was given additional powers. Today it no longer requires a warrant or orders from a higher official to search a person or his property, or to make an arrest.

The promise of the release of all political prisoners seems very much to us like yet another promise that will not be fulfilled.

At present we know of 563 religious and political prisoners whose cases are documented. Many of these are not charged under the usual political articles, but the only reason for their incarceration is their political or religious activity.

Further, there are many people still held in psychiatric institutions and today people are threatened with psychiatric treatment if they do not comply with the authorities. If Gorbachev is to release "all political prisoners by the end of the year" then guarantees must be given that they will not be immediately incarcerated again under some other law or decree.

Deputy Questions Haste on Law, Order Decrees
PM0211183988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Oct 88 Morning Edition p 2

["Abbreviated account of speech by Deputy P.P. Goryunov of Tartu Sovetskiy Electoral Okrug, Estonian SSR," team leader at Tartu instrument plant, at 28 October 1988 evening joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities in the Great Kremlin Palace, Moscow]

[Text] Comrade Deputies! Legislative acts on questions of the maintenance of public order during rallies and demonstrations have been submitted to us for ratification. There are three of them and they seek to ensure the maintenance of the necessary law and order without which socialist democracy is unthinkable. There is great

interest in these documents among the people in the Estonian SSR. This is borne out in conversations with people and at numerous meetings with voters.

At the same time a number of controversial questions have arisen in the course of these meetings, which I would like to share with you.

Everyone understands that a reliable mechanism to ensure order is necessary. But do such tasks have to be implemented by the Armed Forces? If this is really necessary, then the law must clearly specify under what circumstances military units and servicemen are to be brought in to maintain public order. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree in its present form does not make this point clear.

The decree on internal forces' rights and obligations states that internal forces are instructed to carry out duties in the maintenance of public order by decision of the USSR minister of internal affairs. It is prohibited to place internal forces units and subunits under the jurisdiction of local organs of power and administration. However, according to legislation, the maintenance of public order is the task of local and republic soviets. In my view, union republics as sovereign states should, in this case, have the right to state their opinion and take the final decision on bringing in forces to maintain public order.

The decree authorizes the use of special means by internal forces. It is stated at the same time that the range of these means and the rules for their application are determined by the departments. I and my voters would nonetheless like to know what kind of means are involved. Also, in this case, legislative rules rather than departmental norm-creation are needed.

I would further like to draw your attention to the right of servicemen to enter people's living accommodations. Under the USSR Constitution the inviolability of the home is guaranteed to citizens. Only in extremely limited circumstances is it possible to enter residential premises against the will of the people who live there. This question also demands clarification in the decree.

Another USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree defines the procedure to be followed in organizing and holding meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations in the USSR. Such a legislative act is necessary. However, it must be borne in mind that every republic has its own traditions in holding events of this kind. I would like to repeat: Every republic. It is obvious that these differences should be reflected in republic laws. Consequently, it seems hardly necessary to regulate points of detail in a unionwide act. For instance, the decree introduces a fine of R1,000 as an administrative penalty. Comrades, is this really an administrative penalty? After all, it represents not a monthly wage but the annual income of a

considerable section of people. For the sake of comparison—violation of the rules regulating the possession of firearms carries a fine of only R50.

In view of what has been said, I propose that the said USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees should not be passed today. On behalf of many of the republic's voters I propose that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium does some more work on the decrees, taking account of the expressed criticisms and suggestions, and that it submits them for ratification at the next session.

In conclusion I would like to add that preparations are currently under way for a CPSU Central Committee plenum on improving interethnic relations in the USSR. The population is getting ready for new democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet. Hence, very important topical problems will arise for our multinational country in conditions of restructuring and democratization. The question therefore is: Is it necessary to make haste with the adoption of the said decree [singular noun as published]? (Applause)

Zagladin, Others Participate in Danish Telebridge

LD0311002088 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 30 October carries a live or recorded Moscow to Copenhagen telebridge presented in Copenhagen by Leif Davidsen and in Moscow by Georgiy Zubkov. Participating in the program are, on the Danish side, Anker Joergensen, former prime minister; Gert Peterson, Socialist People's Party Chairman; Hans Engell, former defense minister and Conservative Party chairman; and Bjoern Elmqvist, chairman of the Folketing foreign policy committee. On the Soviet side are Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, Foreign Affairs Commission secretary of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, deputy chairman of the USSR parliamentary group and member of the CPSU Central Committee; Fedor Tromfimovich Morgun, chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Protection of Nature; and Boris Vasilyevich Kravtsov, justice minister. Danish participants speak in Danish with superimposed Russian translation. The date is not given.

The program begins with Davidsen saying: "Good evening, Denmark! Good evening, Moscow! In Moscow, the time is six o'clock. We have a link established between Moscow and Copenhagen, between the Supreme Soviet and the Danish Folketing. We are in the Folketing's Hall of Sessions. Our Parliament holds its sessions in this building, and we call our parliament the Folketing. [passage omitted on uniqueness of telebridge on Danish TV]

We have four guests in the studio here in Christiansborg; they are all deputies in the Danish parliament. They represent four different parties, though eight parties are represented in the Folketing. [passage omitted on number of deputies in the Folketing; electoral system; the

constitutional monarchy] Our guests are Anker Joergensen, a former prime minister of Denmark; Gert Petersen, chairman of the Socialist People's Party—Anker Joergensen represents the Social Democratic Party. These two parties represent the opposition to our government, which is in the minority. The representatives of the government parties are Hans Engell, chairman of the Parliamentary Faction of the Conservative Party, who in the last government was defense minister. The present government is a coalition between the Conservative Party, the Radical Party, and one other party—the Liberal Party—which is represented by Bjoern Elmqvist, who at the same time is chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee. Let me now hand over to Georgiy Zubkov. Whom do you have in your studio, and whom do they represent?"

Zubkov replies:

"Thank you, Leif Davidsen, thank you very much for handing over to me." He comments on Davidsen's media background, and adds: "We are in Ostankino, in one of the studios from which live programs are usually made. Let me introduce the participants in the program on the Soviet side. Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin is secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, deputy chairman of the USSR Parliamentary group, and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. Vadim Valentinovich has been a teacher, he has been engaged in journalism, and for many years he has worked in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Now he is an adviser to the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is worth adding that he is a doctor of philosophy and a professor. Then there is Fedor Trofimovich Morgun, chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Protection of Nature and a participant in the Great Patriotic War. After the war, he worked in agriculture in different posts, so he has come into direct contact with the problems of nature protection. He has also been a secretary of a party oblast committee of the party. Boris Vasilyevich Kravtsov is the USSR justice minister. For many years he worked in the procuracy bodies. He, too, took part in the Great Patriotic War; he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage."

"Let's begin our discussion. We have agreed that the first part of our discussions will deal with bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Denmark and some general European problems and the construction of a common European home, as we say these days. If there are no objections, then, perhaps we could ask Zagladin to begin these discussions."

Zagladin: "First of all, on my own behalf, I would like to welcome all our Danish colleagues, and especially Anker Joergensen, whom I met quite recently in Moscow while visiting us at the head of a commission of the parliaments of the northern countries on the problems of a

nuclear-free northern Europe. We had some very good conversations, and I believe that our present meeting will expand the circle of our topics within the framework of Soviet-Danish relations.

"It has to be said, or it can be said, perhaps, that we are meeting at a very special time in the historical development of the world as a whole and of Europe, and of our relations, too. Much is now taking place that formerly would simply have been impossible. I am thinking of the treaty on eliminating missiles, the destruction of these missiles which has already started both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, and the inspections which are taking place. You know, the places which are now being visited by our U.S. partners, officers in the U.S. Army, were at one time utterly closed, the holy of holies, the most terrible military secret. And now we are revealing this secret to each other and are learning how to cooperate in implementing verification of the disarmament process which is extremely important both politically and, I would say, psychologically, too.

"Well there are many other features one can find that distinguish today's situation. One of these features for our two countries is a very important one: the recent meeting between our ministers, or more precisely the visit to your country by Eduard Amvrosyevich Shevardnadze, our foreign minister, a visit which was very successful in the opinion of both sides. We have indeed observed growing mutual understanding between our country and Denmark. We observe a mass of issues on which we take a very close or similar view. We observe a mass of issues which deserve attention from both of us, and these we can indeed discuss fruitfully together. Here, of course, the general situation in the world that I have already mentioned has had an effect, but I do not think that is the only thing, because treaty relationships have now been in existence between ourselves and Denmark for nearly 500 years. The first treaty between our countries was concluded 500 years ago, and during this time there have been no wars between us and there have been virtually no serious conflicts. And that element is, of course, not simply entered into history but it forms an integral part of the atmosphere of our relations today. I think we must maintain the same kind of relations that we have had throughout all these years over the next—why only 500—1,500 years, perhaps, as many years as we are going to exist.

"On the other hand, it seems to me that both Comrade Shevardnadze's latest visit and the whole situation in the world and in Europe show that we have a large number of areas that we have not used to the fullest. There are opportunities that have to be developed; they concern the political sphere, the joint involvement of our countries in the process of European disarmament, the construction of the common European home; the economic sphere; the nature protection sphere; the sphere of cooperation on other problems, including humanitarian ones; and it seems to me that our meeting today could and should map out some ways for cooperation between our

parliamentarians along these lines. But now I would like to hear what our Danish colleagues think about this and how they see the prospects for the development of our relations."

Davidson then introduces the next speaker, Hans Engell, who thanks the Soviet participants for their part in making this contact possible.

Engell then says: "You often talk about what you call the common European home. We are Europeans, too, but we are Danes, and we place the emphasis on the need for this common home to have open doors and open windows. In 1949, together with the other countries of Western Europe and also the United States and Canada, we joined the NATO defensive alliance. In our views, NATO membership provides the best defense of our interests and security. We also want to stress that for many years, both amongst the population and in parliament in Denmark, NATO membership has been supported by a huge majority. This has been confirmed by polls and by numerous elections. Today approximately two-thirds of Danes have a positive attitude toward NATO and our membership in it. But, in addition to defending our security in the military sense, we perceive NATO as a substantial instrument in promoting the development of detente between East and West, an instrument encouraging progress in the human rights field, which is something else we are going to talk about in our discussion today. From the very beginning, Denmark has been one of the countries which has been most active in its support of efforts in the development of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe process.

"We want to welcome the agreement which you mentioned, Zagladin, on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles. As is known, Denmark and other northern countries do not have nuclear weapons on their territories and it is perfectly natural, therefore, that the balance of forces in conventional armaments should be of special significance in our area. You, no doubt, know that in recent years the Soviet Union has implemented a very heavy buildup in conventional forces. This is of special significance for us. Unfortunately this buildup goes much further than what is needed for conventional defense. The considerable additions where tanks are concerned is just one example. Denmark is a small country and we are very worried by the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies have landing troops in the Baltic Sea region which numerically exceed a hundred, and in addition an enormous number of ships. In exercises they work out operations for carrying out seaborne and airborne landings; in other words, they are purely offensive troops in their designation and in their deployment. We understand that the communique of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in June contains a statement that the ability to carry out surprise attacks or to carry out surprise offensives has to be overcome, the possibility of carrying out such operations has to be removed. We place emphasis upon this, but we

ask the question: How precisely is this in accordance with the actions of the Soviet Union; how do its words match up with its deeds? When is the Soviet Union going to begin to reduce its offensive forces, its offensive units which are located in the Baltic region?"

Zagladin replies: "May I reply to that, Engell? In the first place, I want to say that our attitude to the system that exists in Denmark, to your political and other customs, is one of complete respect; we respect your pluralism. We have no desire whatsoever to—nor can we—question the choice made by any people. It is the people's choice, and we respect it completely, in exactly the same way that we respect the foreign policy choice made by Denmark, its membership of an alliance. We do not place that in doubt. That is what we proceed from. Realism today has to be the initial viewpoint for everything. You spoke about the concern, Engell, that exists among Danes. Of course you are right to talk about this; there is concern in your country. We, too, have our own concerns. Just how justified or unjustified they are is another question, but they do exist and in our policy, therefore, we try to take into account the concerns of the other side, even in cases where we are not absolutely in agreement, that is to say where we do not see any reasons for these concerns. Nevertheless we take them into account.

"If I am to talk about our foreign policy priorities now in the field of disarmament and the strengthening of security, these priorities are very clear and it seems to me—even judging by what you have been saying here—that in many respects, yours and ours coincide. First of all we are in favor of seeking in talks with our U.S. partners a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, and later perhaps even more, provided, of course, that the ABM treaty remains in force. Then we are in favor of the destruction and elimination of chemical weapons, just as Denmark is. And, of course, we are in favor of the destruction—of a considerable reduction—in conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. You are right, there are asymmetries, but it is not just a question of our indeed having more tanks than the NATO countries—that is true, considerably more—but there are asymmetries in other types of armaments. And as far as some types of weapons are concerned, for example, and where a number of other types of weapons are concerned. We won't count them now.

"I think that our representatives will be busy with that once a mandate has been worked out for the talks in Vienna and the talks on limiting and reducing armaments begin. But I repeat: We admit that there are asymmetries, we consider that they have to be removed, eliminated; and that will be the start of the process of reducing troops and armaments in Europe. And then in the following stage we have to reduce them so that, ideally, we achieve the principle or reach the level of nonoffensive defense, that is to say the level at which every country or every flat in the European apartment house will be able to defend itself, but no one will be able

to attack his neighbor—be it a close neighbor or one situated far away. I do not think that there are any differences between us here.

"You ask, Mr Engell, when the Soviet Union is going to start reducing its armed forces and its conventional arms, and whether our works and deeds coincide here. You see, this process of reducing troops and armed forces in Europe must proceed across the whole continent, at the same time and on both sides. There are asymmetries both here and there. One side may have more, the other somewhat less, but we are prepared to eliminate these altogether, at the same time, of course, as the other side. We cannot start this process unilaterally, because then new asymmetries would arise, and not to our advantage. I think that it is quite possible to achieve agreed solutions on how to conduct these talks, in Vienna or somewhere else if talks are held after Vienna.

"The fact of the matter is that we have some concerns as well. You say that you are worried by our large number of tanks. We reckon, for example, that the Western side also has serious kinds of offensive weaponry, and there is the strategy of forward lines, there is the strategy that envisages strikes against our areas in the rear, and that is by no means a defensive strategy, either. That is, we have our concerns. You may say that they are unfounded. Well, perhaps, just as we consider yours not very well founded; but let us take as the premise that we must discuss it calmly and, most importantly, come to decisions.

"I was in Denmark a long time ago, and visited the Folketing. I remember—I don't know whether they are still there—there were frescoes there. On one of the frescoes there was the inscription: Not every hen that clucks lays eggs. Is the fresco still there, or not? I think that our conversations, if we could equate conversations about disarmament with the clucking of hens, should produce eggs, good ones; we must arrive at real reduction of arms on our continent together by joint efforts, respecting each other's interests and concerns."

Zubkov interjects: "Vadim Valentinovich, may I add one opinion. Mr Engell said that two-thirds of Danes are in sympathy with NATO's plans, but as far as we know from the statistics, while 3 years ago only 3 percent of Danes were in sympathy with our country, now it has risen to 37 percent, and almost four-fifths are now inclined, in general, to support the initiatives which the Soviet Union is putting forward and the changes which are taking place in our country."

Zagladin says: "I must say that in our country, considerably more—I think it is over two-thirds—regard Denmark more as a friend and partner than as anything else. And another remark: Mr Engell spoke of our amphibious units which conduct exercises—well, any troops that exist carry out maneuvers. If our Danish friends have any worries here—and I can see that they do—then there is the suggestion: Why not have several deputies of the

Folketing and several deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, representing our supreme military command, meet some time and discuss this problem from all sides like two good neighbors can do?"

Joergensen then says that Denmark certainly wants to stay in NATO, but that Engell is right in saying that any opportunity within the NATO framework to prevent nuclear war should be taken. Joergensen says he is working for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone guaranteed by the superpowers. He recalls the open talks he has been able to have with Zagladin and Lukyanov. He continues:

"And something else: We have to say straight out that all medium-range and other nuclear weapons must be removed from the Kola Peninsula and from the region of the Baltic republics adjoining the nuclear-free zone, and there must be firm guarantees that there are no nuclear weapons on dry land or on submarines in the Baltic area." Joergensen hopes that frank talk on such topics will continue, and that bureaucratic hindrances to expression of opinions on such matters by some people will end. Joergensen goes on to mention an antiwar movement which has already visited the United States to demonstrate against nuclear weapons; he hopes that antinuclear demonstrations by independent movements will be possible in the USSR as well. Gert Petersen says that the idea is that a few thousand young Scandinavians might visit the USSR to foster debate about peace; it would be good if they were put up in people's homes, he says. Petersen says he does not quite share his compatriots' approval of NATO. He asks how real disarmament can be achieved, noting the USSR'S changed attitude to the question of on-site inspections.

Engell, responding to Zubkov's comments about public opinion polls, says he has never seen a poll which did not give a clear majority in favour of NATO membership for Denmark. He welcomes the statement about asymmetry in weapons and goes on: "But I must ask you again, why in this case does the Soviet Union, despite the new line, so to speak, despite the fact that the new leadership has been in power in the Soviet Union for 3 years now, why, despite all this, has the Soviet Union not ended the modernization and build-up of conventional weapons? At the very time that the Soviet Union and the Soviet people wish, apparently, as far as I understand, to use their resources differently?"

Zagladin replies: "Well, I shall have to answer three people at once, but this is pleasant because all the questions are interesting and will help us to get a better idea about one another. Let me start with the last question, since Mr Engell was the last. You see, modernization is being carried out everywhere. You can read, say, about new tanks not only in the USSR, but also in France, the FRG and the United States. Modernization is going on everywhere, and I think the main thing to do now is what we have done with missiles. We agreed on the elimination of medium-range missiles and have

begun to destroy them. We must sit down at the negotiation table, come to an agreement on starting to reduce and, above all, to eliminate asymmetries and, perhaps, arrange there for some kind of limits to be placed on the improvement of weapons. There has already been a proposal by scientists, for instance—and it was expressed in particular at the UN—about putting limits on the creation of new types of weapons; and I think this is a very interesting idea.

"Of course, the question of verification arises, and here I move on to the question by Mr Petersen—though it is true that until now I have known him more as a theoretician in the social and public sphere. Incidentally, I would like to say that he has expressed a great many interesting ideas and thoughts both in writing and in what he has said. But in this case his question is also interesting and important.

"Let me say straight out that some time ago in the past, we were very cautious, if not more than cautious, with respect to inspection. We were very restrained with regard to problems of verification as a whole, to inspection in general. But with restructuring, when we realized that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the real reduction of arms—conventional and all others—and the elimination of chemical weapons were the only possible path to security, we realized something else: that without inspection, without verification, this process is impossible. Neither side would believe the other's words alone, even if they had the best feelings toward one another. and we decided that verification had to be begun and made total. And now we insist on full verification during the implementation of any disarmament undertakings. What is more, the situation is such, frankly speaking, that whereas previously we used to be reproached for our restraint—and, generally speaking, correctly so—now our proposals on verification are often met by a lack of understanding from the other side.

"Let me give an example. Say we are conducting talks on strategic weapons with the United States in Geneva. The question of sea-based cruise missiles has arisen. We propose restricting the number of these missiles, perhaps a reduction, and at any rate to do this under verification. And we propose concrete verification measures. Incidentally, certain other countries, including Scandinavian countries, are willing to propose their own methods of verification. But the U.S. side so far has no desire whatsoever for any kind of verification, whether with the help of instruments, i.e. verification from a distance, or with the help of on-site inspections. And they propose that we limit ourselves to unverifiable unilateral statements. This, generally speaking, is no method.

"Then, concerning chemical weapons, we also propose full verification of the implementation of measures to destroy and reduce chemical weapons. Why is this needed and moreover, not only at purely military enterprises? What about binary chemical weapons? After all, they are produced from various components, each of

which on its own may not be a poisonous substance. Therefore verification of such production is also needed. We also have seen no response here.

"On conventional weapons, we are completely willing to have verification with on-site inspection. Our proposals, which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev handed over last year to the U.S. President in Washington and later repeated in Moscow, consisted of something very simple. Let us begin by exchanging maps. NATO would give us maps of its own weapons, as it sees them, and of our weapons, our conventional ones—where they are, how many, which ones, and so on. In turn, we would also supply two maps—our ideas about NATO weapons and our map of our own weapons. We would compare them, and where they do not agree, we would immediately have an on-site inspection, immediately, so that we could see immediately whether the other side was telling the truth or not. I think that this is the very best method, which would make it possible to get out of the dead end of calculations, which the other Vienna talks, which have been going on since 1973, just have not brought to the final stage. And so, Mr Petersen, we are in favor of total and unconditional verification in all spheres."

Zagladin then says that he sees no reason why a Scandinavian youth delegation should not visit the USSR; joint peace events have already been staged with Americans.

Bjoern Elmqvist then says that that what Zagladin had to say on priorities corresponds to a considerable extent to the priorities put forward by NATO. Elmqvist then goes on: "On the verification issue I am not absolutely sure that we understood correctly what was said by Mr Zagladin, but I understand absolutely precisely and give you my assurance that Denmark and NATO attach extraordinary importance to issues of verification of agreements: this is a decisive point for us.

"I think it is essential to stress that on the Danish side we belong to NATO because NATO is a defensive alliance. We do not believe that NATO has any aggressive intentions. On our geographical latitude we are very concerned by the landing forces belonging to the Warsaw treaty that are located in the Baltic. If asymmetric reductions lead to the elimination of our concern, then that will be wonderful." Elmqvist then suggests that the Moscow participants might ask Shevardnadze whether he has read a letter that he handed to him during his visit to Copenhagen, containing specific points.

Joergensen then says: "This is a question about verification. I am very pleased with the statements in favor of the most effective verification. How should this be arranged? I would like to ask whether verification measures are in operation as far as naval forces are concerned, and do they affect calls by naval ships at Danish harbors? Our view is that it should be possible to verify the presence of nuclear weapons, for example, if the Danish authorities require this. I would like to hear what you have to say about this.

Zagladin responds: "As far as naval forces are concerned, even during the days of the talks in Stockholm we proposed that confidence-building measures should be extended to naval forces, though the West is still replying: 'No!' Why? No doubt because here the United States has the superiority and they do not want to disturb this in any way. That is what I assume to be the case. Secondly, regarding calls by ships. In this sense we place ourselves under the rules of the countries that are visited by our ships; and in the event of our ships making a call, we are willing to announce whether or not they are carrying nuclear weapons. We have even put forward an appropriate idea at the UN under which both the USSR and the United States would undertake to inform all countries where our ships might call about the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board.

"And the last thing—once again in connection with what was said by Mr Elmqvist and Mr Engell, earlier—don't try and convince us, you know, that you are in NATO and why you are in NATO: We understand and we accept this fact as a fact that has been in existence since 1949. And when we talk about the building of the common European home, about all-European cooperation, we are not thinking that everything has to be knocked down, that we all have to leave all the pacts, that everything has to be eliminated. No! That would be unrealistic. No one is ready for that. You aren't, neither are we. We propose, therefore, that cooperation should be developed and that the common European home should be built from the elements that already exist and with due consideration for these elements. You say that NATO is a defensive pact; fine. The Warsaw Treaty is defensive, too. I think that in this case, however, it would be very important to establish a political dialogue between them, not just to engage in military matters or engage in political problems separately: it is important to establish a political dialogue. In particular it would be a good idea if the commanders-in-chief of our two military alliances were to meet and talk about all the problems that we are discussing together, esteemed friends! How do you regard such an idea?"

Engell replies: "I would like to tell Mr Zagladin that any form of exchange of opinions is naturally welcomed by us. An exchange of opinions must of course take place within the necessary forums. Before we complete this section of our discussion I would now like to say that I have not received a satisfactory answer to one of my first questions. Let me ask you to give just one single example of the consequences that the Soviet Union has derived for itself, of the steps that it has taken, in accordance with the statements that the Soviet military doctrine is defensive in character. I would also like to ask Zagladin—since we are talking about the common European home—whether or not Mr Zagladin agrees that if we are living in a common home, in the same building, that we have to have the ability to move from room to room, the doors have to be open, that it has to be possible to open the windows there, too."

Zagladin then replies: "About the specific steps. I have already said that as far as reductions in armed forces are concerned, this, I believe, has to be done on a bilateral basis; and naturally we will reduce more because we have the superiority in individual types while the West has more where certain other types of armaments are concerned. Now we are working—our military people, the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense—they are working on the problem of defining what nonoffensive defense is, what are the criteria for the structure of the armed forces, the deployment of the armed forces, the character of the armed forces. At the 19th all-union party conference in our country it was stated—and this is the directive, so to speak, by which we are guided—that henceforth we must be guided not by quantitative parameters but by qualitative parameters, both from the viewpoint of armaments and from the viewpoint of the numbers of personnel in the armed forces. All this is in the process of being worked on. I know that various kinds of work are being done in the West, too. Where we are concerned it is in that direction. And as soon as direct contacts begin between the 23 countries of the West and our countries in the Warsaw Treaty, we will set out the results of this work we have been doing.

"Now the second question about doors and windows. It goes without saying that if the common European home is one where there are no contacts between the apartments and the rooms, then it would not be a home, it would be a prison. We want it to be our shared home, where you can open not just the doors and the windows but even the air vents in the windows. What we have in mind is that the common European home, in the military sense, should be reduced to the level of nonoffensive defense. In the political sense it must be a home open for dialogue based upon a right; in the cultural, in the economic sense, a home where different structures are in existence but where there is also an all-European economic structure—in the field of ecology, for example, transportation, communications, power generation. And in the cultural sense and in the humanitarian sense it must be a home for contacts where everyone sees in the other person not an enemy but a partner or even a friend, though he may be professing different ideas. So the windows and the doors and the air vents have to be open. But I think that this has brought us right up to the next topic, human rights and humanitarian issues."

Zubkov then introduces USSR Minister of Justice Kravtsov to speak on these issues. Kravtsov says how interested he was to listen to the earlier discussions on armaments and disarmament, where mishandling can lead to very severe consequences. Violations of human rights can also lead to serious consequences, which is why very great importance is being given to this problem in his country.

Kravtsov notes that an important point in the draft changes to constitutional laws which have recently been published is the concept of the law-governed state. He

expands on this, saying that the law must be supreme; the Soviet Union is not starting from scratch in this, however. The concept requires effective democracy and a strong judicial system.

Elmqvist says that you cannot have democracy without human rights. He says Denmark is a pluralistic society, where people are free to express their opinions and to form associations. The multiplicity of parties makes Denmark all the richer, he says. Human rights are important to Danes, says Elmqvist, recalling the stiff opposition to apartheid.

Elmqvist goes on: "Our interest also extends to other countries, including those which are geographically close to us, the Soviet Union and the Soviet people in particular. We are following with great interest the reforms being implemented in the Soviet Union. We are waiting, still waiting, for specific results. In Denmark, Gorbachev's plans for reforms, his slogans and his catchwords 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' have become common words in the Danish language. Unfortunately I cannot pronounce other words in Russian in the context of Gorbachev's reforms. A lot is being said in Denmark about the freeing of critics of the system, dissidents, critics of Soviet society. We are talking about political prisoners. We were very interested to hear about what happened during Chancellor Kohl's visit to the USSR, that political prisoners in the Soviet Union are now being freed. We very much hope and believe, at any rate we hope that soon individual Soviet people will be able, just like Danes, to freely put forward critical statements concerning the authorities, because if a person cannot freely criticize his own authorities, then society is not getting anywhere."

Elmqvist then asks for clarification about having a choice of candidates in elections—will people be able to run for different parties, or will two candidates both represent the Communist Party? Elmqvist notes that Gorbachev was elected president unanimously and without a second choice of candidate.

Kravtsov explains that the draft electoral law allows for multicandidate constituencies, and notes that about half of the deputies are already nonparty members at local level, and about 30 percent of the Supreme Soviet deputies are nonparty members. The draft law also envisages representation of public organizations in the Council of Nationalities.

Zagladin observes that restructuring has produced an atmosphere in which matters which were previously not open to comment, including foreign affairs and the law, are now freely criticized. Zagladin then continues: "In connection with glasnost, many of our ideas about the past—not about the past, but which existed in the past—are changing, concerning human rights. We now have a broader view of these concepts, we attach much more significance to them, although we did make our revolution in the name of human rights. But we were not

successful in everything—you know we have had a complex history. And now much is noticable, not only in the sense of glasnost, but in the sense, for example, of people going abroad, as well. I can tell you that, for example, in 9 months of this year, almost eight times as many people went abroad to live permanently as in the whole of 1986. Whoever wanted to go has gone, as long as there were no legal impediments. That is, a lot of changes are taking place.

"As far as elections are concerned, you ask if one party or several are to be represented. We have the one party; but we have party people and nonparty people, believers and nonbelievers; and the Communists are already in the minority in the Supreme Soviet. I think its composition will change even more after the next elections, if candidates of believers and nonbelievers are put forward. And why two? Perhaps there will be more candidates. Recently we had elections in one constituency with three, and none got in, not having gained 50 percent. So a lot is changing here in this respect.

"As far as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is concerned, and his recent unanimous election, I will tell you more. Whatever views people here may have, they can argue over the most varied matters. The session of the Supreme Soviet has just ended here. A number of laws were passed, a number of decrees were endorsed, and this time it was not unanimous. On one, I think, 12 were against, and on another there were 25; there were also abstentions. But were the question of electing the chairman of the Presidium came up, then there would be total unanimity this time, too. I am not saying this so as praise our president, our general secretary, once again. No, the fact is that people see the embodiment of restructuring in him, and that is a feeling not of personal admiration, but a feeling of the desire to go forward. Everyone wants to go forward, regardless of their views, which can be very varied."

Joergensen agrees that there is wider expression of opinion now in the USSR, but he feels that one-party systems are better suited to developing countries. He is glad to see the greater independence of individual regions, recalling Denmark's relations with the Faroes.

Petersen asks why it is only now that there have been votes against and abstentions in the Supreme Soviet. He would also like to know whether new legislation is going to allow for free travel to and from the USSR for Soviet citizens.

Engell then says that the human rights issue is viewed as being just as important as military-political problems, and he goes on:

"I want to recall the fact that Amnesty International, an internationally recognized organization, recently issued a report saying that at the end of 1987 there were still at least 300 prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, either in prisons or in psychiatric treatment facilities.

That is what that report asserts. After the visit by Federal Chancellor Kohl, we learned during the chancellor's news conference in Moscow that all political prisoners in the Soviet Union will be freed no later than the end of this year. In this connection, I would like to ask the USSR justice minister whether he can confirm this perfectly clear and precise statement by the FRG federal chancellor?"

Engell goes on to ask whether it is really easier for Soviet Jews to emigrate now, and goes on to conclude his questions as follows: "A question I would like to ask, also in connection with human rights, is: The Soviet criminal code includes an item on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. For many years it has been used as an article under which people have been sentenced when it has not been thought possible to have them at large. Can one imagine a situation where this article would be abolished, as a link in the policy that Mr Zagladin was talking about, where any form of criticism of the authorities is permitted? And my very last question: Can one now expect, as part of the efforts being made by the Supreme Soviet as well at present, that judges in the Soviet Union will gain real independence from the party? This question is naturally for the USSR justice minister."

Kravtsov responds: "First of all, on entry and exit. As is known, under the existing legislation, at present the drafting of a new law, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, is in progress on the issue of exit from the USSR or entry into our country for Soviet citizens. This draft law will envisage other grounds on which a person can go abroad or come back to the Soviet Union. The new legislation will be in complete accordance with Article 12 of the pact on civil and political rights. Such a legislative act is being drafted here.

"Now on the question of political prisoners: Well, on the whole we believe that those who are kept in places of confinement in the Soviet Union are people who have committed criminal [Kravtsov stresses "criminal"] offences, acts of some kind which are criminal, acts stipulated by criminal law. At this time, the number of people convicted in accordance with Article 70, about which I have been asked, this is...[Kravtsov changes thought] as you know, the article is called: Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda. Well, two people are in places of confinement and there are five people in exile at the present time. There are two people in places of confinement convicted in accordance with Article 190, Section 1. This is the dissemination of knowingly false statements discrediting the Soviet State and social system. In accordance with Article 227, it is these who are regarded as prisoners, so to speak, of conscience. In the case we are talking about, the article envisages infringements of individual citizens' rights under the guise of the performance of religious rites. Two people in places of confinement. Two people. And now what prospects are there? Will this law continue to exist or not? There will be no article 190, section 1 at all, so to speak, for the

moment. What I mean is that there will be no such article. Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the other union republics and in the all-union law—it is Article 7—will undergo significant alteration.

At any rate, responsibility will be stipulated for specific actions which might be expressed in, say, calls for the overthrow of power, for the overthrow of the government, and which might be capable of leading to certain severe consequences. This article will be formulated in approximately those terms in its new form. But this is not yet final; the new law has not yet been adopted, but that is what we have in mind, so to speak, when we talk about Article 70 of the criminal code—yes, the criminal code of the RSFSR. And there is also the issue of the courts. We are of course very concerned with ensuring that judges in our country really are independent. The Constitution now says that our judges are independent and are subject only to the law. But hitherto the real guarantees, sufficiently real guarantees, have not been there. The new draft law which has been published—and a special law is going to be adopted on the status of judges—all these guarantees are provided there. So far it is in the drafting stage, but soon we are to have a session of the Supreme Soviet—it will be at the end of November, on the 29th—and this law will be adopted. And these guarantees are provided there. I simply do not have the opportunity to go on talking about this subject, because we still have a whole problem to discuss."

Zagladin then says: "With regard to what Gert Petersen was saying and the question of why people used to vote unanimously in the past, well, you know, there are many reasons. Let's be frank. In the first place, for a certain time which we call the period of Stalin's cult of personality, it was simply dangerous to vote against. Secondly, people themselves—and this applies to the period that followed and even now it still applies to very many people—prefer to express their opinions in commissions and in discussions, but when they are voting they want to demonstrate unanimity—it's as if it were embarrassing to vote against, as if he were against Soviet power, which is absolutely not the case.

"But now the atmosphere is changing. The situation is changing. I tell you, the discussions that are taking place in the commissions of the Supreme Soviet are so heated that, well, they stand comparison with any of the discussions that take place with you in Denmark, and as far as I know you have some very sharp discussions. And I think that that period of unanimity stemming from a desire to be patriotic is coming to an end. Patriotism, as far as we are concerned, is now to be found in something else, in putting forward specific ideas, in putting forward specific proposals and in getting the best decisions adopted which correspond to the interests of society in the best possible way. This applies to ecology. Fedor Trofimovich, let me hand over to you at once."

Fedor Morgun says: "I am very grateful to Soviet and Danish television for the opportunity to say a few words about ecology. At the same time, I have a grievance against my own colleagues and my Danish ones who have squeezed into the last place one of the most important issues in the lives of people, and have left virtually no time at all for it." Morgun talks of the bold Vikings who travelled across Scandinavia into Novgorod and across the Atlantic to North America, saying they were well acquainted with nature around the whole of Europe and would have some unpleasant things to say about us who live and work today. Nature apparently continues to move along its changeless course, but to the thinking person it is clear that something unnatural is taking place on earth as pollution continues. He adds: "To put things in order in the air, in the waters, in the soil, and in the forests, the good will of everyone is required, as is wise behavior by political leaders and state leaders, and huge sums of money. Where is it to be found? Present-day science has the right technologies: they are well-known in many of the advanced countries and indeed now in virtually all countries. But I repeat: Money is needed. For a long time military people have considered their affairs to be of the highest degree of secrecy. But everything in the world is relative. And there are clever people everywhere, in all branches, controlling things; and clever people, experts, have calculated that 900 billion rubles are being spent every year on arms today. In order to put an end to desertification, to clean up the waters in the oceans of the world, in all rivers and lakes, to put an end to the death of the forests in Brazil, Asia, and Europe—everywhere forests are disappearing—496 billion rubles are required. The possibility is there. People must display the interest and the will. Today I would like to mention my impressions when the general secretary was in Krasnoyarsk. It seemed to me that almost every other word spoken by Mikhail Sergeyevich was 'nature', 'ecology', 'environment', 'air'. When talks were taking place in Moscow a few days ago with Chancellor Kohl and those with him, the several authoritative priority questions that were raised by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, included ecology, and as soon as the ecological situation was mentioned there was an immediate reaction both from Chancellor Kohl and from those with him; such is the extent to which this issue is of interest to the FRG leadership and the leadership of our country. And some very interesting solutions are being found.

"The time for our program is running out. I have heard some interesting discussions and dialogue about arms, about tanks, and bombs: I don't think I shall be giving away any secrets when I say that in the Politburo, in the council of Ministers, in the government of our republic, at virtually every sitting—yes, I know it for myself—that departments which were formerly engaged only in defense are now working for the light industry, for the food industry, for industries linked with providing things for the people."

Zagladin: "For ecology, too?"

Morgun relies: "Of course for ecology; that is what I am talking about. Here is an example. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov says: Why are we ineffective in solving issues concerning the production in our country of a cheese-making plant that he saw when he was in Denmark—a Danish plant? And that is an instruction to a department head who had not been dealing with these issues previously."

Zagladin then concludes: "Esteemed Danish colleagues, our time really is coming to an end and I'm taking the risk of being not very polite, but I would like to suggest that we defer discussion in detail of the ecological problem as Fedor Trofimovich Morgun asked, to another meeting. Perhaps we could first set up a joint group to meet especially to discuss ecology in the North, with deputies from other parliaments taking part, perhaps, as we have done on the security in the North issue with the Anker Joergensen group. Secondly, in January 1988 [as heard] we are inviting representatives of the parliaments of the northern countries to our country to discuss these same ecological problems.

"I repeat once again that I have no desire to be impolite, but I think that here we have to put not a period but a semicolon. In conclusion, for my own part I will say just a couple of sentences. Firstly, I am very glad that we ran out of time, because that means that there are things for us to talk about and that the desire to do so is there. Secondly, when I was visiting you in Kronborg they told me the legend about Holger the Dane, who is always ready to defend this country. My wish to you, my colleagues, and to the whole Danish people is that Holger may ever be at peace; may he never have to take his sword from the scabbard, and together we must ensure that that is the case."

The Danish participants then express interest in the ecological points made by Morgun and look forward to the possibility of another television bridge. Zubkov ends by thanking all the participants.

Roundtable Discussion Addresses Ethnic Issues
PM0211163188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Nov 88 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[A. Chernyak and A. Chernenko account of PRAVDA roundtable discussion chaired by PRAVDA Chief Editor V.G. Afanasyev: "The USSR—Our Common Home. CPSU Central Committee Members and USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies in PRAVDA Roundtable Discussion"—no place or date of discussion specified]

[Text] Azerbaijanis and Estonians, Russians and Ukrainians, Koryaks and Nentsi, Uygurs and Kazakhs, Armenians and Tajiks, Belorussians and Georgians—there are more than 100 nations and ethnic groups living and working shoulder to shoulder in our common home, the USSR. After Great October, every union republic and every people advanced far forward. But the Alma-Ata events in December 1986, the current situation around

Nagorno-Karabakh, [the situation] in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the tragedy in Sumgait, and the complex processes in the Baltic republics and in some other regions have shown that the years of stagnation have also had an effect on the state of interethnic relations.

CPSU Central Committee members, USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, CPSU Central Committee apparatus officials, and PRAVDA staffers gathered for a roundtable discussion to exchange opinions on the most acute problems of interethnic relations.

Taking part in the discussion were: G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; R.N. Nishanov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee; V.A. Mikhaylov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational-Party Work Department and chief of the Interethnic Relations Subdepartment; O.Ye. Cherkeziya, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers; B.V. Kravtsov, member of the USSR Parliamentary Group Committee and USSR minister of justice; N.V. Lemaev, USSR minister of the petroleum refining and petrochemical industry; I.P. Kubilyus, rector of the Vilnius State University; Kh.A. Rayk, director of a secondary school in Tartu; V.E. Siytan, senior salesman in Tallinn's Trade Center; M.P. Kalyuzhnaya, team leader in the "Voroshilovgradkhimstroy" Construction Administration; O.I. Pipikis, engineer at the Ventspils enterprise for petroleum and petroleum products deliveries for export; S.V. Mamunts, sovkhos director from the Azerbaijan SSR's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]; N.A. Polaznov, chairman of Kalinin Oblast's Kalinin Kolkhoz; writer G.G. Abashidze; and AUCCTU Secretary K.T. Turysov.

The roundtable discussion was chaired by PRAVDA Chief Editor V.G. Afanasyev.

Moderator: The topic of our conversation has been defined as interethnic relations, the problems arising here, and the ways to solve them.

The range of questions is very broad. Without in any way imposing any restrictions on anyone's opinions, statements, proposals, or conclusions, I would like to concretize them.

The central problem is: "The Party and the Nationalities Question," the party leadership of the development of interethnic relations. The 19th all-union party conference comprehensively analyzed the state of our society and noted that party organizations at times overlook this important sector. Hence our current, to put it mildly, unpleasant experiences in our large Soviet home. How did this come about and what must party committees and party organizations do to remedy the situation?

About the Soviet people. This idea plays a very important role in the elaboration of nationalities policy and international education. Meanwhile, some press organs

have suddenly started shying away from this term, at times trying to withdraw within a simply national shell, forgetting that all of our peoples and all of our union republics are components of the united USSR.

Let us take the problems of national formations in the broadest sense of the word. We have union and autonomous republics, we have autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, and we also have more than 55 million persons either living outside the boundaries of their national-territorial formations or having no such formations. What is to happen with them?

To continue. With respect to our integrated national economic complex and republican economic accountability, how are they to interact, and how is economic accountability, whether regional or national, to ensure the interests of the Soviet Union, the interests of all USSR peoples? Nationality problems largely stem from the material base and are rooted in the economy. The correlation between center and the localities is an acute question.

There are many arguments about language. There are correct opinions, there are some not altogether correct opinions, there are some simply incorrect opinions. What should we do here? Which path should we follow?

Or take for example ideas like international, national, and nationalist. At times we perceive the national as nationalist, which is totally incorrect. But there is also the other side of the coin—there are attempts to present the nationalist as national and even as international.

So there we are; would anyone like to be the first to speak and open this, I would say, complex discussion? Let me mention, by the way, that this is the first of several meetings planned by the PRAVDA editorial office. We intend to invite and listen to social scientists, economists, workers, and kolkhoz members.

V.A. Mikhaylov: Democratization, glasnost, and pluralism of opinion have cast light on the dark side of national relations which, for a long time, were being ignored and driven deeper inside; but they have also created the conditions necessary for democratically overcoming these defects.

The 19th party conference took a major step in the theoretical and practical substantiation of the nationalities policy in the period of restructuring. It is well known that it adopted a separate resolution on this question. But there is another matter: To what extent have party committees reoriented themselves? What is new in their work, and is it really new?

G.V. Kolbin. The task we set ourselves is to anticipate problems. The specific experience accumulated since the 1986 events in Alma-Ata has convinced us that this work must be done constantly and purposefully by representative organs. Party committees, without inflating their

staff but abolishing superfluous links, have set up interethnic relations sections [sektor]. They analyze the state of affairs and determine who is short of what and what has to be done without waiting for the issue to evolve from national into nationalist. This is a very fine dividing line.

The republic Supreme Soviet set up an Interethnic Relations Commission. Corresponding commissions were set up by local soviets. The republic Supreme Soviet Commission is made up of people from different nationalities.

V.G. Afanasyev: Is this system not bureaucratic?

G.V. Kolbin: The real point is that these structures are staffed not by functionaries but by representatives of all nations and ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. We strove to ensure that representatives of one people should show concern for the interests of another people. We are doing a lot of work with the creative intelligentsia which in many respects shapes public opinion. It was pleasant to hear it said at one meeting: "Now we believe that you are pursuing a fair policy in interethnic relations."

It is very important for people to believe us party leaders. This is why words and deeds must coincide. People must be told the truth. There is no need to promise them paradise on earth, we must proceed from realities. And any work that has been embarked upon must be completed without fail. Take the housing problem, for example. It does perturb people. PRAVDA has already reported on the way we are solving it. This year, just like last year, we will fulfill our annual plan by 7 November. In just 2 years we have succeeded in reducing waiting lines for housing by over 40 percent. The people now believe us and are themselves playing an active part in the work. The same has happened as regards food supplies. Per capita meat consumption in the republic has increased by 10 kg within 3 years. The situation has also improved as regards consumer goods.

People in Kazakhstan are sluggish from the migration viewpoint, and yet there is a surplus of labor resources. What is to be done? In order to employ everybody, we took the jobs to people: Wherever possible, we built branches of light industry enterprises and we are making wide use of homeworkers. This has made it possible to produce approximately R200 million's worth of additional consumer goods in light industry alone.

To put it briefly, we are striving to take people's interests more fully into account and are now seeking the best possible solutions to interethnic questions. This goes a long way toward improving the health of the situation in the republic.

V.A. Mikhaylov. One of the reasons behind complications in interethnic relations is the fact that the mechanism for management of national processes and for

consideration of the interests of nations and ethnic groups was to a certain extent deformed. This started back in the thirties. On the one hand, our program for the nationalities question is clear-cut and noble. On the other hand, we are coming up against the kind of phenomena whereby the interests of some nationality were being infringed or were not being considered. And this led to conflicts.

Gennadiy Vasilyevich [Kolbin] is saying that Kazakhstan has set up party committee sections and corresponding commissions in soviets, and that the first secretary of the republic's Central Committee is personally dealing with this question. This is good, of course. But even so, this is again more a case of the subjective factor at work, while we ought to have a mechanism which would prevent all deviations from and violations of this fine dividing line when combining the national and the international. In this context, would it not be worth looking, for example, at a question like setting up—and above all in the multinational republics like the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and others—their own Soviets of Nationalities in the republic Supreme Soviets—chambers of nationalities to represent the interests of the peoples living in these republics?

G.V. Kolbin: I believe that this would be useful.

R.N. Nishanov: Without any doubt. All nations and ethnic groups would be represented in the Soviet of Nationalities. This would be especially good for republics which have autonomous formations. Like our Karakalpak ASSR, for example.

We could advance even further along this avenue. It was said here that there are more than 55 million persons of various nationalities living outside their territories. And why not set up national rayons and even national rural soviets for them within the republics or oblasts? As a rule, they live in compact communities. Take as a specific example the Crimean Tatars or the Koreans living in Uzbekistan. If national formations were to be created, they would be legally represented in the supreme organ, and the supreme organ would help to solve all their problems.

V.A. Mikhaylov: As a matter of fact, we have had experience of national rayons and national soviets in operation in the past. Many of us here probably remember the prewar Greek, German, or Jewish rayons.... The RSFSR and the Ukraine alone had created more than 300 rayons and about 3,000 rural soviets. They helped to solve many questions concerning the development of culture and language, and to satisfy other national needs. Why not have national clubs and culture centers in the cities?

G.G. Abashidze: I think that this could only be useful. The most beautiful aspect of our life is the friendship between peoples. We have lauded it. And probably

nobody even imagined that we would live to see the Sumgait events. Yes, there are most diverse reasons here. Some of them have already been mentioned. I would like to speak about writers.

A writer's position is such that, if he were loyal to his people, he could not go against a current such as that in Karabakh. When the whole people is out demonstrating, a writer cannot shut himself off inside his home. An Azerbaijani writer would join his people, an Armenian would join his....

N.A. Polaznov: But why join them? There are occasions when the masses are following an incorrect path, having succumbed to sugary speeches by demagogues who are pursuing their own ambitious objectives. Who else, if not the writer, will tell people the truth?

R.N. Nishanov: Not just the writers. The party official and the mass media must also have their say.

G.G. Abashidze: Our people in Georgia often feel greatly annoyed when some media transfer Stalin's and Beriya's crimes to the whole Georgian people. As if other peoples have produced no criminals, as if people of other nationalities have committed no crimes. Stalin and Beriya inflicted great harm on the Georgian people themselves. There were executions by firing squad in our republic since 1921, while the best part of our intelligentsia was destroyed in 1937.

R.N. Nishanov: Let me add that the so-called "Uzbek affairs" are insulting for Uzbeks. Any sober-minded person would understand that the "cotton affairs" are just one link in a long chain of crimes committed by dishonest people. Responsibility for crimes committed by individuals must not be shifted onto the conscience of an entire people. Such an approach by mass media makes people indignant.

K.T. Turysov: Public organizations, the trade unions, and the Komsomol can do a lot to improve interethnic relations. Unfortunately, they do not fully perform their functions. Nowadays there is recurrent talk that social justice is not observed in the distribution of social consumption funds. Families in some Central Asian republics—in Turkmenia for example—have 10 and more children, while Russian families have just 1 or 2 children. It is obvious that they do not make identical use of social funds. Prices and wages in our country are deformed. This also has its effect.

Sometime back in the mid-sixties, our economists put forward the thesis that the equalization of republics' economic levels had been completed. Economic strategy was elaborated on the basis of this premise. In actual fact, however, there had been no economic equalization. Even now some republics are developing one-sidedly. For example, vast regions of the RSFSR to the east of the center, and parts of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, possessing tremendous natural resources and having

become the nation's pantry, are at the same time regions that have been done out of their fair share socially. Wealth is at times a trap, because it is subordinated to one purpose: To take it away as quickly as possible. And what about people? Little thought is given to them. A consumerist attitude is developing toward human personality. There is ministerial or departmental dependence, which is often held out to be dependence by individual republics. And this anomaly often produces anomalies in interethnic relations.

There is also something else. As a result of the deformation of prices which I already mentioned, national income in regions where extracting sectors are developed is lower, even though people apply all their energy at work. We must think this over.

V.G. Afanasyev: Yes, there are instances of unequal exchange.

K.T. Turysov: So, how are we to switch to territorial economic accountability in these conditions?

O.Ye. Cherkeziya: It has somehow happened that a region's transition to economic accountability and self-financing is nowadays directly linked with the question of national-economic sovereignty. I think that we are approaching this in a somewhat simplistic manner. Neither economic accountability nor self-financing is possible without settling the question of price formation as regards raw and other materials and commodities. Meanwhile, terms like subsidized republic and subsidizing (*emissionnaya*) republic have taken root and been established in practice. And everything has turned topsy-turvy. The former is condemned, the latter is cursed. For example, Georgia has been nonsubsidized all this time. But throughout its existence it has been subsidizing because its output is sold beyond the republic's boundaries and, naturally, the money stays there. These questions must be resolved. They can be settled by economic means, but under no circumstances by administrative edict methods.

Time and again we now also hear it said in our republic that we must apparently strive for national economic sovereignty. What has brought this about? Here it was said that attention to national problems has slackened in places. I think that proper attention has been lacking not just in places but everywhere. In real life we somehow separated national problems from economic problems. International education and nationality problems were treated on the level of showy performances in a declaration of love. This is the cause of everything. You could say that an approach did exist, but this approach was very superficial. And now, in the conditions of glasnost, everything has floated up to the surface.

Many questions were not raised not because they did not exist but because they had been driven deeper under ground in order not to make life unnecessarily complicated. Excessive centralization in all spheres of our life had, and still has, its effect.

I.P. Kubilyus: Quite so. I have already said this on television once, and I will repeat it now: For how long will some Ivan Petrovich in Office No 421 keep making decisions whether to build a public toilet in some Lithuanian city whose name he cannot even pronounce? And the corridors of power in Moscow are long....

N.V. Lemayev: The way I see it, Ionas Pyatrovich [Kubilyus], you are somewhat out of step with life. Today we are not dealing with public toilets. Enterprises and associations under the Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry work in conditions of economic accountability. They have their own money and they build whatever they want. Labor collectives have R653 million to their names. For example, Kazakhstan has set the task of ensuring housing for every working person before the year 2000. We will help. We will also help in other similar cases.

I.P. Kubilyus: For the time being, this independence of enterprises is rather theoretical; in practice they cannot take a step without the center. There is also something else. The idea of dependence is now current. People are displeased when it is applied to them. Lithuania is an agricultural country and it makes losses because prices for agricultural products have not risen for years on end, while prices for equipment and fertilizers have. And how! Lithuania produces more meat per capita than the United States. So how can we be described as dependent when we are working hard? There is a striving for economic accountability in our economy, even though we realize that it is difficult.

O.I. Pipikis: I would like to second these comrades. Excessive centralization is our scourge. I work in an enterprise in Ventspils which is subordinate to a union department. Ours is an international city. But this also exacerbates its problems. The central apparatus makes appropriations to solve only "its own" problems. The enterprise employs non-local people. Local residents do not benefit from such appropriations. A strange situation has developed—they are nobody's responsibility, neither Riga's nor Moscow's. Outcasts. Here is the cause of conflicts. And now, as USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, I have been instructed to somehow get hold of a certain percentage of deductions for the city.

O.Ye. Cherkeziya: Add our elementary disorder to centralization, and what do you get? For example, the simplest of articles—a typewriter with Georgian typeface—is a major problem for many of our institutions. And this immediately starts smacking of Russification.

Take another example. We have repeatedly instructed the Georgian SSR Ministry of Communications to supply our telegraph offices with Georgian typeface printers. Just look at what happens. Someone sends a telegram from one village to another. The Russian alphabet is used to write words in Georgian. The rubbish that comes out at times is such that neither a Georgian nor a Russian could read it, let alone make any sense of it.

Such facts have on numerous occasions evolved into a national problem. After all, even in a republic with a homogeneous population, regional development ought to be approached with due consideration for specific conditions. The different anomalies cause people's dissatisfaction. And if there are national grounds for it, this is already a calamity! We often fail to take this into account.

R.N. Nishanov: The idea of regional economic accountability and self-financing is sound as such. Last year we transferred the agro-industrial complex in Surkhan-Darya Oblast to economic accountability. The experiment proved successful. We have a profit of almost R100 million and not a single loss-making farm. But this work must not be approached mechanically.

It is true, order must be introduced in price formation. We also receive a subsidy of almost R2 billion. But no account is taken of the fact that only 9 percent of the cotton we produce is processed in the republic.

Economic accountability, self-financing, and economic independence are different things. In-depth work on economic accountability and self-financing is one thing, while economic independence is something completely different. There are thousands of threads linking us with one another, and they must not be broken under any circumstances. On the contrary, it is necessary to strengthen the integrated national economic complex by all possible means. Therein lies our strength.

N.V. Lemayev: But not everybody is doing this. I have only just come out of a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session. An important decision for the national economy was being made there—on the building of a new industrial complex. Today, without the chemical industry, it is as if we were without hands. And yet both the Belorussians and the Ukrainians refuse to build the complex. You might as well try and build it on the moon. It was decided to build it in the tayga. About R15 billion will have to be invested there....

B.V. Kravtsov: We have already spoken about economic defects which, of course, have an effect on interethnic relations. The reasons were also discussed. I would like to look somewhat ahead. What lies in store for us tomorrow?

Speaking about the legal aspect in the system of interethnic relations, I think that now we can already address the draft Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution which is now being discussed. Where would I like to focus attention? Henceforth, all the most important and really vital problems will be solved by the Congress of People's Deputies. It will be able to effectively examine questions concerning the USSR's composition, and it will have the power to ratify the formation of new autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts

within the composition of union republics. The powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will include the introduction of new forms of administration [upravleniye] whenever necessary.

Kh.A. Rayk: The country's main wealth is our multinational nature. But I think that we are not always sensible in dealing with this wealth. The question of educational work has already been raised here. And this work begins at school. We in our country strive to inculcate in children a sense of respect for other nations. We organize friendship festivals, conferences, arts festivals, and other events. We have many friends in the Ukraine, in Moscow, in Armenia, in Belorussia.... In order to know each other better, in order to be friends, it is necessary to have more frequent contacts, to visit each other. But over the last few years we have somewhat curtailed the opportunities for all this. The cost of tourist travel is high. It is ridiculous, we invite Americans to visit us at home, but how about inviting each other?

The nationalities question is acute today. In my view, the main mistake was made at schools, in their programs. For example, Russians in our schools did not study Estonian, while the study of Russian is mandatory for Estonians. That was a mistake, but we are correcting it.

I.P. Kubilyus: Exactly the same thing happened in our republic. The sphere for cultivating the Lithuanian language was getting narrower, it was being curtailed all the time. Look at the way Lithuanian history is taught in schools. It was virtually nonexistent, this history. Just like geography, as a matter of fact. All this must be corrected, and this is being done now.

Following the 19th conference, our republic's public became very active. A simple chain reaction, as nuclear physicists say. There are many reasons for it. There are our own mistakes, as well as central organs' miscalculations regarding the republic. There are also what we see as the undemocratic elections for the 19th party conference in Lithuania. Moscow said one thing, and something else was being done in our country. People were dissatisfied with this. The result was the emergence of the People's Front and of "Sajudis," the movement for restructuring. On the whole, it is a progressive movement, even though it is attracting certain hangers-on.

It was correctly said here: Party committees—and I would say the party bureaucracy—are slow in restructuring themselves. Renewal is under way in society, radicalization is under way, and today it is no longer possible to apply yesterday's methods and work in the old style. "Sajudis" has taken on everything that the party bureaucracy failed to do as regards restructuring. Unfortunately, the central press writes virtually nothing about what is happening in the Baltic republics. And there are all sorts of rumors circulating. Even while in the

"Moskva" Hotel I overheard someone saying that Russians will be evacuated from the Baltic republics. The Lithuanians are hatching something. Nothing of the sort, but the rumors are circulating....

Let me repeat once more, there are also people with very devious intentions inside "Sajudis." But we are talking about individuals. All sorts of things happen whenever a revolutionary transformation is going on. This is nothing to fear.

I have been working with young people for a long time. If you like, I will quote one of the classics: "To be young and not to be radical means being heartless. To be old and not to be conservative means being mindless." I perceive a great meaning in this even though, like all dicta, it is figurative.

G.G. Abashidze: Many party officials have a suspicious attitude toward so-called informal associations and, to put it mildly, are afraid to mix with people. And yet it must be said that some informal associations are doing a good job. For years on end we had a military testing range right next to a 6th century monument. One of the best examples of architecture was being mindlessly destroyed until the public rose to defend it.

Obviously, we ourselves were incorrectly brought up in the past, we brought others up incorrectly, and we have thus reached the point where we are today. I think that literature and art in general, as well as the party organizations, must solve these questions, take a closer look at the problems and study them in greater depth, generalize them. This is that much more necessary now, in the conditions of democracy. It is an open secret that people interested in muddying the waters and instigating rash steps often latch on to pure and sincere young people. We must protect them from these people's influence.

In my view, the cleansing of socialism from corrosion and the solution of the nationalities question in line with Lenin's principles will suit everybody. Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Tajiks, Estonians....

O.I. Pipikis: The neighbors on my right and my left, representing Estonia and Latvia, and other comrades have expressed their views on language. I agree with them: Living in a given republic, it is impossible not to know its language. Especially those working in the services sphere, soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol, party committees. I suggest the payment of salary supplements for this. Why should someone working in a restaurant receive a supplement on production of evidence that he speaks English? What about right there, in daily life, where conflict situations frequently develop nowadays, why not here? There should be incentives, at least during the initial period.

V.A. Mikhaylov: Knowledge of two or three languages must become the norm. A writer from one of the Baltic republics said in this context: I speak three languages and

I am dubbed a nationalist. Someone else, who has lived in the republic for 20 years and speaks only Russian, is an internationalist. Following the October revolution's victory, when party officials were posted to national republics and oblasts, they as a rule learned the national language as quickly as possible. Older people today are actually amazed at what has happened: We all spoke the language and were familiar with the culture, and there were no frictions at all. In the recent past, however, over the last 10-15 years, the absence of this culture of interethnic contacts and of correct language policy has led to unpleasant conflicts.

V.G. Afanasyev: This is exactly what Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kolbin is doing right now. While working in Georgia he mastered the Georgian language, he was posted to Kazakhstan and immediately started learning the Kazakh language, he recently had a meeting with Kazakh young people and spoke their native language. This must be encouraged by all means.

O.I. Pipikis: There need be no fear of social formations, they are useful. For example, our People's Front calls on everyone, regardless of national affiliation, to take part in restructuring. Other public organizations are also emerging in the republic. But they do not share the same views and perceive the People's Front as an insult.

I have attended People's Front rallies. There was an appeal against mixed marriages. Many perceived it as racist. But this is not so. A new family must become part of the republic's life, it will live in Latvia, and therefore it must know the traditions of its people.... After all, a family produces children. They must know the language and culture of the people among whom they live. Otherwise they will be unhappy.

V.G. Afanasyev: Are there not some traces of national exclusivity here? What about love, if nothing else?

R.N. Nishanov: And I would add that, if people reason in this way, they wittingly or unwittingly infringe upon the legitimate interests of representatives of other nations.

V.A. Mikhaylov: I think that we all must show some concern to ensure that no representatives of any nation or ethnic group are insulted, to ensure that they feel themselves equal citizens of the republic where they live.

S.V. Mamunts: Correct. And a specific approach must be adopted toward the solution of nationalities problems. Every nationality has its own history, its own culture, its own customs, its own soul. Today there is a lot of talk about Nagorno-Karabakh. The NKAO problems are a synthesis of problems: They include social disorders, suppression of the national pride of Armenians in Karabakh, scornful attitude toward their national, cultural, and spiritual heritage, and the social injustice which, to a certain extent, led to discrimination against our people....

I am certain that if the republic leaders and the union government had promptly investigated these problems, we would not be experiencing such pressure by events today. Indeed, the overwhelming number of the oblast's residents are Armenian, and yet their language is treated as second-class. Why? Simply because the national majority and its culture were "overlooked" when the oblast was formed. I deem it necessary to say: Our fraternity has not been lost. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that, even during the tragic days and nights in Sumgait, some Azerbaijanis saved their Armenian fellow-countrymen. In our view, however, today's form of interethnic structure is obsolete; it has led to conflicts. And not only in Karabakh, whose people are industrious and honest.

B.V. Kravtsov: As regards the question linked with NKAO, it is being studied at present, and proposals are being drafted in the spirit of the well-known party and government decisions.

N.A. Polaznov: I am altogether at a loss to comprehend things when people start talking about some republic or oblast being wounded. I am here to represent the Russian Non-Chernozem Zone. And if we were to speak about wounding, nobody is probably worse off than we are. After all, we have lived to see a situation when there are no schools in the countryside because there are no pupils there. Our sovkhos has a school with just two first grade pupils! These are not just trivial insults; it is necessary to somehow radically solve the question at the level of the great home, as it were.

N.V. Lemayev: This conversation is making it clear that every republic has its own worries. But there is one common problem—everybody must work better. If we all work better, we will all live better—and nationalities questions will not be so exacerbated. The economy will be stronger and in a better position if both national and all-union interests were more fully taken into account.

R.N. Nishanov: Here we touched more on the interests of national republics, of national development. I think we are agreed that an international basis ensures the success of national development. If there are international ties, there will be a consolidation of the common base, there will be a consolidation of our common home. Not a single one of the nations represented in the Soviet Union could ensure its future free development without the others.

V.A. Mikhaylov: I would like to return to the starting point of our conversation—the problems of party leadership. Vladimir Ilich Lenin repeatedly warned Marxists against "national philistinism." Unfortunately, this phenomenon is still a frequent occurrence. Events around NKAO are a confirmation of this. The behavior by many Communists in Armenia and Azerbaijan must be negatively assessed. Neither of the republics adhered to Lenin's behest from the start: To make reciprocal concessions and adopt self-critical attitudes in acute

national questions. Exactly the opposite happened: Confrontation, an attempt to find out who is most to blame. There is a current expression: I am first a representative of a given nation, and only then a Communist. People with such non-Marxist world philosophy cannot be called Communists and cannot solve the most complex questions of interethnic relations.

V.G. Afanasyev: I assume that all who are present here think the same. I am certain that this conversation will prove useful. True enough, we did not touch on all the questions set for discussion. Never mind, let us leave them for the next meeting.

The sphere of interethnic relations is so complex that, as we get deeper into it we constantly encounter more and more new aspects: Politics, the social or legal sphere, ecology, demography, and finally culture, language, sports....

It seems to us that this experiment with a heart-to-heart and open round-table discussion on national problems will encourage our readers and scientists to apply to participate in the next conversation. We await your suggestions, comrades.

Agenda Changes for Lithuanian Supreme Soviet
LD2810215988 Vilnius in English to North America
2300 GMT 26 Oct 88

[Summary] The ordinary sitting of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has introduced substantial changes in the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session which is to be held in the second half of November.

The agenda was announced in advance and it was planned to adopt next year's plan for economic and social development, to approve the budget, and to confirm the Lithuanian language as the state language in Lithuania's territory.

However, the developments of the past few days, namely the change in the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee leadership and the Congress of Sajudis, the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, have considerably accelerated the course of events in general.

Thus, during its recent sitting, the Supreme Soviet Presidium commissioned the corresponding subcommittees to work out draft laws concerning the new state flag, anthem, and emblem of Lithuania. The draft constitution approved by Sajudis and elaborated by the Academy of Sciences provides that the state emblem shall be the image of a white warrior on horseback against a red background. The state flag is the national tricolor; and the national anthem is the national song by Vincas Kudirka.

There also issues which had been dropped from the agenda. One of these is the notorious decree concerning meetings and rallies and restrictions in organizing them. The decree was adopted by the Supreme Soviet Presidium and was rejected by the public as unconstitutional.

The Ministry of Justice and other state departments are commissioned to work out a draft variant of the corresponding act taking into consideration the proposals of the public. The same institutions are charged with the elaboration of the draft law on citizenship and referendum.

Another decision to restructure the apparatus of the Presidium itself was adopted. The apparatus will be reduced by one-fourth.

A joint committee of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers will be set up with the task of investigating the events which took place in Rainiai settlement, Telsiai Rayon, in 1941. There is evidence that over 70 prisoners from Telsiai were cruelly murdered in the Rainiai grove by Soviet activists as the troops were withdrawing because of the attacks of the Nazi armed forces.

A kolkhoz in the Telsiai Rayon was named after one of those activists as well as a street in Telsiai. People refused to live in the kolkhoz and the street with this name. The street and the farm was renamed.

The public demanded that the day for commemorating the dead, which is usually on All Saints' Day, be made a holiday.

The Lithuanian Council of Ministers has decided to transfer the day off from the next Saturday [29 October] to next Tuesday, 1 November.

Historic Anniversary Marked in Lithuania

LD2810213788 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 27 Oct 88

[Summary] Celebrations were held today at the Trakai Church of the Visitation of the Most Holy Virgin Mary to mark the 558th anniversary of the death of Vytautas the Great, grand duke of the Great Duchy of Lithuania.

The church was founded by Vytautas the Great in 1409. Priests came from various parishes in Lithuania to take part in the sacred mass, which was led by Prelate Algirdas Gutas, administrator of the Vilnius Archdiocese.

The national flag was consecrated during the mass. It was then taken by students of Trakai to Vytautas Street in Trakai. The procession followed the flag to Trakai Castle where it was placed on the gate tower.

Hundreds of people gathered for the occasion. The Trakai Sajudis group invited Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, to take part in the celebrations.

This was the first time that the anniversary of this historic figure was openly celebrated in postwar Soviet Lithuania.

Estonian Gorispolkom Resigns, Chairman Reelected

PM0211192388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 88 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS correspondent Ye. Kapov report: "Ispolkom Resigns"]

[Text] Estonian SSR—The entire Kohtla-Järve Gorispolkom has resigned.

A session of the city soviet discussed this question for 8 hours and throughout this time the city's inhabitants followed the course of the debate on local radio.

A conflict arose several months ago between V. Loydap, the young chairman of the gorispolkom, and his deputies, who tried in every possible way to thwart his determined struggle against certain dishonest staffers of the gorispolkom apparatus. Instead of attending to the city's problems, they concentrated all their efforts on attempts to compromise the gorispolkom chairman.

In these circumstances V. Loydap addressed to a session of the city soviet the request to release him from his post. However, the deputies did not accept his resignation. A new ispolkom was formed at the session and V. Loydap has been reelected its chairman.

"It seems to me," TASS was told by Ayn Soydlä, first deputy chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, who attended the session, "that both the decision of the gorispolkom and the decision of the session are completely natural phenomena in our time. I believe that this is the only way when people find that they cannot work effectively. However, the present session of the city soviet is noteworthy because, while discussing an organizational question, as it were, the deputies in fact examined a wide range of the city's characteristic and very pressing problems. They included the need to improve the ecological situation, the provision of amenities, and the housing question—in short, everything that the new gorispolkom will have to attend to."

New Election System 'Functioning Normally'

LD3110145688 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 31 Oct 88

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—The draft new Soviet election system, still discussed before being put to consideration by the Soviet parliament in November, has

been tested in practice. This happened last Sunday [30 October] in Lyubertsy, a town near Moscow, during a second voting at the election into the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

The election was needed to fill a vacancy formed by the departure of a deputy. However, when the voting took place a week ago it turned out that none of the three candidates had collected the required majority. The existing legislation has no relevant provisions. Therefore, the district election commission ordered a second voting in keeping with the draft law on elections of people's deputies of the USSR. This time the bulletins carried the names of only two candidates who received the highest number of votes last time.

The second voting breathed new life into the campaign as meetings and discussions were held at clubs and enterprises this time by two candidates. Campaign activists pasted posters with calls to the voters. The campaign was covered by the local newspaper LYUBERETSKAYA PRAVDA and the city radio.

The election was won by 50-year-old Sergey Mikheyev, the chief designer of one of the enterprises, who gained 61 per cent of votes. His victory comes as no surprise because during the first voting Mikheyev left his opponents far behind. This means that the election mechanism, proposed in the draft law and being currently discussed nationwide, is functioning normally.

Azerbaijan Central Committee Reviews Media Role
NC0211080488 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
1700 GMT 29 Oct 88

[Text] The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee meeting discussed the increasing tasks of the republic's mass media organs in light of the increased openness and democratization of society. Editors of the republic's provincial, city, and rayon newspapers; special correspondents for the central newspapers; and leading officials of the radio and television network and information agencies participated in the meeting.

Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, analyzed the work recently done by the republic's press organs. He also noted that reporting on work in the agricultural field and preparations made for the plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on the question of constructing housing facilities was very essential.

Vezirov discussed in depth the main directions of work by the press organs in light of the new stage of the course of reconstruction. He noted that matters related to the accounting and election procedures in party meetings, the work of the soviets concerning the broadening of openness and further democratization of society, the

consolidation of discipline and law and order in production, [words indistinct] the more active participation of women in reconstruction procedures, and the development of ethnic relations should be deeply and consistently discussed.

Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov also referred to the important directions of the work carried out by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, detailed the problems concerning the further development of the Republic's economy, and replied to questions put to him by journalists.

Ratib Zeynalov, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the meeting.

Armenian Deputy Speaks at Supreme Soviet
NC3110123488 *Yerevan International Service*
in Armenian 1630 GMT 30 Oct 88

[Text] The newspapers report on the speech delivered by Martirosyan, representative of the Armenian SSR and deputy of the Zeytun constituency, at the 11th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet's 11th convocation. Martirosyan spoke about the success achieved and (?problems faced) [words indistinct] in our republic's economic, social, and cultural fields.

Referring to the recent incidents in Armenia, the deputy said: The (?just resolution) of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] issue has become the focus of attention for all the republic's residents, (?overshadowing) all other issues.

The party and government decisions on the acceleration of the NKAO's social and economic development and the dispatch to the autonomous oblast of the representative of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium were received with gratitude in the republic, and great value was attached to the activities of the commission on inter-ethnic affairs, headed by Avgust Voss, in the NKAO and Yerevan.

The Soviet people will always remember the February 1988 incidents in Sumgait and the September 1988 (?criminal acts) in Khodzheyli village in the Azerbaijan SSR where, during mass disorders organized by hostile elements, completely innocent people—Armenians—were killed and (?wounded). Sumgait has remained in the hearts of the Armenian workers as a (?deep wound). The trial of those responsible for the tragedy has started at the USSR supreme court in Moscow. But the most (?severe) punishment should be [word indistinct] suffered by those who organized these [words indistinct]. (?It is hoped) that they will be tried and receive the punishment they deserve.

I would like to re-emphasize that a constructive, political and, ultimately, just solution of the NKAO issue that takes the will of the oblast's Armenian residents into account (?could ease the tension) in the oblast and

normalize life in Azerbaijan and Armenia, (?leading to the) [word indistinct] of the Leninist principles of ethnic policy. This is what the great task of reconstruction (?calls on us to do), he concluded.

Georgian Premier Gives Supreme Soviet Speech

PM0311103188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Oct 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Abbreviated account of "Speech by Deputy O.Ye. Cherkeziya of Tbilisskiy-Ordzhonikidzevskiy Electoral Okrug, Georgian SSR," chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, at 27 October 1988 Afternoon Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union in the Great Kremlin Palace, Moscow]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies!

According to the draft state plan for 1989, the republic's national income will increase by 5 percent and the volume of industrial output by 5.1 percent. And even though the republic will not reach the parameters envisaged by the 5-year plan according to the results of the 1st 4 years, these, comrades, are the highest indicators being marked up by us during the 12th 5-Year Plan period. This will enable us to come very close to the frontiers mapped by the 5-year plan. It cannot be denied that the task is far from simple, but the republic can solve it.

Of course, by no means everything depends only on us. Approximately 40 percent of the republic's national income is created in the agro-industrial complex, and its economic dynamism depends on the solution of questions arising in this sector.

Georgia's working people welcomed with gratification the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on urgent measures to accelerate the revival of the former glory of Georgian tea growing. Thanks to the measures which have been adopted, the volumes of picked and processed leaf tea have already—during this year—been stabilized, the questions of improving purchase and wholesale prices were resolved, and a new economic mechanism was created providing incentives for high-quality tea production. I would venture to say that Georgian tea from this year's harvest will be of considerably better quality than the tea from the previous decade.

But we are alarmed by the fact that union ministries ignore the demands of this resolution as regards the development and manufacture of new types of machines and equipment. Nor has there been any solution to the question of appropriating in 1989 the capital investment sums envisaged by this directive document for the development of the tea industry and the reclamation of land for new plantations. We ask the USSR Gosplan to look further into this question.

There is something else. With the expansion of the cooperative system and the introduction of lease contracts everywhere, agriculture has developed an acute need for modern small-scale agricultural equipment. It is well known that the creation of capacities for the series manufacture of power units and small tractors in Kutaisi has been going on for a long time now. Capacities for power units have virtually been already created and Georgia will manufacture up to 10,000 units in 1989, but the target for the commissioning of capacities for small tractors has already been wrecked. To this day the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building has not only failed to allocate the funds necessary for the acceleration of construction work, but has not even approved the plan for the facility's reconstruction. We would ask the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building to take the necessary measures to ensure fulfillment of the USSR Government's targets on this question.

I have to draw the session's attention to the acute problem of balancing the population's monetary income and expenditure. The specific nature of the orientation of Georgia's production specialization within the union-wide division of labor is such that the republic supplies consumer goods worth R1.2 billion more than it receives from other regions in the country. Moreover, outward shipments of fast-selling agricultural produce and food-stuffs in great demand by purchasers are 2-2.5 times higher than inward shipments.

These facts have an extremely negative effect on the processes of money circulation in the republic, since earnings from the sale of commodities supplied by Georgia circulate in other regions of the country.

Comrade deputies! I would like to draw your attention to a key problem whose solution will largely determine the fate of our plans and our set pace of acceleration. The issue concerns the need to immediately bring under a common denominator the entire system of transition period reforms as regards the legal regulation of mutual relations between ministries and labor collectives at regional level. Today this is the sector where the main factors which apply the brakes on restructuring are concentrated because, in practice, the operation of the ossified collection of departmental instructions and of forms and methods of leadership often prevails over the USSR "Law on the State Enterprise (Association)" and the fundamental party and government decisions on new approaches toward the national economy's development. Look no further than the practice of planning financial and economic indicators. Subjectivism, willful decisions, and consumerist attitudes are still prevalent here, while the economic levers providing incentives for enterprises are ignored.

For example, how is the "Gruzrybprom" Association to function efficiently in the new conditions if the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry assigns it a wittingly inflated profits plan? And yet this indicator is the main

source for the labor collective's payments into the state budget and for the formation of its funds for economic and social development. But the association's normatives for deductions into state funds are based on proportions whereby the Sukhumi fighting combine, for example, pays virtually its total profit of R5 million into the state budget. Other "Gruzrybprom" subdivisions are in a similar position.

I am certain that the combination of utmost union republic independence with the unconditional performance of tasks of unionwide importance will significantly enhance their prestige and responsibility for the prosperity of their own people, and of the whole country, and will cement the country's truly fraternal internationalism.

Zaykov, Ligachev Visit Meat, Dairy Industry
LD0111222588 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 1 Nov 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] For 4 days Comrades Zaykov and Ligachev have been studying in detail the work of Moscow's meat and dairy industry, which is a major national economy complex. The annual volume of sold production here exceeds R1.5 billion. The enterprises annually produce some 500,000 tonnes of meat and sausages, and 2.3 million tonnes of milk, cottage cheese, cultured cream, and other valuable produce. On-the-spot analysis was carried out of progress in implementing the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on strengthening the material and technical base of Moscow's processing enterprises, their technical refurbishment, and raising the production and quality of meat and dairy products.

Comrades Zaykov and Ligachev visited a number of dairy and meat-processing combines and works, including some under construction. While meeting workers and specialists on the shop floor they were interested in their working conditions, the state of production welfare, mastery of progressive forms of work organization and incentives, contracting and leasing, and intra-enterprise financial autonomy. Great attention was paid to activity by primary party organizations and labor collective councils and to increasing their role in developing democracy and glasnost, enterprise management, strengthening production discipline, and solving social issues.

Meetings of party and economic aktivs were held on the results of the visit, and the sector's production association leaders, labor collective council chairmen, chairmen of Moscow and Moscow Oblast agro-industrial committees, and heads of departments spoke at the meetings. Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov addressed the meetings. The results of the discussions were summed up by Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev.

Also examining these issues were: Moscow Obkom First Secretary Comrade Mesyats; USSR Automotive Industry Minister Comrade Pugan; USSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman Comrade Paskar; and Moscow Gorispolkom Chairman Comrade Saykin.

The press will publish an account of the visit to Moscow enterprises and party and economic aktivs.

Alcohol-Related Road Accidents Rise Sharply
LD0211193988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Excerpt] We all know about the great importance attached to the struggle against such a shameful phenomenon as drunkenness. The decision of the CPSU Central Committee on that issue, which was published the other day, mentioned quite a few shortcomings in this work. It stressed, specifically, that in many places, an atmosphere of public condemnation was not being created around drunkards. It emphasized further that a particularly disturbing situation was taking shape in railway and motorway transport. Militia Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Dmitriyevich Sorokin, specialist on traffic safety and a journalist, is in our studio. He will share his thoughts on measures aimed at preventing alcohol-induced road accidents.

[Sorokin] Recently, an utterly tense, maybe even catastrophic, situation has arisen with road accidents caused by drunk drivers. Believe me, I am not exaggerating. This is simply how things really are today with traffic safety. The loss of life and material damage caused by drunk drivers are truly enormous. Over the last 9 months, they have caused over 34,000 road accidents, resulting in 6,500 deaths and nearly 40,000 injuries. Compared to the same period last year, the total number of similar accidents has increased by nearly 10 percent, the number of deaths by over 13 percent, and the number of injuries by over 10 percent. A rise in alcohol-related road accidents has been registered in four union republics and in 59 ASSR's, krais, and oblasts of the Russian Federation. In fact, we have not seen such an increase in road accidents and casualties caused by drunk drivers for a long time. [passage omitted]

Economic

Kazakhstan Plenum Discusses Food Supply
LD0211140488 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 1 Nov 88

[Text] Today at a Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee plenum, the participants discussed the republican party organization's tasks in further improving food supplies to the population in light of the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Having noted the positive improvements in this matter, the plenum participants expressed serious anxiety over the

fact that a great lag had been allowed to develop behind the food program target for the production of grain, potatoes, vegetables, and fruits. A decision was adopted on this question.

The plenum also adopted a decision to form within the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee a commission on the reorganization of the republic party bodies apparatus.

Kolbin, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee, delivered a speech at the plenum.

Management Improvement Seen

LD0211180988 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0955 GMT 2 Nov 88

[Text] Alma-Ata, 2 November (TASS)—Supplies of foodstuffs to towns and villages is improving noticeably in Kazakhstan. During 1986-87, the annual consumption of meat per capita in this central Asian republic increased by 6 kg, that of milk by 31 kg and of fruit and berries by 11 kg. These statistics were made public at the plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee, which took place here on 1 November.

It was noted at the plenum that changes for the better had proven to be possible mainly due to a transition to new methods of management. "Wide-ranging opportunities have opened up for enterprising, thrifty, and industrious people," the rapporteur, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Gennadiy Kolbin, noted. "Over the past 2 years restrictions on the number of cattle in private farms have been lifted and the leasing of land and machinery for extended periods of up to 50 years has been permitted. This year around 2,000 state and collective farms (90.3 percent of all of the republic's farms) began to use various forms of contracting and leasing. Work has begun on transferring all enterprises of the agro-industrial complex to full financial autonomy, self-financing and self-recoupment by 1 January 1989."

Kazakhstan's party organization is now resolutely freeing itself of unenterprising, incompetent leaders who cannot free themselves of the "hypnosis of obsolete instructions." The Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party has made party leaders of oblasts, towns, and rayons of the republic personally responsible for the uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs to the population.

62 Cooperatives Form 'Rossiya' Association

LD0311170588 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Sixty-two Soviet cooperatives have formed an association, 'Rossiya' ('Russia'), to protect themselves against what they term as hostility on the part of the population and local governing bodies, the newspaper IZVESTIYA reported today.

The government daily admitted that cooperators were unjustifiably seen by many in the country as 'swindlers robbing the state.'

The first form of defence is through legal aid. Another one is establishing a cooperative bank that will provide credits for cooperative societies.

The association would enjoy full economic freedom and all cooperatives within it would retain independence, the paper said.

There will be no interference in economic and financial activity, all ties will be on a commercial basis. Legal aid will be provided by a law cooperative, also a member of the association.

The bank will give credits on usual terms. Rossiya is planning to set up a foreign economic cooperative that will help on a commercial basis each member of the association to sell its goods abroad and import everything it needs.

A paid school of managers will shortly open under the association's umbrella. It will provide tuition in the theory and practice of market economy. Rossiya's charter envisages the establishment of insurance societies and organization of wholesale trade in means of production.

Scientific

AN-74 Turbjet To Tour Foreign Antarctic Bases

PM3'10153788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Oct 88 Morning Edition p 6

[V. Belikov report on interview with Ye. Korotkevich, deputy director of the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute, by Belikov under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Antarctica Subject to Inspection"; date, place of interview not given]

[Excerpt] The new AN-74 turbjet, which was specially built for flights to the polar regions, is setting out for the Southern Hemisphere for the first time on 28 October. On the icebound continent its work will begin by servicing a group of Soviet specialists who are to conduct an inspection of scientific stations in the Antarctic.

The international treaty on the Antarctic concluded in December 1959 foresees the possibility of conducting inspection visits and checks. This will be the first time that Soviet researchers have completed this familiarization tour of their neighbors across the sixth continent.

Ye. Korotkevich, deputy director of the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute, who is participating in the inspection expedition, says:

"The group of Soviet specialists headed by A. Chilingarov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, will analyze the way the scientific observation methods and the possibilities of the apparatus used by expeditions from other countries accord with their conclusions in their proceedings and reports. The exchange of experience, setting up of contacts, and determining of spheres of further joint work will be very significant. In particular, only combined efforts can really reveal the mechanism which gave rise to the 'ozone hole' and the most effective methods of eliminating it."

[Belikov] "Does the Soviet inspection group plan to visit foreign stations?"

[Korotkevich] "There is a provisional plan, but Antarctica can alter any plans. After arriving in the South Shetland Islands off Tierra del Fuego, where our Bellingshausen station is located, we will be traveling by helicopter to other countries' scientific settlements located nearby. Then a flight to Novolazarevskaya Station, and from there to the airstrip at Molodezhnaya—the main base of Soviet Antarctic expeditions. The routes to various corners of the continent using an AN-74 equipped with wheel landing gear and an IL-14 equipped with skis will begin from here.

"We are also counting on utilizing U.S. air transport when visiting the U.S. Amundsen-Scott station at the South Pole and when flying from their McMurdo Station to New Zealand. The program of our 40-day expedition will also include a visit to Christchurch on the homeward journey to see the New Zealand institute concerned with Antarctic questions, and a business visit on the way to the icebound continent to our Argentinian colleagues and scientists in Buenos Aires." [passage omitted]

Jet Leaves Kiev 2 Nov

LD0311100288 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 2 Nov 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] A new AN-74 turbojet flew from Kiev to Antarctica today. [video shows the aircraft taxiing on a runway, then shows a group of people standing next to it] The AN-74, a cargo and passenger aircraft, was developed especially for working in extreme conditions. It is equipped with the latest radio navigation equipment, is capable of taking off and landing on any kind of airfield, is able to fly at a good speed and for long distances, has a substantial climbing capacity, and is able to carry a considerable payload. The AN-74 has established world records in many of these areas. Its best qualities were demonstrated to the fullest extent during the tests and work in the Arctic. Now the polar workers in Antarctica are awaiting this aircraft. [video shows a group of people boarding the aircraft]

Team leader A.T. Romanyuk [identified by screen caption] says that the team has three objectives: to provide aviation assistance to the 34th Antarctic expedition; to report to the State Commission for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control for the inspection of scientific bases in Antarctica, including the foreign bases; and to assess the use of the AN-74 in its (?wheeled) version, crew commander version. V.G. Lysenkov [identified by screen caption] says that the aircraft will cover a distance of 17,000 km. [video shows the party assembled in front of the aircraft, then the aircraft's takeoff]

Mission of Airliner Detailed

LD0311100388 Moscow TASS in English 0835 GMT
3 Nov 88

[Text] Kiev November 3 TASS—The new Soviet turbojet AN-74 air liner left Kiev, the Ukraine, on November 2 for its farthest, 17,000 kilometre long flight. Its route will run through Italy, Cape Verde Islands, Brazil and Argentina to the Soviet scientific station "Bellingshausen" in the Antarctica.

In Buenos Aires the air liner will take aboard a group of Soviet specialists who will participate for the first time in inspection of scientific stations located on the sixth continent. This is provided for by the International Treaty on the Antarctica, which was concluded in 1959. The treaty disallows any military measures there by any state. The inspection will also make it possible to assess how efficient are environmental protection measures which are being taken.

The AN-74, which has recently been put into serial production, is in for a stern trial in extreme conditions. The crew were preparing for the flight by a special schedule, checked the plane in the Arctic. The AN-74 brought expeditions to the Severnaya Zemlya, cargoes for polar explorers to the Taimyr Peninsula and Yakutiya, made landings on drifting ice in the Arctic Ocean.

The Soviet station "Molodyozhnaya" will be the main base for the AN-74 in Antarctica. From there pilots will make approximately 200 flights. It is planned to visit the Antarctic bases of Austria, Argentina, the GDR, the People's Republic of China, New Zealand, Japan and other countries. The AN-74 is planned to land in the geographical point of the South Pole—the U.S. scientific station "Amundsen-Scott."

New Polar Freight Delivery Method Noted

PM0311095588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Oct 88 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Deryabin: "Ekspark" Looks into the Future"]

[Text] This spring I visited the SP-29—a drifting scientific research station in the Arctic Ocean. I remember that I started to talk with the polar research winterers about how journalists are rare guests at these latitudes.

And they are not to blame. Every helicopter and aircraft is loaded to the gunwales, as they say, with food and equipment. A replacement of specialists is needed. The solution of many problems lies in the activity of "Ekspark" (arctic parachute expedition), which has been led since 1984 by A. Sidorenko, an Honored Master of Sport of the USSR.

In the period from 1984 through 1988, a news conference at the State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation devoted to "Ekspark's" problems noted that there have been 35 aircraft flights to the SP-26, SP-27, SP-28, and SP-29 drifting stations and polar stations on Vize and Uyedineniya Islands. Over 450 tonnes of freight have been dropped with the aid of parachute systems. Considerable economic savings have been effected with the use of aviation parachute technology. During work in the Arctic in April 1988 the savings were over R4.5 million. And in terms of promptness, the delivery of freight by IL-76MD aircraft exceeds previous delivery times over 35 times. Scientific and technical research and developments to improve aviation parachute technology and the dropping of freight were carried out under the leadership of V. Smykov, deputy director of the State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation; N. Talikov, deputy chief designer of the S. Ilyushin experimental design bureau; N. Selivanov, doctor of technical sciences; and D. Akhmetdzyanov, a navigator. A large contribution to the organization and execution of aviation parachute expeditions was made by Yu. Izrael, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology; his deputy, A. Chilingarov; A. Volkov, USSR minister of civil aviation; Academician Yu. Ryzhov, rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute; Academician G. Novozhilov, general designer at the S. Ilyushin experimental design bureau, and others.

"Ekspark" is now looking into the future, with the hope that the method proposed by the parachute sportsmen and providing a substantial savings of time and money will finally be put on an industrial footing and be successfully developed and improved.

Isaak Khalatnikov on Problems of Science
PM2810125288 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian
23 Oct 88 pp 231-2

[Interview with Isaak Khalatnikov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by Daniela Minerva in Rome—date not given]

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted] [Minerva] Professor Khalatnikov, Gorbachev himself has observed that in the Soviet Union the road from a scientific discovery to its introduction into production is too long. Why is this?

[Khalatnikov] The government sometimes expects from us solutions that lie outside our sphere of responsibility. The fact that the Soviet Union produces six times as many tractors as the United States, but that they are of

very poor quality, do not work, break down immediately, and so on is not our concern because it is a technological problem. The Academy of Sciences is an organization devoted exclusively to pure research.

[Minerva] So whose concern is it?

[Khalatnikov] It is the concern of the very numerous and very generously financed industrial laboratories answerable to the various ministries. For instance, the Transport Industry should deal with this matter of the tractors.

[Minerva] Why do you say "very generously financed"? How are research funds divided in the USSR?

[Khalatnikov] Roughly speaking, I would say that 5 percent goes to the Academy of Sciences, which conducts basic research. Some 15 percent goes to the universities and the remaining 80 percent to industrial laboratories managed by the various ministries, which should deal with the transfer of our scientific discoveries to the production apparatus, in other words, with technology.

[Minerva] In his book, "Perestroika," Gorbachev openly discusses the crisis of Russian technology and talks explicitly about "targeted programs to encourage labor collectives and scientists to work creatively." What changes are taking place in practice?

[Khalatnikov] A successful attempt is being made to introduce a system very popular in the West—economic recognition for results achieved. The industrial laboratories must be in a position to finance themselves by selling their products to factories, which are in turn responsible for the efficiency and economic viability of the innovations introduced. Believe me—and this is not because I am an academician—but the problems lie in the ministries' management of the industrial laboratories, not in the Academy, whose excellent scientific activity is clear to all and which receives constant international recognition, but which cannot finance itself since it produces basic research.

[Minerva] Nevertheless Vitaliy Ginzburg has spoken unambiguously in OGONEK about the bureaucracy that is stifling the Academy of Sciences, and Gorbachev himself has appealed for more openness and flexibility from scientists. What is being done to combat bureaucracy?

[Khalatnikov] The anecdote about the photocopies [reference to Ginzburg's OGONEK account of his experience of the ease of obtaining them in the United States] is frankly rather weak. At the institute that I direct, anyone can make as many photocopies as they want, whenever they want. The real problem is that some institutes within the Academy are too large to be efficient. For instance, the Lebedev Physics Institute or the Semenov Physical Chemistry Institute, which employ hundreds of scientists, are so huge that their scientific

output and administrative problems escape the directors' supervision. Every program goes its own way and the administrative management inevitably becomes complicated and bureaucratic. What we are trying to do at present is to dismember these mammoths into smaller institutes employing no more than 200 people, whose activities can be coordinated by their directors. Then you will see that photocopies are no longer a problem for anyone. In any case they are not a serious problem even now.

[Minerva] So what are the serious problems?

[Khalatnikov] For instance, the fact that many institutes and universities, especially in the provinces, lack enough foreign currency to pay for their subscriptions to journals. How can you conduct research without journals? The entire data apparatus is extremely unsatisfactory: Even the Soviet journals circulate slowly. The information system functions poorly. Laboratory equipment is often old and obsolete and new equipment must be purchased. If restructuring releases a substantial amount of money from the grasp of the military, life will be different, and so will science.

[Minerva] However, the difficulties of Soviet science and technology seem to be disappearing all of a sudden from the space sector, where there is a surprising rapport between aeronautics and basic research. It is possible to believe that this is the only field where the vast military financing has any civilian spinoffs. Why is this?

[Khalatnikov] I myself am very surprised by the successes of the space program. I often wonder what there is there that is lacking elsewhere. I believe it has to do with tradition. It is rather like the ballet. Everyone tries to equal the Russian ballet, employing vast resources and excellent artists, but nobody succeeds. You have to have it in your blood, and the same applies to space.

Military

Moscow Military Chief's Order for 7 Nov Parade

PM0211191188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Nov 88 First Edition p 4

[Moscow City Garrison Chief Order No 11 on 7 November Troop Parade]

[Text] Moscow City Garrison Chief Order No 11, Moscow, 31 October 1988

On the 7 November 1988 troop parade:

1. To mark the 71st anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution a parade of Moscow Garrison troops is to be held in Moscow on Red Square at 1000 hours.

Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, will review the parade.

I have been instructed to command the parade.

2. Commanders of combined units and units are instructed to dispatch guides and to line up the approved detail of troops for the parade at the set time.

Type of clothing—winter dress uniform, service caps.

3. Major General G.D. Bashkin, Moscow Kremlin commandant, will carry out the gun salute according to instructions issued by me.

4. I entrust Maj Gen N.N. Smirnov, Moscow City military commandant, with the overall leadership of maintaining order in Red Square.

Army Gen K. Kochetov, chief of the Moscow City Garrison, commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District

Deputy Chiefs Confer on Military Legislation

PM0111151788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Oct 88 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "On Military Legislation"]

[Text] A scientific theory conference has taken place devoted to improving military legislation in the light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union party conference. The conference was held by the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the USSR Defense Ministry Administration of Affairs, and the USSR Defense Ministry Military Institute. Taking part were legal specialists and representatives of the main staffs and political directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces and a number of main and central administrations and central military press organs.

The report at the conference was delivered by Colonel General M. Gareyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. Coreports were delivered by Lieutenant General N. Shapalin, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate propaganda and administration directorate, and Justice Major General L. Zaika, first deputy chief military prosecutor.

The discussion centered on questions connected with the drafts of the law on the defense of the USSR and other normative acts. It was noted that military legislation should be improved in close connection with the processes taking place in the life of society and should reflect new trends in the development and training of the Armed Forces and elaborate the legal backup for democracy under the conditions of the Army and Navy and social protection for servicemen. The need was emphasized to assert a practice whereby the legal acts which are being prepared are comprehensively discussed by a wide range of competent people and in the military collectives.

